Status quo prevails. A Tennessee update

I am still Roadshowing this week, among other things, so I will again offer some content but with a caveat about its brevity.  (And, again, if you are sitting in a highly-entertained crowd looking for the embedded Spotify playlist just keep scrolling and you’ll find it.)

In the before time, the long, long-ago at this space (right before Xmas 2016 actually), I previously mentioned how Tennessee is a jurisdiction that does not toll the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions based on the continuing representation of counsel.  When I did so, I managed to offer a contradictory take from the “Hot List” folks in Tennessee in terms of predicting how the Tennessee Supreme Court would rule in the Story v. Bunstine case.  (Admittedly though, I did flagrantly misspell Bunstine in the process back then.)

For the uninitiated, that whole “continuous representation” concept of tolling  just means that the mere fact that a lawyer continues to represent a client does not mean that the client’s time frame for filing suit over alleged legal malpractice does not start running.  For more than 20 years in Tennessee, the way we have dealt with the accrual of the cause of action involves application of the widely-familiar “discovery rule” approach.

For more than 20 years, our state has also operated under guidance providing that, if for some reason [for example, the potential that a mistake or misstep in the underlying action might be fixable and, thus, what seems like a very damaging outcome in the present could be the kind of situation in the future that everyone involved might laugh about] it is awkward to pursue the legal malpractice lawsuit while the lawyer is still trying to remedy the error, then the manner of addressing the situation is to file the legal malpractice action in a timely fashion (within 1 year of the problem) and ask the Court to stay that lawsuit until the underlying suit is completed.

Yesterday, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled in Story v. Bunstine in which the plaintiff’s counsel explicitly asked the Court to undo that long-settled approach in favor of either the tolling for continuous representation or even the “appeal tolling” doctrine.  I am happy to report in this space that the Court — in a very well-written and thorough opinion, rejected those calls for change and re-affirmed the status quo as to accrual of a cause of action for legal malpractice.

If I had to pick one portion to be the simplest portion of Justice Page’s opinion for the Court that drives home what matters, I’d go with this one:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that our formulation of the discovery rule articulated in Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1995), and again in John Kohl &
Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1998), remains the appropriate analysis for determining when a claim of legal malpractice accrues. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the two tolling doctrines proposed by Plaintiffs—the continuing
representation rule and the appeal-tolling doctrine—and also decline to hold that a final judgment is required before there is an actual injury for purposes of accrual.

You can read the full opinion, should you so desire, at the link set out above.

Friday follow up – TIKD off by a DQ motion and the Supremes won’t stop suspending the wrong lawyers.

In the middle of Roadshowing (short break until the next stops next week) and also still trying to handle client matters to boot, so this will be a quick post.

(If you are here next week looking for the Roadshow playlist, just keep scrolling down as it can be found in the post immediately below this one.)

The dustup between the smartphone app known as TIKD and the Florida Bar has been back in the news in the legal trades recently over a motion to disqualify TIKD’s counsel filed by the Florida Bar.

On its face, it sounds like a pretty decent disqualification motion on the merits as the Florida Bar is alleging that TIKD’s counsel who is a former Florida Bar president had access during his term in office to internal information evaluating the Florida Bar’s antitrust liability exposure given its structure in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in an antitrust suit against the board that regulates dentistry in North Carolina.  (You might recall that I wrote a bit about that in the past as well as it is that case that has revived interest in, and concerns about, antitrust issues for the regulation of the practice of law in unified bar/mandatory bar jurisdictions.)  That would seem like a slam-dunk in terms of disqualification if that person had been a former General Counsel or otherwise a lawyer for the Florida Bar, but the analysis may be a lot murkier if, as is the case generally of bar presidents, that the president of the Florida Bar is always a lawyer but isn’t necessarily acting as a lawyer for the organization during the term of office.

Oh, and speaking of the U.S. Supreme Court, I wrote a bit earlier this year (as many other people did) about the weirdness associated with the fact that the United States Supreme Court made the very unfortunate mistake of suspending the wrong attorney – confusing one lawyer named Christopher P. Sullivan for another lawyer named Christopher P. Sullivan.  At the time, I tried to make discussing the circumstances a bit more worthwhile substantively and not just anact of piling-on by citing that epic mistake by the highest court in the land as maybe the ultimate example of the need for people in our profession to be deliberate in their actions and take their time because what we do can have real consequences for us and for others.

