So last week I was quoted a bit in a Law360 story related to Judge Kavanaugh’s continued effort to ascend to the highest judicial position in our nation. If you are a subscriber, you can read the article here. It had to do with the news of the lawyer who was going to be representing Dr. Blasey-Ford and whether his departure from his firm was really sudden or not and the reasons why a firm with a significant appellate court practice might not want to let themselves have to treat Judge Kavanaugh as an adverse party. If you are not a subscriber, I’ll offer you the two snippets involving what I had to say:
If Bromwich had stayed at Robbins Russell, Judge Kavanaugh would consequently have become an adverse party for conflicts purposes, potentially complicating the firm’s appellate efforts on behalf of clients, said Brian S. Faughnan, a legal ethics attorney at Lewis Thomason.
“That could have led to Judge Kavanaugh recusing himself from any appellate cases in which Robbins Russell was counsel of record or likely required the firm to seek Judge Kavanaugh’s recusal in all such cases. If he were confirmed, that would mean placing firm clients in a position where potentially only eight justices could hear their cases,” Faughnan said.
Even if Kavanaugh is not confirmed to the Supreme Court, the representation of Blasey Ford could still hurt the law firm as long as Judge Kavanaugh continues to hold a spot on the D.C. Circuit, Faughnan said.
Although that article came out just a week ago, it feels more like a year ago.
Based on the highly partisan nature of what Judge Kavanaugh had to say in his prepared testimony, it seems likely that, for as long as he has a position as a federal judge in any capacity, there will be lots of litigants and counsel that will have to seriously weigh whether to pursue motions for him to recuse from their cases. “What goes around comes around,” could be a recurring quote referenced in motions seeking recusal for many years to come.
There are lots of other things I might write today about the troubling nature of things, but I will instead send anyone with an interest in where my perspective is at the moment to this piece published elsewhere.
While we are on the subject of federal judicial ethics though, I’d like to point out that there are proposed revisions to the Code of Conduct for United State Judges pending and for which there is a November 13, 2018 deadline for public comment. The proposed changes do not impact in any fashion the existing rules for disqualification of federal judges — Canon 3(C) — nor the rule that would be most difficult for a federal judge to claim would permit the making of any false statement under oath — Canon 2(A).
What the proposed changes do address are the conclusions of the June 1, 2018 Report of the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group and the perceived need for additional ethical guidance regarding workplace harassment in the world of federal judges — an area to which none of the accusations against Judge Kavanaugh extend.
The most extensive proposed changes are set out in Canon 3(B) addressing the performance of administrative responsibilities and in new explanatory Commentary. The rules would include a new provision:
(4) A judge should practice civility, by being patient, dignified,
respectful, and courteous, in dealings with court personnel,
including chambers staff. A judge should not engage in any form
of harassment of court personnel. A judge should not engage in
retaliation for reporting of allegations of such misconduct. A
judge should seek to hold court personnel who are subject to the
judge’s control to similar standards in their own dealings with
other court personnel.
A new paragraph in the Commentary would further explain:
Canon 3B(4). A judge should neither engage in, nor tolerate, workplace
conduct that is reasonably interpreted as harassment, abusive behavior, or retaliation
for reporting such conduct. The duty to refrain from retaliation reaches retaliation
against former as well as current judiciary personnel. Under this Canon, harassment encompasses a range of conduct having no legitimate role in the workplace, including harassment that constitutes discrimination on impermissible grounds and other abusive, oppressive, or inappropriate conduct directed at judicial employees or others. See also Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, Rule 4(a)(2) (providing that “cognizable misconduct includes: (A) engaging in unwanted, offensive, or abusive sexual conduct, including sexual harassment or assault; (B) treating litigants, attorneys, judicial employees, or others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner; or (C) creating a hostile work environment for judicial employees”) and Rule 4(a)(3) (providing that “cognizable misconduct includes discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, gender identity, pregnancy, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, age, or disability”).
You can read all of the proposed revisions here.