The thing about the re-regulation of the practice of law …

. . . is it really could go either way. It could make things better or it could make things worse. It truly depends on who ends up doing the re-regulation and what motivates them along the way.

What is prompting the need to say this sentiment out loud today exactly? Well, cynical types might say it is because there are these two things I want to write about and maybe it is the only thing they have in common. Less cynical types might say … well pretty much the same thing.

It also might come from the general feeling, shared by lots of folks out there I believe, that so many things in life sit on a knife’s edge at the moment and, depending on lots of variables, could pivot in one direction and start to get better or another direction and get even worse.

Recently, we revisited the state of things on the general topic of re-regulation to note that the Utah Supreme Court actually pulled the trigger on creating their regulatory sandbox to allow lawyers and others to collaborate more closely in the delivery of legal services. Frequent readers of this space will know that, in the past, posts about the happenings in Utah have always been in close proximity to the happenings in Arizona and will not be surprised to know it has happened again.

The Arizona Supreme Court has once again jumped ahead of Utah’s trailblazing by simply eradicating RPC 5.4 altogether (as well as eradicating any restrictions on solicitation by lawyers in the advertising rules) effective January 1, 2021. No sandbox or limited experiment, just full steam ahead.

My initial belief (which will also come as no surprise to readers) is that this is and will be a good thing for consumers of legal services. But there is no guarantee that it will be. Much will depend on who takes advantage of the changes. If Arizona sees an influx of interest by investors into lawyers and law firms that represent consumers, then the needle will almost undoubtedly move in the direction of greater access to both information about the availability of legal services and access to meaningful justice. If Arizona instead sees growth mainly in the delivery of business services or expansion by large accounting and consulting firms into the practice of law and outside investment in lawyers and law firms that defend wealthy clients, then things could actually get worse in terms of the balance between the haves and the have-nots.

The battle for the re-regulation of the practice of law, however, will not be fought only in changes to ethics rules that govern those who actually already have become lawyers. It will also be fought over how those who wish to become lawyers are evaluated before being admitted to practice. In terms of evaluation, I do mean both from an intellectual preparedness standpoint but also on the topic of character and fitness to be a lawyer.

As to the first, there are many, many stories to be read on the internet these days about the difficulties facing states all over the country in how to deal with bar examinations for law school graduates as we, as a nation, still struggle with COVID-19. Unfortunately, less than a handful states so far have pivoted to granting diploma privilege to the graduates caught in this professional limbo. Fortunately, only a few states insisted on simply plowing forward with in-person examinations. All of the other states have engaged in experiments in trying to deliver online examinations. The results have been mixed at best. (With luck I will have a bit more to say on this topic later today, but only over on Twitter so hit me up with a follow @bsfaughnan over there.)

As to the second, the process of evaluating the character and fitness of those who aspire to be lawyers is a significantly less-than-perfect process. The fact that the same process is also applied to lawyers who seek additional licenses from other state bars further reveals its flaws. That it is a process that often improperly seeks to force aspiring lawyers to provide information about receiving treatment for mental health unrelated to questionable conduct further invites strong criticism.

This week in an opinion out of federal court in Kentucky a judge managed to simultaneously strongly call out that state’s problematic and invasive approach in a way that is nearly impossible to disagree with on the merits but also to provide evidence that the ABA was correct when it concluded that he was not fit for the federal bench in the first place. The opinion is a particularly bittersweet ride given that, effective today, the judge in question is now being elevated to a set on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. (As to the appellate position, the ABA has concluded that he is qualified.)

If you’d like the short version of the opinion in question, you can check out this ABA Journal online article. A full copy of the opinion, however, can be obtained at the download button below.

In the opinion, the judge absolutely savages how Kentucky treats applicants for licensure and does so in circumstances involving a lawyer who had practiced, without incident, for many years in Florida before seeking to add a Kentucky license to her tool belt. The judge particularly focuses upon the invasive nature of Kentucky’s demands for disclosures about treatment for mental health conditions, demands unbounded by any relationship to any prior inappropriate conduct or any effort by the lawyer-applicant to explain such conduct as being caused by some prior untreated condition.

In the strongest and most emotionally charged language that tends to resonate with those of us who strongly believe that mental health issues in the profession need to be de-stigmatized, the judge closes his opinion out as follows:

Law school is hard. The stress, rigor, and competition can lead to depression, anxiety, and substance abuse. Many students who start school healthy are far from it by the time they graduate. Some kill themselves.