As is of course true for literally billions of other people on the planet, the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court is not a dedicated reader of this space (or didn’t take heed of that message) as a new story came to light a week or so ago of pretty much the same thing happening again with the Court suspending a lawyer named Jim Robbins instead of a lawyer named James A. Robbins.  (Even more coincidentally, the Sullivan who was wrongly suspended earlier in 2017 practiced law with a firm called Robins Kaplan.)

Actually, to say that pretty much the same thing happened isn’t quite right, as the James A. Robbins that deserved to be suspended wasn’t actually a member of the U.S. Supreme Court bar at all.

I’ve been fortunate enough to have been admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court since December 2008 and even more fortunately it appears to be an admittee with a name, Brian S. Faughnan, that seems highly unlikely to be duplicated on (or off) its rolls.

I Dowd that very much.

Last week was a pretty eventful week in the area where politics and the law overlaps, and an initially bizarre turn of events that was made more bizarre by subsequent claims injected some questions of legal ethics into events on the national stage again.

What I’m talking about is all stuff you’ve likely already read about.  In short story form, it goes like this: the news of the guilty plea of former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn for lying to the FBI, followed shortly thereafter by an incredibly-unwise-seeming Tweet by the current occupant of The White House that was quickly discussed by others on-line as amount to direct incriminating evidence of obstruction of justice by that current occupant, followed then by claims that the current occupant of The White House didn’t actually write that Tweet and that, instead, the Tweet was drafted by one the current occupant of The White House’s personal lawyers, John Dowd.

Now, what do I believe in my heart of hearts happened.  That’s easy.  I’m a staunch believer in Occam’s Razor, so I believe that the same old man who has consistently, inappropriately used his Twitter account to say stupid things, spew vitriol, and retweet white supremacists and Islamiphobes tweeted something without thinking it through, and did so either without consulting with his counsel or simply with disregard for legal advice he was given about Tweeting about such things.  After that, I believe that one of his lawyers, fully recognizing just how problematic the contents of the Tweet were for his client, has decided to try to reduce the impact of the client’s admission by claiming that he was actually the author because that has, in turn, allowed him to claim to have been mistaken about what his client knew at various points in time.

I’m not writing this to claim to be the end-all-be-all on this line of reasoning actualy, but to address two things that I have seen others write about this situation that have bugged me.  Those sentiments are: (1) that it couldn’t have been written by the lawyer, Dowd, because the lawyer wouldn’t incorrectly say “pled” instead of “pleaded,” and (2) that if Dowd is lying about having been the one who wrote the Tweet then he ought to be disbarred.

I think both of those sentiments amount to hogwash.

As to the first one, I’m a lawyer – and I like to think I’m a fairly decent one – and I prefer to use “pled.”  I’ve seen people point to the AP Stylebook on “pleaded” versus “pled,” and I’m also well aware that Bryan Garner insists that “pleaded” is the proper usage.  Nevertheless, I fall into the camp of lawyers like the King & Spalding lawyer quoted back in this ABA Journal piece on its usage, who believe it is the better term to use to indicate the past tense verb form, and would certainly use it even in real-life writing.  It is not unfathomable that Dowd might fall into that camp as well.  Further, it is damn sure the better term to use on Twitter where character limits matter greatly.

As to the second one, there would definitely be an ethics violation or two (or three) for which Dowd could be charged with violating if he is lying about being the author of the Tweet in question in order to protect his client.  Nevertheless, to jump to the notion that the appropriate discipline for that would be disbarment is a bit silly.

A lawyer who would lie about the authorship of a client’s Tweet that could otherwise be an admission of a crime would run afoul of a couple of obvious rules, such as RPC 8.4(c) and RPC 4.1(a).  The ABA version of those rules respectively provide as follows:

Rule 8.4:  Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Rule 4.1: Truthfulness in Statements to Others

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.

The lawyer could also be subject to a charge of violationg RPC 7.1 which people often forget does not only apply to advertisements.  The ABA version of that rule provides:

Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning A Lawyer’s Services

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.

In this sort of context, an interesting question could be raised about whether the lawyer would also have violated RPC 3.4(a).  The ABA version of that rule provides:

Rule 3.4: Fairness to Opposing Part and Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully . . . alter . . . a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.

