ABA Ethics 20/20 revisions. New York adopts some; Tennessee proposal still pending.

Roy Simon, the Chair of the NY State Bar Association Committee on Standards on Attorney Conduct, was kind enough to include me on an email last week and, as a result, I learned that New York’s proposed adoption of certain aspects of the ABA Ethics 20/20 revisions was approved, effective January 1, 2017.  Back in 2015, New York adopted certain revisions to Comments to the Rules consistent with Ethics 20/20, but the proposal to change the rules themselves required Court action.  You can read the details of the revisions that were adopted in this PDF: order-adopting-black-letter-amendments-to-part-1200-eff-jan-1-2017.  As with many jurisdictions, New York has picked up the move to a black letter duty in Rule 1.6 to “make reasonable efforts” to safeguard confidential information but not adopted several of the other Ethics 20/20 black-letter revisions  For example, New York has not adopted the Ethics 20/20 revision to acknowledge in Rule 1.6 the need to disclose certain information in connection with lateral moves and mergers in order to comply with the concomitant duty to avoid conflicts under Rule 1.7.  The Comments adopted in 2015 in New York did pick up the Ethics 20/20 revisions to the Comment to Rule 1.6 on that topic, however.

The Comments adopted back in 2015 also included the new paragraphs in Rule 1.1 that are touted by many as establishing a duty of technological competence for lawyers.

I wrote back in the late part of the summer about the TBA’s petition to the Tennessee Supreme Court proposing that Tennessee adopt almost all of the ABA Ethics 20/20 revisions.  The deadline for public comments expired in November 2016, but not before our disciplinary body, the Board of Professional Responsibility, filed comments proposing a number of additional amendments to be layered upon the TBA proposal.  Several of the BPR proposals, all of which you can read here (starting at page 2 of the linked PDF), are puzzling.

The TBA filed a response/reply to the BPR’s comment arguing against the majority of the BPR proposals.  The TBA’s response is not yet up at the Court’s website, but as I was one of the signers of it, I happen to have a copy, and you can read it at this link:  petition-bpr-comment-response

This situation regarding the pending proposal is one of the 12 developments I’ll be covering, including a detailed discussion of some of the puzzling pieces of the BPR proposal, during this year’s Ethics Roadshow.

The first stop is this morning in Memphis, and I’ll be doing it again tomorrow in Nashville.

 

Lawyers and client confidentiality. Death does not part us.

It has been a while since I’ve written about a good ethics opinion.  There is a Maine opinion from a few months ago that fits the bill (and interestingly was actually posed by bar counsel in Maine apparently) but before I spend a little bit of time discussing it, I want to give context behind why it interested me enough to write about at this point when it actually came out in April.

Quite recently in Memphis, a very well-known lawyer with some involvement in pretty historic litigation in Memphis passed away.  While he had lived a long and storied life, the end came quickly as it does for many folks in that a stroke was followed within weeks by his passing.  The local daily paper here in Memphis did a very nice piece about the attorney’s passing (behind a modified sort of paywall) which, unfortunately, was marred just a little bit by a piece of misinformation that was included as a result of a quote from the deceased lawyer’s son (not a lawyer).

The quote in question was this:

“Attorney-client privilege no longer exists after the client passes away,” Mr. Caywood’s son said. “So Dad was able to testify for the prosecution. He was able to admit in court that Holly feared for her life.”

A tough spot for the reporter, of course.  It’s a good quote even if the first part is not true, but it is a shame for the paper of record in our city to put that information out there.  In Tennessee, as with most U.S. jurisdictions, the attorney-client privilege does survive the death of the client.  There is assuredly another explanation for why the lawyer was able to testify in the particular matter about the client after the client’s death even though the son may not have been aware of it.

With that now as context, let’s talk about that Maine ethics opinion — Opinion #213 from the Professional Ethics Commission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar in Maine, which makes the correct point that the ethical obligation of client confidentiality also survives death – whether that is the client’s death or the lawyer’s death.  It also makes for an interesting opinion to write about it from the perspective of my state, Tennessee, because Maine has a version of RPC 1.6 that is something of a blend between the older version of the rule on client confidentiality — under the Code of Professional Responsibility — that spoke in terms of protection for “confidences” and “secrets,” and the current version of the rule under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct approach that we have in Tennessee that extends more broadly to “information related to the representation of the client.”  Specifically, unlike Tennessee’s version of RPC 1.6(a) which reads like the ABA Model Rule, the Maine version provides that:

A lawyer shall not reveal a confidence or secret of a client unless, (i) the client gives informed consent; (ii) the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure is authorized in order to carry out the representation; or (iii) the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).