Aspiring lawyers should seek the health care they need. But if Kentucky continues to punish people who get help, many won’t. And one day, a law student will die after choosing self-help over medical care because he worried a Character and Fitness Committee would use that medical treatment against him — as Kentucky’s did against Jane Doe.

It is not a matter of if, but when.

The entire opinion, in fact, is filled with this kind of simple language that is compelling and easy for lawyers to understand. But 90% of the 18-page opinion is all dicta because the judge actually disposed of the lawsuit filed by the lawyer because they had now finally become a lawyer and no longer had standing to challenge the process they went through when they were an applicant. Only an applicant would have standing to bring the kinds of claims being sought – and, perhaps, not even then because of immunity issues associated with the decision-makers. It could have been a straightforward, nondescript, three- or four-page opinion.

Thus, what the opinion really reads like is an attack on what the judge “tags” as the “Bar Bureaucracy” and drips with the vindictiveness of someone whose credentials were challenged by the largest national association of lawyers in the United States, the ABA.

As someone who believes, on the facts laid out in the opinion, that the Florida lawyer was poorly treated by the Kentucky approach to such issues, reading the opinion is still a highly bittersweet experience. (A bit like watching a shark attack even your worst enemy — something you can’t take any pleasure in because at any point the shark might turn its attention to tearing into you.)

This is particularly true when you bear in mind that this judge – like many that have been installed on the federal courts during the last 4 years and that are career-long members of The Federalist Society — appears to have a very likely overall agenda that is not centered in the kind of empathy that he now expresses over issues of mental health in the legal profession.

Instead, this is a judge whose other prominent decisions during his short-lived tenure include attacking a mayor in Kentucky who was trying to deal with the pandemic as having “criminalized the communal celebration of Easter.” He is also a judge who, if given the opportunity, is likely to vote to strike down the Affordable Care Act and strip healthcare from millions in the middle of a pandemic. He is a judge in a mold of judges who will decry all that they do not like as “judicial activism,” but blithely engage in the kind of judicial activism that involves writing a scolding and self-righteous decision nearly 90% of which was unnecessary as dicta.

If the landscape surrounding entry into the practice of law is shaped and re-regulated by the kinds of judges that have been enshrined into power over this last Presidential term of office, then things might improve for the better or they could very well become much worse.

Three for Thursday?

Can that be a thing?

I’ve fallen down on the job of being a reliable blogger and I’m not sure I’m getting up any time soon.

I think I’ve continued to manage to be a decent lawyer, pretty good expert witness, okay husband, mediocre father, and generally non-evil human being. But I’m failing as a blogger lately.

I have decent intentions. I can’t prove that, but you’ll just have to trust me. But when I try to carve out the time, I stray to the world of constant information of the Internet and wallow in the notion that 150,000 people in the United States have died now and so, so, so very many of them did not have to if we had even halfway decent leadership in our nation. And, it doesn’t look like it is getting better any time soon.

So, here’s three short entries about three topics I’ve written about in the past and that are back in the consciousness of, at least me, but also I think the legal news world.

Remember when, as lawyers in the United States, we were worried about protecting client information in connection with international travel?

Hey, remember when lawyers in the United States could travel internationally?

Yeah, good times.

Well, very briefly to reset the discussion to back in the before-times, things were maybe looking up and it looked like privileged and confidential information possessed by lawyers might be protected in connection with border crossings. Here’s a link to an ABA Journal story that indicates that things may not actually be looking up really at all. At least not as long as the current regime remains in charge.

So, topic the second, states are still trying to figure out how to allow the law school graduates of 2020 to demonstrate that they can be admitted into the practice of law. I wrote some about what Tennessee was going to do, and chided a little bit about how signs were pointing toward trying to go to diploma privilege was probably a better answer. Since then, Tennessee has cancelled its rescheduled in-person bar exam and instead will have an online only exam in October 2020. Better. Still not willing to allow for diploma privilege as the answer though.

On a not unrelated point, Michigan was one of the first states pursuing the online only bar exam option to move forward this week, and it did not go very well. Tech problems. Caused apparently by a DDOS attack. Good thing there is no reason to think those might happen in other states. Oh, also, Indiana has been trying to do one online and announced it will instead have an emailed bar exam.