But, the idea that such an offense or offenses by Dowd would be punishable by disbarment is a bit silly.  A quick review online of publicly-available information shows that Dowd has never previously been the subject of any public discipline.  He’s been practicing for 50 years without even receiving a public censure.  Unless he managed to hire a lawyer to represent him who has been as sloppy as the lawyers folks associated with the current administration have hired to defend them, then I can’t imagine that outcome coming about if any disciplinary case were ever brought against him.

And, on that subject, given Dowd’s other missteps along the way in this high-profile setting, it weirdly is a bit more difficult to rule out the possibility that he actually was the one who exercised the poor judgment of creating the content of, and presumably even sending, that Tweet for his client.

Three-For-Tuesday.

Any old radio station in your town (most probably one playing “Classic Rock”) can provide you with a Two-For-Tuesday, but where else will you find a Three-For approach to this otherwise underrated day of the week?

First, I recently let you know that Tennessee was in play with a proposed version of RPC 8.4(g) to make harassing and discriminatory conduct related to the practice of law a violation of the ethics rules.  The Tennessee Supreme Court has put that joint petition out for public comment and has set a March 21, 2018 deadline for submissions.  So, by the time we know the outcome of the joint petition, you’ll have had the chance to go see two highly-anticipated film adaptations of very good books, A Wrinkle in Time, and Ready Player One.

Second, I’ve written recently about how rare lawsuits tend to be where a lawyer or law firm sues another lawyer or law firm over marketing activities.  There are lots of reasons that firms can tend to be reluctant to file such suits, but if you are looking for various objective indications of just how harshly competitive the marketplace for legal services is getting these days – and how much lawyers perceive their futures to be at risk – the fact that such suits seem to be happening with greater frequency is one such indicator.  Here is a link to the latest example where one advertising law firm has sued another over advertising firm over the design of billboards and whether those are serving to mislead consumers into confusion over which is which.

One of the billboards says “Injured?  Results You Deserve.”  The other says “Injured?  Don’t stand alone.”  Now, neither one of them are exactly fabulous exemplars of good marketing I guess.  I mean, you might see the first one and think, I’m kind of a shiftless person and I’m not sure the accident was anyone’s fault.  I’d rather not get the result I deserve.  And the other one might strike you as tone-deaf if you were so badly injured that you can’t stand at all.

Either way though, let me say this, there is a movie out in theaters now called Three Billboards, and I think a good third one to put out on this Massachusetts interstate would be one that reads:  “Injured?  Not by my billboard.”

Third, and speaking of advertising, based on this recent headline out of Ontario, it appears pretty clear that my words of wisdom and encouragement to a throng of Canadian lawyers suggesting they chill out about advertising issues was not a butterfly-flapping-its-wings-bringing-about-global-change kind of moment, but more akin to the impact that a butterfly makes on the windshield of a moving car.  In keeping with today’s theme, while it is incredibly untimely as far as movie recommendations go, it is still true to say that if someone is going to force you to watch an Ashton Kutcher film, The Butterfly Effect is your best option.

A short update on Avvo ratings

You may recall, a while back, that I kvetched a bit here about my belief that Avvo’s rating system was less than a bona fide system.  The primary focus of my argument centered on Avvo’s decision to assign numerical ratings to some lawyers even though those lawyers have never claimed their profiles.  I then spent a little bit of digital space picking some examples of lawyers that I considered to be exceedingly better than their ranking and that the such ratings would actually do a disservice not only to those lawyers – seeming to “punish” them for not claiming their profile – but also to consumers trying to use Avvo to make decisions about lawyers.  While admittedly not scientifically exhaustive, my research seemed to indicate that it was a rare lawyer who could get a rating at 7 or above without at least claiming their profile.

Well, I am pleased to report that Avvo has recently changed its approach and has now returned to offering only a non-numerical rating for most lawyers who have not claimed their Avvo profile.  Earlier this month, Avvo has changed its approach and, according to Avvo’s General Counsel, “most unclaimed lawyer profiles are now rated either ‘No Concern’ or ‘Attention’ (the latter for those with underlying Avvo Ratings below a 5).”

If you go back to look at that prior post, you will see that Avvo’s General Counsel, Josh King, was kind enough to share that information in a new Comment on that post last week, but knowing that not everyone goes back and reads old posts to find new comments I wanted to make sure to prominently note the change here.