The Maine version of the rule on confidentiality also defines the terms “confidence” and “secret:”

As used in Rule 1.6, “confidence” refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and “secret” refers to other information relating to the representation if there is a reasonable prospect that revealing the information will adversely affect a material interest of the client or if the client has instructed the lawyer not to reveal such information.

So the question being answered by the Maine opinion is: can a law firm, in possession of really, really, really old client files with documents of arguably historical value, donate those files to a library or an educational institution?  The short answer, if you don’t want to read any further, is “no,” not without client consent.  Given that the clients are long dead, then the opinion explains likely not without the lawyer slogging through files on a document-by-document basis.

In fact, if you do want to read further, you should probably just go read the Maine opinion because it has some eloquent bits, but if you don’t then I can’t come up with a better way to end this post then with the Conclusion of the Maine opinion:

In short, absent a reasonably reliable indication of informed consent or some other exception to the requirements of Rule 1.6 or a meaningful ability to determine that the materials held by the attorney were not client “confidences” or “secrets,” the attorney may not divulge the confidential materials in that attorney’s possession despite the passage of time and the potential historical significance of the materials.

Proposal to adopt Ethics 20/20 Revisions in Tennessee Put Out For Public Comment

Back in August 2012, the ABA House of Delegates approved revisions to the ABA Model Rules proposed by the ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission.  Very few of the proposed revisions included in the ABA Ethics 20/20 package are earth-shaking revisions, as many of them only involve change to language in the Comment accompanying certain rules.

The overall bent of the revisions, however, are to address aspects of the impact that technology has on modern law practice, highlight for lawyers their duty to, at the very least, keep abreast of and be competent regarding the types of technologies they use in their practice, and address a few other issues with good guidance regarding how aspects of globalization and the increased use of outsourcing interact with our ethical obligations.

More than twenty-five states have now adopted all or significant parts of the Ethics 20/20 package of changes.  Most recently Washington state has done this, with its revisions to become effective September 1, 2016.  Here in Tennessee, the TBA has filed a petition proposing adoption of almost all of those rule changes, and our Court has now put the TBA petition out for public comment with a November 17, 2016 comment deadline.  (There is also an Errata that the TBA put out to fix a redlining error made by the stupid Chair of the TBA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility when it was pointed out that we’d forgotten to pick up some changes to our RPC 5.5 that went into effect back in January 1, 2016.)

In my opinion, the most important, and most helpful, part of the Ethics 20/20 revisions takes place in RPC 1.6 by explicitly acknowledging the need to reconcile the duty of confidentiality with the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and the fact that, in reality, this means that lawyers need to be able to disclose some otherwise confidential information when looking at moving law firms or when firms are looking at proposed mergers in order to make sure to identify and address potential conflicts of interest under RPC 1.7.

The Tennessee proposed revisions would pick that change up.  Thus, if adopted, like the ABA Model, our RPC 1.6(b)(6) would now provide an exception to RPC 1.6(a) confidentilaity:

(6) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.

If adopted, the TBA’s proposed revisions would also move the language about duties of safeguarding confidential information from the Comment to RPC 1.6 up into the black-letter of the rule itself.  Although our version of that rule would be place into a new RPC 1.6(d), instead of Rule 1.6(c) as in the ABA Model Rules because we already have a RPC 1.6(c) that deviates from the ABA Model Rules approach by imposing certain duties of mandatory disclosure of confidential information.

What we do not propose to pick up, however, are certain aspects of the Ethics 20/20 changes that were made to ABA Model Rule 4.4.  This is because, in Tennessee, we have a more robustly detailed version of  the rule that specifically addresses the duties of lawyers when they receive confidential information that they know or should reasonably know was inadvertently transmitted to them or that they know or should reasonably know was provided to them by someone not authorized to have the information in the first place.