And, finally, the ABA recently issued a Formal Ethics Opinion designed to try to lay to rest ongoing concerns about what the scope of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is and what it does and does not restrict. You might recall 8.4(g) which was adopted almost exactly 4 years ago by the ABA and has been adopted almost nowhere else since. (You might recall it from when I used to write about it Hamilton-style (“non stop“).) It is a good advocacy piece. Probably better than the advocacy pieces that the ABA had available when it first passed the rule. It is not a good ethics opinion exactly though because it doesn’t really do any of the things you would expect an ethics opinion to do. You can read it here.

But, I mean, have you looked at the world around us?

I don’t think a well-reasoned explanation of why states could adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and not be concerned that they would somehow be restricting cherished liberties is going to gain much traction whether it looks like a traditional ethics opinion or an outright advocacy piece.

So, I mean, why not just try an advocacy piece, I guess?

Sigh.

(P.S. Given that the only prior Taylor Swift album I liked was the one Ryan Adams did as a cover… I never expected I’d be saying how incredibly good a Taylor Swift album is, but here we are. folklore is fantastic. And it isn’t fantastic just because I love The National and Bon Iver. Ms. Swift’s got incredible talent, a very lovely voice, and wrote some really good and poignant lyrics.)

(P.P.S. It is a really good, really good album as is. But I also can totally imagine every single song (except Exile [for obvious reasons]) also being excellent if sung by Matt Berninger. I’m thinking that’s a feature not a bug.)

Two for Thursday.

It is Thursday, right?

In a “recent” effort, I mentioned that there were recent developments I was planning to eventually write about. Today presents an effort at checking two of them off the list that have only Tennessee in common. Neither of which likely provides fodder for a full post, so they will be covered together.

The first is a recently enacted revision to Tennessee’s ethics rules regarding money held in trust accounts. Specifically, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a revision to RPC 1.15 regarding trust accounts to impose requirements for dealing with “unidentified funds” held in trust.

As revised, RPC 1.15 now has a new subsection (f):

(f) A lawyer who learns of unidentified funds in an IOLTA account must make periodic
efforts to identify and return the funds to the rightful owner. If after 12 months of the discovery of the unidentified funds the lawyer determines that ascertaining the ownership or securing the return of the funds will not succeed, the lawyer must remit the funds to the Tennessee Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (TLFCP). No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend to a lawyer’s exercise of reasonable judgment under this paragraph (f).

A lawyer who either remits funds in error or later ascertains the ownership of remitted funds may make a claim to TLFCP, which after verification of the claim will return the funds to the lawyer.

I personally was opposed to this proposal because in almost all circumstances “unidentified funds” simply shouldn’t exist in a trust account in the first place and, thus, this is one of the very few places in the rules that addresses a situation which can nearly only come to pass because of lawyer misconduct. Although the rule doesn’t define “unidentified funds,” my understanding is that these are different from “unclaimed funds” because the lawyer simply has no idea to whom the funds belong at all. Comment [14] still indicates that as to “abandoned” funds those will likely have to go through the process of escheatment to the State. Thus, other than circumstances in which a lawyer purchases someone else’s law practice and then finds that the underlying records aren’t up to snuff, this rule addresses obligations of a lawyer who has already dropped the ball on a very important duty.

The Tennessee Bar Association publicly signaled support for the proposal, however. The rule revision was not accompanied by any new comment paragraphs, so perhaps a time will come in the future for the Court to give a bit more clarity about how funds might come to be “unidentified” and whether the protection for judgment extends only to whether to send funds to the TCLF or not and not also to judgments about whether funds qualify as “unidentified” or not.

The second development raises a question of judgment as well. If you’ve been following aspects of how the legal profession is trying to cope with the ongoing, and now worsening in the U.S., pandemic, you’ve likely seen a variety of approaches in various states to dealing with graduates of law school and how to provide them with an opportunity to get their law license. Some states have transitioned to having their bar exam online, some states have limited the number of people who can sit for the traditional bar exam in a socially-distanced room (and some of those states have given preference to in-state law school grads), and some states have opted instead to offer diploma privilege rights to law students and allow them to become licensed without having to sit for a bar examination.

To date, my state has gone with an approach that involves limited availability but with a twist. The traditional July bar exam would have limited spaces, but they also determined to hold an extra bar exam later in the fall.

