So, those familiar with this space may remember I have written a bit from time-to-time about Tennessee’s proposed rule revision to adopt a modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The future of the proposal is still up in the air and the public comment period continues to run until March 21, 2018. If you want to, you can go read those comments that have been submitted so far at this link. The Court regularly updates the contents of the PDF at that link as new comments are submitted. (Spoiler alert: quite a few lawyers are pointing to their religious beliefs as being under attack if an ethics rule is adopted that would prohibit them from harassing or discriminating against people and, in the process in my opinion, overlooking the vast chasm that exists between proclaiming one’s personal beliefs but still treating all people with respect and conduct that involves harassing or discriminating against someone.)
The purpose of this post is not exactly to provide an update on Tennessee’s proposal. Instead, the reason for writing is to share another approach to the topic that I learned of recently when I was getting fully up-to-speed on Idaho’s rules.
Although it was only tangentially relevant to my presentation to the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association, I learned that not only does Idaho have the same RPC 8.4(d) and Comment  approach as Tennessee [both patterned after the older ABA Model Rule approach] but, in addition to that, Idaho has additional language targeting lawyer conduct motivated by discrimination in its RPC 4.4.
In Tennessee, for example, RPC 4.4(a)(1) prohibits the following sort of conduct:
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person….
Idaho’s version of this rule, however, adds something extra by way of an example of what is included:
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, including conduct intended to appeal to or engender bias against a person on account of that person’s
gender, race, religion, national origin, or sexual preference, whether that bias is directed to other counsel, court personnel, witnesses, parties, jurors, judges, judicial officers, or any other participants….
It is an interesting approach because I have found myself, in some discussions at seminars in Tennessee where I’ve discussed my support for the proposed rule responding to examples of things lawyers say could become fodder for a bar complaint if the rule were revised, pointing to the fact that the conduct being described could very well be pursued as a violation of RPC 4.4(a). I think that’s likely true in a number of litigation-related examples of sexual harassment or usage of racial and other kinds of epithets directed at others involved in the process, but would only cover issues related to when a lawyer is representing a client. I happen to think that’s likely true in any jurisdiction that has language like Tennessee’s RPC 4.4(a) even without going to the trouble of elaborating on the point as Idaho has in its rule.
But, Idaho’s approach is certainly an interesting one as something of a belt-and-suspenders approach to trying to stop such conduct by lawyers, but only when they are representing clients.