Based on the November 2016 comment deadline, there is reason to be hopeful that these proposed revisions might become effective in Tennessee as early as January 1, 2017.  But, stay tuned.

A former lawyer of Donald Trump speaks … but shouldn’t have

A long while ago I wrote about a lawyer’s public interview that should never have happened.  Here is a lawyer’s op-ed piece that should never happened, you can read the op-ed if you haven’t already at  this link at The Huffington Post.  Now, because such a disclaimer seems to be in order and beneficial to some extent, I say this as someone who contributed to Senator Sanders campaign during the primary and who has contributed to Secretary of State Clinton’s campaign more recently, but here is a lawyer publicly saying everything people who think Trump’s candidacy represents an existential threat to democracy  should want to hear injected into our current political discourse — but the introductory portions of it, the things that the author attempts to use to give it credence and relevance as someone with real insight into the person being criticized, demonstrate that, at least in this version, the piece should never have been written at all.

Taken at face value, the writer is a former lawyer of Trump’s and he appears to be licensed in a jurisdiction, New Jersey, that (like most jurisdictions) provides for a continuing obligation of confidentiality owed to former clients.  New Jersey’s RPC 1.9(c) provides:

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

Thus, the first few paragraphs of the piece set this lawyer up for trouble in terms of allegations that what he is doing — and to some extent what he clearly does (the limo conversation and one or two other conversations) — is breaching his duty of confidentiality to a former client.  The statements about things his former client said to him are certain being used to the former client’s disadvantage and certainly are not generally known pieces of information.

This lawyer needed both a good editor and a good legal adviser who could have told him that with some massaging and editing at the outset he could have still written the lengthy 4,000 words or so about the 20 problems with a lead in that acknowledged that he was obligated by ethics rules not to disclose anything he learned during the representation and that everything he is writing about is information he worked hard to track down through publicly-available sources but ….

Actually, once you remove that piece of it – there is no more need for this gentleman’s voice in the public discourse (other than the stakes involved in the electoral process).  It particularly seems unwise for this lawyer to have taken on this risk, particularly given the well-known litigious nature of the target of the column — who actually, for example, had a lawyer send a letter to Trump’s co-author of The Art of the Deal demanding a return of all royalties now that the co-author is speaking out negatively about Trump despite the fact that book came out almost 30 years ago.

California (where this gentleman is not licensed) just put out a formal ethics opinion driving home the point that its confidentiality requirements adhere even to information that has been publicly disclosed.  Worth noting is even under that opinion, California would appear to signal that the rest of this piece, the just-one-more-voice detailing criticisms from publicly-available sources would not be a violation of duties to the former client, as the California opinion explains about the lawyer’s perhaps unnecessary and unwise but not unethical disclosures about a former client’s arrest for DUI at a time after the representation had ceased.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, earlier this month, refrained from disciplining a NJ lawyer over the disclosure of confidential facts of a current client representation that were already public, so maybe this guy will get a pass?

More on that Persuader Rule decision out of Texas

I’ve written a good bit here about the problems that the Department of Labor’s proposed new Persuader Rule interpretations present and, most recently, wrote a little bit about a Texas federal judge’s ruling issuing a preliminary injunction about the rule going into effect.

My discussion of that ruling back at the end of June 2016 pales in comparison to the wonderful, and wonderfully thorough, piece that the fine folks at the ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct have put out today.  I’m going to start sounding like a broken record but the reporter who produced this treatment of the case, Joan Rogers, did a wonderful job with the subject-matter.  She really dug into the ruling, the history, and the implications and competing positions.  She was also kind enough to include a little bit of my thoughts into her piece as well, for which I’m truly grateful.

Bloomberg/BNA has made the story available outside of their subscription paywall, so you can go read the whole thing at this link.

Astonished and admonished.

So, on days like today, it is very difficult to have a forum (even one as small as this one) and not talk about truly important problems plaguing society, but no one comes here for my thoughts on those things so I’ll refrain.

Staying in my lane, here is another example of a problem lawyers are still having trouble grasping.  The exceptions to client confidentiality under RPC 1.6 (which can also be looked to as a way of justifying disclosure of information about representation of a former client under RPC 1.9) are not likely to give you permission to debate a dissatisfied client publicly, online.  This latest example of the problems arising for a lawyer who does so comes via the fine folks at the Legal Profession Blog who first wrote about it yesterday.