Last month, however, a collection of law school graduates has filed an emergency petition with the Tennessee Supreme Court requesting that the Court take action to allow for diploma privilege in Tennessee because of, and in response to, the pandemic. You can go read the full petition here.

It is hard to try to argue that they don’t have a point.

Edit/update: About an hour after putting this up, the Tennessee Supreme Court posted an order cancelling the July 2020 bar examination in Tennessee. You can go read the order here … it doesn’t sound like the Court is seeing it along these lines … but having to cancel it rather than move it online seems to me to be more support for seriously considering the diploma privilege route.

Two For Tuesday For Tennessee

From time to time I feel a real obligation to write about things that are primarily (if not exclusively) only of interest to Tennessee lawyers. Today is one of those days so apologies in advance if this is not your cup of tea. (On the upside for you, this will be relatively short so you might be able to justify still reading it.)

There have been two significant developments this week in Tennessee involving rule changes (not ethics rule changes) but rule changes important to the practice of law in Tennessee. One is the adoption of a new Tennessee Supreme Court Rule authorizing collaborative law family law practice. The other is a further structural and substantive set of changes to the rule that governs the admission of lawyers in Tennessee – Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7.

The revisions to Rule 7 address a number of non-substantive changes including architectural reworking of the structure and ordering of portions of the rule but also address some substantive issues as well. You can read the entirety of the order implementing the revisions (which includes both a clean and a red-lined copy of the revised Rule 7) here.

Perhaps the most important substantive change to Rule 7 is the expansion of a registration procedure (currently available to in-house counsel admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction but working in Tennessee) to foreign legal counsel employed as a lawyer by an organization as well. In connection with that development, a 180-day amnesty period for foreign legal counsel presently practicing in Tennessee is on offer (as occurred in the past with the in-house counsel provisions).

Second, while the provisions addressing the right to practice pending admission have been explicitly tweaked to make clear that someone can apply and obtain that authority whether seeking admission by comity or by sitting for the bar exam (or, now that TN has embraced the UBE, submitting a score on the UBE from another jurisdiction), the rule has also been amended to make plain that a disciplinary complaint filed against someone practicing pursuant to the practice pending admission rule is also a disciplinary complaint against the attorney who is on record as being their supervising attorney (as is also the case with qualified law students permitted to engage in limited practice in compliance with the rules.

The adoption of a new rule permitting collaborative family law practice in Tennessee has been in the works since 2017 but was finally implemented this week and takes effect immediately. You can read the entirety of new Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 53 here.

For those unfamiliar with the concept of collaborative family law practice (and I suspect there are many of you), a review of the rule is worth your time to get a flavor for the dynamic. One of the most important pieces is the notion that lawyers engaged in this kind of representation are prohibited in almost all circumstances from engaging in any litigation proceedings on behalf of the party they are representing related to the issue for which the collaboration is focused. (Which is a bit of weird end around on what would otherwise likely be viewed as a restriction on the right to practice in violation of our RPC 5.6.) In terms of impact on lawyer ethics, the other piece of the rule that has a direct impact is the piece that provides relief from the imputation of a collaborative lawyer’s conflicts to other lawyers in their firm in instances where the representation involves a person of “low income.” Specifically:

Section 10. Exception from Disqualification for Representation of Low-Income Parties.

After a collaborative family law proceeding concludes, another lawyer in a law firm with which a collaborative lawyer disqualified under Section 9, Subsection (a), is associated may represent a party without a fee in the collaborative family law matter or a matter related to the collaborative family law matter if:

(a) the party has an annual income that qualifies the party for free legal representation under the criteria established by the law firm for free legal representation;

(b) the collaborative family law participation agreement authorizes that representation; and

(c) the collaborative lawyer is isolated from any participation in the collaborative family law matter through procedures with the law firm that are reasonably calculated to isolate the collaborative lawyer from such participation as set out in Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 8, RPC 1.10.

If racism is disqualifying for a juror, why not for an aspiring lawyer?

Nothing like the day after a holiday weekend to pose a difficult, potentially controversial, question, right?  But when the holiday weekend in question is one to celebrate the life and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., this particular question is certainly topical.

This is a post I have had rattling around inside of my head since this I read this weighty article from The Huffington Post.  Now, I know, for many, HP is not thought of as a place for weighty articles, but this one really fits the bill.