Also, in light of this change, I can follow through with what I said in a comment to that earlier post in an exchange with Josh where I wrote:  “If Avvo only assigned numerical ratings to those who claim and participate, and limited itself to the “no concern” or “concern” approach to others, I would readily agree that it was a bona fide system in the way the rules contemplate.”

Now that they are back to that sort of approach, and consumers now can’t use numerical ratings to compare apples and oranges, I think I am left where I said I would be – readily agreeing that Avvo’s rating system is bona fide in the way the rules contemplate.

RPC 8.4(g) – Tennessee is in play

I’m pleased to report that, yesterday, a joint petition was filed by the Tennessee Bar Association and the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility asking the Tennessee Supreme Court to adopt an RPC 8.4(g) patterned after the ABA Model Rule.

As I’ve written here in the past, I’ve long been hopeful (not necessarily optimistic but certainly hopeful) that states like mine would take action to enshrine a prohibition on harassment and discrimination into our ethics rules.

You can read the petition filed yesterday by clicking on this link: (filed_tsc_rule_8_rpc_8.4_g .)  As you’ll see, in my capacity as Chair of the TBA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, I am one of the signatories on the petition.  I am certain that there will be some public comments filed in opposition to the petition, but I’d like to think that the fact that both the TBA and the BPR are behind this effort will make it more viable for the Court to grant the petition even in the face of some opposition.

More importantly, as a matter of principle, I think the petition is one that should be granted because the proposed rule is a good and necessary one.

We’ve made some very good additional revisions to the ABA Model Rule in our drafting process — additional revisions that even more clearly help delineate that the kind of conduct prohibited by this proposed rule is conduct that has no place in our profession but does not go so far as to infringe on important First Amendment rights of lawyers.

We made two prominent, and I think important, revisions in the new comment paragraphs that would elaborate on the new (g) provision.  Exhibit B to the petition offers a redline showing how what we have proposed differs from the language of the ABA Model Rule, but I will lay them out here because of the significance.

First, we have added the following final sentence to Comment [4]:

Legitimate advocacy protected by Section (g) includes advocacy in any conduct related to the practice of the law, including circumstances where a lawyer is not representing a client and outside traditional settings where a lawyer act as an advocate, such as litigation.

Second,  we have added a Comment [4a] not found in the Model Rule, that provides:

Section (g) does not restrict any speech or conduct not related to the practice of law, including speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment.  Thus, a lawyer’s speech or conduct unrelated to the practice of law cannot violate this Section.

I anticipate that our Court will likely put this proposed rule change out for public comment before the end of the year.

Something TIKD this way comes.

So, about a week ago, the Florida Bar and The Ticket Clinic (a Florida law firm that somehow can manage to keep the lights on by specializing in representing people regarding traffic tickets) were sued in federal district court by something called TIKD.  TIKD is, at heart, an app for your smart phone.

The lawsuit alleges that the bar and the law firm have combined to damage TIKD in its business endeavors in violation of antitrust law and other unfair competition law.  Others have already written a bit about this development, but I still cannot resist chiming in because, though the litigation will likely end up amounting to nothing truly impactful, the underlying substance (or lack thereof) of the area of law being battled over with potentially such high stakes for the profession could easily be made into the stuff of a dark fantasy novel.

While others have written about this new federal court lawsuit where TIKD is the plaintiff, and there is some decent media coverage of it at The Washington Post and in some Florida news outlets, I want to just flag for your attention the existence of another lawsuit in Florida involving TIKD, but that was brought against TIKD seven months earlier in state court by one of the defendants in the TIKD suit, The Ticket Clinic.

You can read that full lawsuit at this link.  The gist of it though is also one for unfair competition.  The law firm, Gold & Associates d/b/a as The Ticket Clinic sued TIKD and its two owners claiming TIKD engages in false and deceptive advertising and is itself engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  You can judge for yourself, but those particular claims to me seem dubious at best.  TIKD seems to do exactly what it advertises it will do and hires lawyers rather than tries to practice law.  But in the midst of those questionable claims, the suit still finds the nub of a true problem: unfair competition for lawyers trying to compete with (rather than work with) TIKD.

While it is the suit TIKD has filed pursuing the Florida Bar and The Ticket Clinic for antitrust violations that is currently getting all the media attention — folks who want to be “disruptors” in the legal industry are certainly using it as an opportunity to attack the entire concept of the regulation of the practice of law — the lawsuit filed by The Ticket Clinic as plaintiff forces a reader to think about the flip side of that problem by pointing out that what TIKD is doing to market its service, and convince people to use it, is making guarantees and promises that lawyers are prohibited from making under the ethics rules.