A D.C. lawyer has been informally admonished for trying to refute allegations published on the web by a former client.  The former client was complaining about overbilling, and the lawyer’s allegedly negligent/improper handling of a mediation for her.  Even though the DC Office of Disciplinary Counsel ultimately cleared the lawyer of the alleged violations as to fees and actual handling of the matter, the informal admonishment was in order because of what the lawyer disclosed online in responding to the former client’s complaints.

As the informal admonishment letter to the lawyer explains:

We do find, however, that in including detailed information about your client and the client’s case in your responses to her website postings, you violated your obligations under Rule 1.6 to protect her confidences and secrets — obligations that continued after your attorney-client relationship ended.  See Rule 1.6(g).  The information that you included in your responses to the client’s posts included information about the client and the client’s case that were protected under Rule 1.6.  Although you did not refer to the client by name, you included the name of the client’s employer, the dates on which certain events occurred, and other detailed information that could lead back to your former client.  You did not have the client’s consent to publish or disclose this information.  Nor did your disclosures fall within any of the exceptions to Rule 1.6, including the exception under 1.6(e)(3) that permits a lawyer to use or reveal client confidences or secrets “to the extent reasonably necessary to establish a defense to a criminal charge, disciplinary charge, or civil claim, formally instituted against the lawyer . . .” (emphasis supplied).

Now, D.C.’s version of the Rule 1.6 “self-defense” exception makes the inability to do what this lawyer did more clear cut than in many other jurisdictions.  (It also didn’t help this lawyer’s cause, as the letter goes on to explain, that during the disciplinary investigation process, he went back to the online site to post information claiming he’d been exonerated — conduct the letter indicates was a violation of Rule 8.4(c) and that violation is wrapped into the admonishment as well.)  But even in jurisdictions that do not have the “formally instituted” language of D.C., lawyers face an uphill climb trying to respond to online complaints of former clients as I’ve mentioned before a time or two.

It is also worth remembering that, in most jurisdictions, unlike the “confidences and secrets” language still used in D.C., RPC 1.6 extends to any information regarding the representation of a client.  Remembering that, and the fact that a paragraph of the Comment to the rule most places alerts lawyers that the prohibition on revealing information “also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person.”

Although the Legal Profession Blog has a bad link, you can get the full letter to the D.C. lawyer here.  And, candidly, I’m a bit astonished by that.  Here, in Tennessee, this kind of informal discipline is private.  Not so in D.C.  Learn something new every day.

(Updated – it was brought to my attention that I also had provided a bad link to the letter.  I’ve corrected the link.  Apologies.)

Two updates – one persuasive, one not so much

An important development for labor lawyers that I delved into a bit recently here has now been put on hold.  I managed to point out that there would be significant efforts aimed through litigation at stopping the rule from ever going into effect.  Yesterday, a Texas federal district court has stayed the Department of Labor’s new “Persuader” rule from going into effect on July 1, 2016.  You can read the full 90-page order here or, if you’d prefer the cliffnotes, this ABA Journal online piece does a fine job as always.  Beyond the substantial concerns that exist about how the rule would impact the giving of legal advice and the seeking of legal counsel by employers in connection with union organizing efforts, the crux of things boils down to whether the Department of Labor exceeded its rule-making authority.

Speaking of people who are union members, some of you will recall that I’ve managed to write twice before, using Johnny Manziel as an example, about how much better off professional athletes can be if they would retain the services of an actual lawyer to represent them because of the benefits they would obtain from the obligations lawyers have to treat all information related to the representation of their clients as confidential.  Well, that didn’t work out so well.  We learned this week that Manziel’s lawyer handling his criminal matter managed to send a rather lengthy text to the Associated Press rather than to the prosecutor with whom he was intending to communicate.  On the upside, this time the lawyer quit rather than firing Manziel as his past agents did, but I’m starting to think that Manziel is just cursed at this point.