The article’s title is “Should White Supremacists Be Allowed to Practice Law?”  The article delves into the nature of the question and elaborates a bit on the underlying concept that people who wish to be admitted to the bar in any given state not only have to demonstrate competence in the law but also must satisfy “character and fitness” requirements to be issued a law license at all.

The HP article does an effective job of examining the thorny, and obviously problematic, nature of the problem with staking out a position that someone’s ideas or thoughts alone should prohibit them from being permitted to pursue a chosen profession – a profession for which they have otherwise demonstrated qualifications by passing the required tests and satisfying the objective criteria.  But — given that fundamental principles of white supremacy (for example) can be shown to go beyond mere beliefs and into promised actions and conduct that are at least inherently discriminatory and taken to the logical conclusion of the movement are even genocidal — the slope being argued over does not sound all that slippery in such a context.

Further, the slope our profession has to wrestle with on such a question is inherently slippery because of how subjective the admission standards are as to character and fitness as a concept — the idea that existing lawyers will evaluate the candidacy of applicants for admission to see if they have the requisite “character” and “fitness” to be a member of the profession.  Moreover, as someone who has represented quite a few folks in bar admission proceedings, I can tell you that the admissions process often creates seemingly ridiculous barriers to entry labelled as character and fitness matters.  Traffic offenses and underage drinking as just a few common examples where law school graduates frequently find themselves having to respond to orders to show cause why they shouldn’t be denied admission.

The notion that an avowed white supremacist would be deemed to be an acceptable candidate to practice law from a character standpoint when a person who struggled with a “lead foot” throughout college gets extra scrutiny seems laughable.

For a little more context, here are the admission standards in Tennessee from which character and fitness questions spring:

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7 requires the Board of Law Examiners to decide that an applicant

has demonstrated the reputation and character that in the opinion of the Board indicates no reasonable basis for substantial doubts that the applicant will adhere to the standards of conduct  required of attorneys in this State.  (Section 1.03(d))

The same rule elaborates in more detail what this means:

(a) An applicant shall not be admitted if in the judgment of the Board there is reasonable doubt as to that applicant’s honesty, respect for the rights of others, and adherence to and obedience to the Constitution and laws of Tennessee and the United States as to justify the conclusion that such applicant is not likely to adhere to the duties and standards of conduct imposed on attorneys in this State. Any conduct which would constitute grounds for discipline if engaged in by an attorney in this State shall be considered by the Board in making its evaluation of the character of an applicant.  (Section 6.01)

If espousing an inherent belief that one race is inherently superior to other races and that certain races are so inferior that the world would be better off if they were eliminated from society is not something that would “justify a conclusion that such applicant is not likely to adhere to the duties and standards of conduct imposed on attorneys,” then what exactly is the point of referencing “respect for the rights of others” in such a standard?

And, if even you are inclined to agree that would move the needle in the direction of being unfit, then you probably still might have more difficulty agreeing with the idea that racism is not inherently as bad as white supremacy and is more just an idea or state of mind that should not be regulated and, thus, there can be no cogent argument made that just being a racist should prevent someone from being issued a law license.  After all, as noted above, in Tennessee, the standard requires the Board of Law Examiners to only look to conduct of an applicant which – if undertaken by someone who is already a lawyer could trigger discipline.  You would be hard pressed to find many instances of lawyer discipline imposed against a lawyer merely for holding dear to a belief system, no matter how ignorant or odious.

And, yet, quite recently, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Tharpe v. Sellers that reversed and remanded a case over a certificate of appealability in a death penalty case that turns on whether racist statements made by one of the jurors who voted for death could justify the reopening of habeas corpus proceedings premised upon arguments that improper racial animus infected the jury deliberations.

Although the analogy is admittedly not a perfect one, it seems very difficult to feel very comfortable with the idea that racism on the part of a member of the jury is unacceptable but that letting someone with the same views become a lawyer and, thus, be in the position of getting to routinely strike citizens from being selected to be on juries because of the color of their skin is just part of the system.

And, no this is not intended to be an advocacy piece for the proposed rule revision in Tennesee that I’ve written about before, because these questions are extremely ripe ones in my jurisdiction and other jurisdictions under even existing ethics rules.  In Tennessee and elsewhere, the rules already prohibit lawyers, regardless whether they are representing clients or not at the time, from engaging in conduct that is prejudical to the administration of justice.  (RPC 8.4.)