Specifically, paragraph 12 of the complaint points out a number of aspects of the TIKD business model that allow for unfair competition, which includes TIKD:

b) making guarantees to pay financial penalties imposed by courts and/or the “full cost of their ticket”;

[snip]

g) promising to “cover the full cost of your ticket no matter the price – even if the cost is higher than what you paid us;”

Paragraph 28 of the complaint further drives the point home:

In promising to pay a fine if they lose at no additional cost, TIKD, RILEY and BERTHOLD make a promise that a lawyer or law firm cannot possibly make, and they essentially “rob Peter (those persons whose cases are dismissed with no fine or court cost after
paying TIKD 75-80% of the fine stated in the citation) to pay Paul (those persons who are directed to pay the fine in full or greater, with costs)” which is a “house of cards” that will eventually fall, leaving clients with no remedy.

The story in The Washington Post also helpfully reinforces that these are important aspects of what makes TIKD a desirable service for which to pay:

TIKD, which launched in February, works this way in Florida: A driver who gets a traffic ticket can contact the company on a cellphone and be offered a one-time charge below the amount of the ticket. TIKD connects the driver with an independent attorney for no additional costs or fees, and the attorney handles the case without the driver having to appear in court.

If the ticket is not dismissed, TIKD pays any fines, and if the driver gets points on his or her license, TIKD will fully refund the one-time charge.

It is undeniably correct that the ethics rules would never let a lawyer make the same arrangements with a client.  It also seems pretty clear that without the ability to make those financial guarantees the app would lose pretty much all of its luster.  Thus, regardless of what you may think about the merits of any claim that The Florida Bar and The Ticket Clinic are engaged in some coordinated effort to hurt TIKD, it appears undeniably correct that there is a fundamentally unfair competitive advantage to being able to make the kind of financial guarantees that the app is making and which any lawyer would have to risk their license to match.

A reckoning in the legal industry is going to have to take place at some point relatively soon, but part of that reckoning absolutely has to be a level playing field in the area of providing legal services.  Either the same rules and restrictions will have to apply to all those operating in the space or those rules ought to apply to no one operating in the space.

The notion that the reckoning could be ushered along more quickly because of a fight over an area of legal representation that most firms have first-year associates handle for free as a perk for clients (i.e. getting speeding tickets dismissed) and involves a firm run by a lawyer who has been embroiled in litigation over a nearly $20,000 tab at a strip club and whose firm is being investigated for taking money to falsify traffic school certificates is just absurd enough to fit in with the rest of the fundamental absurdity that plagues 2017.

“Boies will be boys was never a good response” or “Advance waivers are still better than unwanted advances”

(I’ve apologized once before for a Bullwinkle-style title and here I am doing it again.  The underlying societal issues are not funny in the least but it’s been a hard week for many folks and a little bit of levity can help you make it through.)

If you are inclined to read this blog from time to time, then you likely already have read or heard something about the mess David Boies has found himself in related to his firm’s simultaneous representation of The New York Times and his efforts to assist another client Harvey Weinstein in working with a black-ops style investigation outfit to try to stop an NYT story about Weinstein.

If you haven’t read anything about it, there is a wave of reporting to catch up on.  You can start with this ABA Journal article which gives easy jumping off points to this article in The Atlantic, and this The New York Times article, and this further ABA Journal article addressing additional issues after the NYT fired Boies’s firm.

The whole situation weaves a tale more than worthy of a law school essay exam question.  I could likely manage to spend the full three hours of the Ethics Roadshow talking about the ethics issues raised in the scenario.  (I probably won’t, but you’ll never know for sure unless you attend in one of the six cities where it will be taking place.)

While there are quite a few angles ripe for discussion, I just want to talk a bit today about the advanced waiver angle involved.  As most of the articles discuss, in addition to minimizing his role in assisting Weinstein, Boies pointed to language in his firm’s engagement letter with the NYT as authorizing certain conflicts in advance.