Unfortunately, this act of preventable negligence on the part of Manziel’s lawyer will, of course, spur some folks to argue that this is further proof that lawyers should never use text messaging to talk to a client or someone else involved in a matter about a client’s matter.  Do not count me among those folks as I think such advice is entirely unrealistic in 2016.  The only lesson to be learned is the old-fashioned, but harder to swallow, advice about being careful, cautious, and deliberate in all of your communications.

 

Radiolab does the “buried bodies” case

Over the last couple of years, like a lot of other people, I have gotten very into listening to podcasts on my way to and from work and on car trips.  Most of what I spend my time listening to is in the comedic vein (MBMBAM, Judge John Hodgman, You Talking U2 to Me), but I listen to some other shows that don’t fall into that category, one of which is Radiolab.  My 11-year old son really, really likes Radiolab, which helps a good bit too in terms of finding time to listen.

Radiolab is predominantly geared toward exploring scientific issues, but the latest episode of the podcast takes on the famous “Buried Bodies” case.  That case serves often, especially, in legal ethics courses taught in law school as the starkest example of what lawyers have to be prepared to do in order to fulfill their ethical obligation of confidentiality to clients.  It is certainly the height of absurdity for me to think I can drive any traffic to Radiolab, but if you don’t otherwise know how to get to it, you can download the episode from this link.

For those of us who have a law practice that involves representing and advising lawyers, or those who follow legal ethics issues generally, the only truly new aspect of the story in the podcast is getting to hear from the mother of one of the missing girls.  I will not explicitly spoil that for anyone, but you probably don’t need many guesses to answer the question of what she thinks of the duty of confidentiality.

Tennessee,like many other jurisdictions, casts the net of lawyer-client confidentiality broadly to cover all “information relating to the representation of a client.”  We differ from a number of other jurisdictions, however, in that we require lawyers to disclose confidential information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,” rather than merely permit a lawyer to make a disclosure for that purpose as the ABA Model Rules do.  But, as Radiolab covers well, that kind of provision does not offer a lawyer a way out when the information relates not only to the representation of the client but to people who are already dead.

RPC 1.6 confidentiality is a concept that is difficult enough for some lawyers to grasp given how broadly the net is cast, and that it makes no explicit exception for information that has already been made public, so it is no surprise when regular people do not understand its full scope.

Yet, it doesn’t help when, in many respects, the duty is so frequently cast aside on mundane matters in that lawyers talk publicly and post publicly about aspects of their representation of clients undoubtedly without having gotten their client’s consent to do so.  I think how confidentiality continues or changes over the next decade or so ought to be fascinating to watch given the differences that already exist between generations with respect to social media and how that impacts whether you do or do not share everything about your life online.

Three short technology stories for a Tuesday

Throwback Thursday is definitely a thing all over the World Wide Web it seems, but maybe Tech Tuesday ought to be a thing?  Though, I guess, for lawyers focusing on technology has to be an every day affair.

Like multitudes of others, I wrote a little bit recently about the Panama Papers and the Mossack Fonseca data breach fiasco.  Fortune now has an article online about a Wired U.K. story that casts a harsh light on the electronic security measures that the Panamanian firm had in place.  Blurbs like these

Mosseck Fonseca’s client portal, according to Wired, runs on a version of Drupal last updated in 2013, and vulnerable to an array of attacks, including one that would allow attackers to execute commands on the site. Another weakness allows access to the site’s back end just by guessing the right web address.

Just as bad is the firm’s webmail portal, which runs Microsoft Outlook Web Access, and hasn’t been updated since 2009. The firm also did not encrypt its emails. As one expert speaking to Wired put it, “They seem to have been caught in a time warp.”

sound very bad when you are talking about a firm that trafficked almost exclusively in “highly sensitive financial information.”  I suspect though that there are lots of other lawyers out there that are hopeful that their technology arrangements will never be subjected to even half as much scrutiny.

One lawyer who is in the middle of a highly public examination of their choices in technology is the lawyer at the heart of this story yesterday.  The lawyer has been sued by her former clients over a theft from them of $1.9 million resulting from hacking of the lawyer’s email account.  The couple had hired the attorney to represent them in the purchase of a nearly $20 million co-op apartment.  Luckily, it appears that the clients figured out what was going on even before the lawyer did and were able to recover almost all of the $1.9 million that was to be the down payment but was wired to the fraudsters.  The lawyer — and you ought to brace yourself here (though I admittedly know lawyers who still use this service) — was using an AOL email account for her real estate law practice.