So, I guess the true question to struggle with is this:  Does empowering a racist by conferring a license to practice law on them something that is inherently prejudicial to the administration of justice?

Another Tennessee-centric offering.

Using the term “Tennesentric” would probably be more efficient, but two items involving potential rule revisions relating to ethics and lawyering in Tennessee are worth briefly discussing.  One of the two has gone out for public comment and has a deadline, while the other has just been filed with the Court and does not.

I’ve written at length in the past about Tennessee’s effort at cleaning up some problems with comity admission standards and the extended amnesty period for certain folks in need of getting properly registered as in-house counsel.

Our Board of Law Examiners has recently filed a petition, which the Court has put out for public comment, to further extend the dates and deadlines for folks to have gotten into compliance in these areas.  Interestingly, the Petition seeks to extend the time period but not all the way up until the petition itself was filed, but rather has sought a cut-off period that would be December 31, 2016.  If enacted, the impact of this rule change would appear to be to make amnesty available to in-house counsel who did not get into compliance by July 2016 but who would have if the deadline for compliance was December 31, 2016 and to afford the Board with the same flexibility in making rulings on comity applications that were filed as late as December 31, 2016 but for which the Board didn’t rule – for obvious reasons – before the end of the year.  The deadline for public comments on that proposal is April 14, 2017.

The other proposal – which has not yet been put out for public comment —  is a filing by our Board of Professional Responsibility to clarify in our Rule 9 itself that the hearing in a disciplinary proceeding is public, unless a protective order is obtained.  This has long been the practice, but the rules presently do not exactly say that.  If this petition is granted, the result would be that the rules would bless the traditional practice.  But one even better benefit of this revision, if adopted, is important for cases of potential public and media interest, because this would make clear that the Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 30 Media Guidelines ought to govern media coverage of such proceedings.  Such a clarification would be important so that hearing panels in Tennessee understand that the attorneys of record in a case are entitled to know of a request for media coverage so that counsel can then proceed to make a timely motion to seek to prohibit such coverage under the terms of Rule 30.

Suffice it to say, this does not always happen.

You can read the BPR Petition Filed to Amend Tenn Sup Ct R 9 § 32 at the link.

Friday follow up: In-house counsel amnesty deadline just a week away

In the very early days of this aspiring little blog, I wrote repeatedly about a number of proposed, and ultimately adopted, changes to Tennessee’s admissions and licensing rule, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7.  Included among the implemented changes was one last chance at amnesty for lawyers working in Tennessee as in-house counsel but who were not properly licensed here.

The purpose of today’s post is simply in the nature of a public service announcement for any lawyers working as in-house counsel in Tennessee but who still may not have gotten their licensing house in order.  The deadline for turning in your paperwork for a registration license in Tennessee is July 1, 2016.  Even though time is now exceedingly tight, the paperwork to complete is still relatively easy.  You can access it over at the Board of Law Examiners website.

Over the years, I have represented a number of in-house lawyers that have had to deal with problems arising from not being properly licensed in Tennessee, and it really is important to stress that this last opportunity to have any such sins of the past washed away by getting properly registered before the deadline is really not one to be missed.

If you happen to be reading this and know of any in-house counsel in Tennessee, you might pass the link to this post along so that they can make sure they and all of their colleagues know of this opportunity to get squared away.  If you don’t want to just take my thoughts on this at face value, you can also go read more about the situation at the Administrative Office of the Courts website.

Tennessee Supreme Court takes long-awaited action to smooth admissions problems

Yesterday, the Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order that addresses a variety of issues I have written about on a number of prior occasions.  You can take in the entire order setting out all of the new provisions here.  In addition to making a spot change to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 6 and a revision to RPC 5.5(d), it replaces Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 7 in its entirety.

In almost all respects, the Court’s action offers the hoped for outcomes on a variety of issues plaguing Tennessee’s admission system for lawyers licensed in other jurisdictions.  The contents of the new rule becomes effective in just 11 days, on January 1, 2016.

As to comity admission, the Court has removed the requirement it had added into Section 5.01 that conditioned eligibility for comity admission upon having both applied for it, and being approved for it, before moving to Tennessee to be employed as a lawyer.  Effective January 1, 2016, Section 5.01 will no longer say anything along those lines (and in fact does not even explicitly require the application be submitted before arrival in Tennessee).