The topic of whether and when a lawyer can obtain an advanced waiver from a client to a future conflict is still a surprisingly controversial one in ethics and lawyering circles.  There are some who ardently fight for the position that no conflict can be waived in advance, even by sophisticated clients.  I don’t count myself among their number and, instead, believe that the availability of advance conflicts waivers is an important part of modern law practice from an ethics standpoint.  Along those lines, I believe that Tennessee, and other states that have language in a Comment to RPC 1.7 patterned after the Model Rules get the ethical guidance on the situation correct.

Tennessee’s Comment [22] to RPC 1.7, for example, explains how things generally should work when a lawyer requests a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future:

The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails.  The more comprehensive the explanation provided to the client of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding.  Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict.  If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved.  Nevertheless, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent to a future conflict is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject matter of the representation.

This Boies/Weinstein/NYT saga, however, isn’t particularly all that helpful in terms of providing guidance into the question of whether any advance conflict waiver obtained by Boies complied with New York’s ethics rules, but it is extremely helpful in reminding that whether or not an advance conflict waiver passes muster under the ethics rules is just one aspect of the situation that lawyers and law firms need to keep in mind (and though it is a bit sacrilegious to say it might not always be the most weighty aspect of the situation).

The Boies/Weinstein/NYT saga is extremely helpful as a reminder that whether to take on a representation that can only be justified to another client on the basis of an advance waiver is extremely tricky as a business decision.

Boies’s firm included an advance waiver in its engagement letter with the NYT undoubtedly to try to maximize the number of clients it could have has now managed to lose both the NYT and Weinstein as clients.

The loss of Weinstein under all the circumstances might be a net positive, but the loss of the NYT likely stings and would have stung even if it hadn’t ended up managing to say this publicly in the process of cutting ties with Boies:

We consider this intolerable conduct, a grave betrayal of trust, and a breach of the basic professional standards that all lawyers are required to observe. It is inexcusable and we will be pursuing appropriate remedies.

Whether or not an advance waiver is consistent with the ethics rules, an offended client can always still decide to drop the lawyer or his firm and what that mess might looks like if or when that comes to pass might be the most practical way for lawyers to think through these issues.

 

Advocating for attorney advertising.

So, back in August, I mentioned that I was going to have the opportunity to debate issues of lawyer advertising before an audience of top-notch Canadian lawyers in November.  This post is something of a coda to that post as I want to, very briefly, say a word or two about that talk.

It was, as I anticipated, a highly rewarding experience and all of the attorneys affiliated with The Advocates’ Society with whom I had the opportunity to meet and speak were delightful.

During the presentation, my job was to be the one to give voice to things that those assembled might not want to hear.  So, to start things off, I broke the news to them all that we don’t pronounce Hermitage, as in The Hermitage Hotel, in the fancy manner they were wont to do.  After having dealt that disappointing blow, I gave my pitch about what regulation of lawyer advertising should be, and what it shouldn’t be.

I tried to do so with a focus on things beyond just the protections afforded under our First Amendment for commercial speech because they don’t have anything quite the same under their nation’s law.

Those points – which I will happily repeat as many times as anyone ever gives me the chance to do so — are:

  • Ethical restrictions on lawyer advertising ought to pretty much start and end with prohibiting statements that are false or actually misleading.
  • It is pretty much a universal truth that the only people who complain about lawyer advertisements are other lawyers.
  • Those tasked with regulating attorney conduct don’t particularly like spending time adjudicating squabbles between lawyers about ads.
  • Consumers don’t get worked up about lawyer advertising at least in part because they get it.  If you are paying to advertise something, you are going to emphasize its good points.
  • But consumers also don’t get worked up about it because they don’t view it the way lawyers do.  There are still people out there who simply did not know they could hire a lawyer without having to pay money or who don’t know their problem might be something a lawyer could even help them with at all.
  • Some times the way those people learn this information is because they see some kind of lawyer advertisement in one place or another and, when they do, they don’t particularly think about whether or not it is something that you would think is “dignified.”
  • If you are motivated to want to impose stricter regulations on lawyer advertisements because of a concern that there is not enough public respect for our profession and advertisements that you think should be “beneath” lawyers fosters such disrespect, then I have a suggestion of how you could better direct your energies.
  • Imagine how much more could be done to foster better respect for our profession and what we do if we all focused our energies on encouraging communication of what it is that lawyers do, the role we play in society, and what we bring to the table that can help people in times of need for legal services, including helping educate them that their problem is one that could be helped by the work of a lawyer?