The lawsuit contends that AOL accounts are particularly vulnerable to hacking and that the hacking was what let the cybercriminals know when certain transactions were going to take place, but as the article makes clear there were other opportunities for the lawyer to realize something was amiss:

It accuses Doran of forwarding bogus emails from the hackers — who were impersonating the seller of the apartment’s attorney — about payments from the Millards without confirming their authenticity last December. The name of the seller’s attorney was misspelled in the email which should have been a tip off that something was amiss.

Finally, the usually on-point Karen Rubin has a well-done post over at The Law For Lawyers Today about a relatively fortunate Oklahoma lawyer who managed to avoid full reciprocal discipline over his inability to figure out how to e-file in bankruptcy court.

The Oklahoma lawyer was permanently suspended by the Western District of Oklahoma bankruptcy court from ever practicing before it again, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court hit him only with a public censure.  Given the current rhetoric surrounding the practice of law and the demands everyone appears to assume lawyers absolutely must satisfy when it comes to using technology, it is pretty startling to read a state supreme court, in that case Oklahoma’s, issue an opinion in a lawyer discipline case that can be read to seem to minimize the obligation to be technologically competent.  But, in fairness, unless the Oklahoma Supreme Court was going to be willing to disbar the lawyer in question — which would seem supremely harsh — then any discipline imposed through reciprocal channels was going to be less than that meted out by the federal bankruptcy court and a public censure sounds about right to me.

 

Three updates for the Thursday before Tax Day

Back in September, I wrote a bit about some different perspectives on the purpose of lawyer regulation and commented on a story that discussed a proposal that Colorado had in the works.  On April 7, 2016, The Colorado Supreme Court took action to adopt a new “Preamble” that serves as the introduction to its rules governing admission of lawyers to the bar, its attorney ethics rules, and its disciplinary procedural rules.  You can read the language of what was adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court here.  It should come as no surprise that the list of objectives does not including anything that could be construed as obviously anti-competitive, but it also creates a framework for interesting conversation about whether there are particular ethics rules in Colorado that can actually be viewed as unnecessarily standing in the way of furtherance of one or more of the Colorado objectives.

A second shoe has now fallen with respect to the Dentons’ disqualification situation in the proceedings before the U.S. International Trade Commission that prompted my two part piece on Swiss Vereins back in July 2015 (here and here).  RevoLaze – the client from which Denton was disqualified from continuing by the ALJ’s ruling, has filed a legal malpractice suit against Dentons earlier this month over that conflict and the damages it says it has suffered as a result of its law firm getting disqualified.  The suit seeks in excess of $50 million from Dentons.  After Dentons was disqualified, The Gap, another client of Dentons but that was being represented by other lawyers in the ITC matter, ended up settling its patent suit back in August 2015.  RevoLaze is claiming that it ended up having to settle for far less than the case was worth after Dentons was disqualified and it had to get new counsel involved.  If you are a Law360 subscriber you can read a bit about the suit (and actually get access to a copy of the complaint) here.

Last, and saddest, Johnny Manziel is back in the news in a big way mostly because he has been fired by another agent.  Back when Manziel’s prior agent issued a press release about firing Manziel in February, I wrote this piece about how baffled I get when athletes opt not to hire agents who are also lawyers.  Because Manziel still doesn’t have an agent who is a lawyer, his latest agent issued a public statement about how he’d dropped Manziel but given him 5 days to take action and enter a treatment facility:

“I have informed him that if he takes the immediate steps I have outlined for him that I will rescind the termination and continue to represent him,” Rosenhaus said. “Otherwise the termination will become permanent. There is a five-day window for me to rescind the termination. I’m hoping he takes the necessary steps to get his life back on track.”

Had Manziel secured a lawyer-agent, there is no way the lawyer-agent would have been able to make that kind of public ultimatum without violating client confidentiality under RPC 1.6.  And, it seems like the Rosenhaus ultimatum news managed to also break the news that LA police were investigating Manziel’s involvement as a passenger in a hit and run, which is now serving a further platform of negative publicity for a guy that sure doesn’t seem to need any help generating negative publicity on his own.