The Court also had adopted a robust practice pending admission provision that will permit applicants awaiting a ruling on their comity application to practice law in Tennessee for up to 365 days.  The provision is largely patterned after the ABA Model provision on the topic and requires the applicant to “associate[] with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in Tennessee.”

With respect to in-house counsel registration, the order provides a second round of amnesty so that any lawyers, currently employed as in-house counsel in Tennessee but who are not licensed here and did not get properly registered before now, can have any prior sins in this respect forgiven as long as they get an in-house counsel registration application filed within 180 days from January 1, 2016 (June 30, 2016).  Accompanying this change is a revision to RPC 5.5(d) to add a (3) that more prominently explains the repercussions in the future for any in-house counsel who fails to make timely advantage of this amnesty (and for any in-house counsel who may arrive in Tennessee in the future and miss the 180-day registration deadline).  The Court also took this opportunity to make explicit what was previously just strongly implied — that an in-house counsel who gets their application in timely (i.e. on day 175 for example, need not worry that the work they do during days 1-174 is somehow UPL.

The Court also took favorable action on a request made to make it easier for the spouses of those in military service to become admitted in Tennessee.  The Court took something of a compromise position between a proposal made by military spouses and a counter-proposal offered by the TBA – offering a 2-year initial license period with the ability to renew for additional 1-year periods provided the initial requirements for obtaining the license remain in place.

Additionally, and importantly, for a number of lawyers with comity applications that have been pending or on hold or otherwise stuck in the system while these long discussed changes have been under consideration, the Court has adopted a specific provision addressing the transition period from the old rule to the new rule as to comity admissions and that reads as follows:

(i)  Transitional Provision.  From January 1, 2016, and continuing through December 31, 2016, the Board is authorized to exercise its discretion in adjudicating pending applications for comity admission that have not been finally ruled upon as of the effective date (January 1, 2016) of this revised Rule.  Such discretion includes waiving or altering time periods or otherwise varying the provisions for admission by comity, and the Board shall tailor such discretion toward granting the applicant’s application for comity admission as long as the Board otherwise reaches the conclusion that the lawyer possesses the character and fitness to practice law in this jurisdiction.

While the transitional provision is very helpful, it does not go quite as far as what was proposed by the TBA.  The TBA had sought for the Court to adopt language that would have read as follows:

From and after [January 1, 2016] and continuing until [December 31, 2016], the Court specifically directs the Board of Law Examiners to use discretion in adjudicating pending applications that have not been finally ruled upon, including waiving or altering time periods or otherwise varying provisions, to tailor such discretion toward granting the applicant’s application for comity admission as long as the Board otherwise reaches the conclusion that the lawyer possesses the character and fitness to practice law in this jurisdiction.

The difference likely does not affect a horde of folks but there may be lawyers out there who had held off filing comity applications while awaiting a ruling who now may wonder whether they must apply in the next ten days to take full advantage of these changes.  It also may be less than clear whether any lawyers with currently pending comity applications but who already have offices in Tennessee will be permitted to take full advantage of the practice pending admission provision because of the specific language of the transition provision.  Thus, there may be situations out there that will still fall within some gaps in the working of the rule moving forward.  (There also are some grounds to criticize other aspects of the rules requirements on public policy grounds — questions such as whether the change in the rule to now require someone who went to law school in a foreign country but wishes to sit for the Tennessee Bar exam has to first obtain an LLM in the United States are too restrictive.)

But, on the whole, there can be no question that the entry of the Court’s order yesterday is a good outcome.

Don’t be an ass.

Quite a few years ago now, I did a seminar titled something like “The Golden Rule of Litigation” or “Litigation and the Golden Rule.”  One of the fun aspects of putting it together was finding confirmation that some version of The Golden Rule – the “do unto others as you would have them do unto you concept” – is espoused in some form or fashion by every world religion I could dig up.  The goal of the seminar was trying to drive home the point that if you applied some variation of that concept to litigation to construct such a rule, it would be along the lines of “Litigate against others as you would have them litigate against you.”  And, my overriding point was that if we all managed to adhere to that tenet, lawyers wouldn’t have to spend much of their time worrying if their conduct violated the rules of ethics, at least in the litigation context.

The title of today’s post is a more negative (and certainly crasser) variation on that message, but one that readily applies to all aspects of the practice of law, whether litigation, transactions, negotiations, etc.

Don’t.  Be.  An.  Ass.

Two gentlemen in the news this week have pretty egregiously violated this rule.  The result is that one of them is losing his law license permanently and the other one looks like he is never going to be issued one in the first place.

A Florida lawyer who was showcased in my 2013 Ethics Roadshow when he received a two-year suspension for what the Florida Supreme Court called “appalling and unprofessional behavior” is now back in the news.  He is getting disbarred after not complying with Florida’s rules regarding the giving of notice to clients and others once you have been suspended and for continuing to practice law after being suspended   An ABA Journal story back at the time of his suspension highlighted many of the troubling ways this lawyer would disparage his opposing counsel (and even the court), but the part that was most offensive about the whole thing was that the primary target of his wrath (or at least the primary target in proceedings that actually got adjudicated in the disciplinary process)was a 71-year old lawyer who had a long, unblemished career and who, at the time he was on the other end of the Florida lawyers vituperative rhetoric was suffering from both Parkinson’s and kidney cancer.  The now-disbarred lawyer tried to take his two-year suspension to the U.S. Supreme Court to get it reversed, but the Court denied his cert petition in October 2014.  Yesterday, the Florida Supreme Court entered an order permanently disbarring him that also makes mention of the fact that this lawyer continued, even in those proceedings, to undertake the kind of conduct for which he was disciplined before, including referring to bar counsel as evil and despicable and engaging in a smirk and stare down session with each of the justices of the Florida Supreme Court.

Another character has made it onto the radar screen for having his application to be admitted to practice law after passing the bar exam in Massachusetts denied on character and fitness grounds three days ago.  I saw the first news story about this and was prepared to be on the side of the applicant given the headline’s reference to past litigation conduct and my own experience with seeing that bar admission authorities can often manage to hold applicants to what seems like a higher standard than the standards to which already licensed attorneys are held.  But, on closer read of both the article (particularly the email that the guy thought it made sense to send the ABA Journal about his situation), and the Massachusetts opinion itself, this looks very much like an example of Massachusetts managing to avoid giving a license to someone in the first place who probably would have ended up practicing law like the Florida lawyer mentioned above.

So, as you wrap up your office day today and head into your weekend, don’t be an ass.  I promise I’ll do my best to take my own advice.

The TBA’s Filed Comment to the Board of Law Examiners Proposed Rule Changes

Over the last few months, I have posted on several occasions about the petition pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court seeking some significant changes to the rules in Tennessee regarding admission of attorneys to practice in a variety of contexts.  If you are new to the blog, you can get up to speed on this issue here and here.

In advance of the July 31 deadline for comments, the Tennessee Bar Association has filed a comment that is generally supportive but that, most importantly, proposes changes the Court should make before adopting that would improve upon the proposal.  You can read the comment in its entirety and the TBA’s proposed redline revisions here.

As one of the lawyers who had the honor of drafting the comment, I can tell you in summary form that the TBA’s position backs the BLE proposal to remove the barrier to comity admission that exists in the current rule as a result of the requirement that a comity application be approved before beginning employment in Tennessee and backs the BLE”s request for a new amnesty period for in-house counsel registration compliance.  The TBA also is proposing changes that would:

  • Result in a better practice pending admission rule that would be patterned after the ABA Model Rule on practice pending admission and which would, among other things, permit experienced lawyers moving to Tennessee licensed in another U.S. jurisdiction to practice for up to 365 days while waiting for approval of their comity application.
  • Result in explicit protection in the rules for the work that an in-house counsel does prior to putting in a registration application as long as the application is submitted timely within the first 180 days of employment.
  • Remove barriers to admission for military spouses who are attorneys licensed in jurisdictions other than Tennessee but in a less bulky way that would involve a renewable one-year temporary license.
  • Create a standard to be applied during a transition period in which applicants already in the pipeline who have been waiting during this uncertain period and who apply in the future while a ruling on this petition is awaited will not have strict timing issues held against them to deny admission but who will be blocked from admission only on grounds of true character and fitness concerns.

There is no set timeline for a ruling from the Court now that the deadline for comments has expired, but there are many lawyers who are hopeful that given the importance of these issues that the Court will act expeditiously.

On the military spouse admission issue, you can read the collection of separately-filed comments on that rule proposal here.  Interestingly, only one entity appears to have filed a public comment in complete opposition, the Montgomery County Bar Association, Clarksville – the city in Tennessee home to the largest military base in our state is located in Montgomery County.