ABA Ethics 20/20 revisions. New York adopts some; Tennessee proposal still pending.

Roy Simon, the Chair of the NY State Bar Association Committee on Standards on Attorney Conduct, was kind enough to include me on an email last week and, as a result, I learned that New York’s proposed adoption of certain aspects of the ABA Ethics 20/20 revisions was approved, effective January 1, 2017.  Back in 2015, New York adopted certain revisions to Comments to the Rules consistent with Ethics 20/20, but the proposal to change the rules themselves required Court action.  You can read the details of the revisions that were adopted in this PDF: order-adopting-black-letter-amendments-to-part-1200-eff-jan-1-2017.  As with many jurisdictions, New York has picked up the move to a black letter duty in Rule 1.6 to “make reasonable efforts” to safeguard confidential information but not adopted several of the other Ethics 20/20 black-letter revisions  For example, New York has not adopted the Ethics 20/20 revision to acknowledge in Rule 1.6 the need to disclose certain information in connection with lateral moves and mergers in order to comply with the concomitant duty to avoid conflicts under Rule 1.7.  The Comments adopted in 2015 in New York did pick up the Ethics 20/20 revisions to the Comment to Rule 1.6 on that topic, however.

The Comments adopted back in 2015 also included the new paragraphs in Rule 1.1 that are touted by many as establishing a duty of technological competence for lawyers.

I wrote back in the late part of the summer about the TBA’s petition to the Tennessee Supreme Court proposing that Tennessee adopt almost all of the ABA Ethics 20/20 revisions.  The deadline for public comments expired in November 2016, but not before our disciplinary body, the Board of Professional Responsibility, filed comments proposing a number of additional amendments to be layered upon the TBA proposal.  Several of the BPR proposals, all of which you can read here (starting at page 2 of the linked PDF), are puzzling.

The TBA filed a response/reply to the BPR’s comment arguing against the majority of the BPR proposals.  The TBA’s response is not yet up at the Court’s website, but as I was one of the signers of it, I happen to have a copy, and you can read it at this link:  petition-bpr-comment-response

This situation regarding the pending proposal is one of the 12 developments I’ll be covering, including a detailed discussion of some of the puzzling pieces of the BPR proposal, during this year’s Ethics Roadshow.

The first stop is this morning in Memphis, and I’ll be doing it again tomorrow in Nashville.


DC Ethics Opinion 370 – Y’all knew I wouldn’t be able to resist

So, the D.C. Bar has come out with a far-reaching, sort of two-part ethics opinion addressing lawyers and social media usage.  Opinion 370 (Part 1) can be grabbed here.  Opinion 371 (Part 2) from here.  Opinion 370 has lots of really good parts, but much of the publicity it has received to date revolves around something it throws out for lawyers to bear in mind and be wary of that hasn’t really been said by opinion-writing entities before.

Here’s how the ABA Journal online headline treated it – “beware” of “social media statements on legal issues.”  Other aspects of the reporting I have seen described it as warning lawyers who offer opinions online of the potential for creating an “issue” conflict.  There’s a reason, I think, this topic hasn’t been explored much by other opinion-writing bodies:  it is a relatively silly and irresponsible take.  Regardless, given the minimal treatment of the issue that the opinion offers, even if you think there were merit to flagging the issue for consideration, the portion of Opinion 370 that “addresses” it still would be better left on the cutting room floor.

Here, in its entirety, is the analysis of this issue as a risk for lawyers from the DC Opinion:

Caution should be exercised when stating positions on issues, as those stated positions could be adverse to an interest of a client, thus inadvertently creating a conflict. Rule 1.7(b)(4) states that an attorney shall not represent a client with respect to a matter if “the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be adversely affected by . . . the lawyer’s own financial, business, property or personal interests,” unless the conflict is resolved in accordance with Rule 1.7(c). Content of social media posts made by attorneys may contain evidence of such conflicts.

Now, to help get your bearings straight if you aren’t a D.C. lawyer, D.C.’s Rule 1.7(b)(4) is different from what is set out in the ABA Model Rules and, thus, different from what we have here in Tennessee (for example) in the closest equivalent rule, RPC 1.7(a)(2).  Our RPC 1.7(a)(2), just like the ABA Model, establishes a conflict of interest — albeit a potentially consentable one — where “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”

In a (stop-me-if-you-heard-this-one-before) well-done story by Samson Habte with the ABA/BNA Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct, some quotes are gathered from folks pointing out that the concept of an “issue” or “positional” conflict of interest necessarily involves or requires taking contrasting positions in front of one or more tribunals and, thus, a lawyer’s public statements of opinion about a legal question couldn’t create a positional or issue conflict.

In Tennessee, for example, we address issue/positional conflicts of interests in Paragraph [24] of our Comment to RPC 1.7.  While incapable of being that kind of conflict, supporters of the D.C. Opinion warning might argue that it is still a risky endeavor to express opinions about a legal issue because the lawyer might then have a “personal interest” in how something is resolved that would materially limit the ability to represent a client.

To me, that kind of approach to the topic not only misunderstands what it means to be a lawyer representing a client but also what the rules say in a variety of places it means to be a lawyer at all.  I’ll stick for now to just the Tennessee rules though I’d venture a guess that similar principals are laid out in D.C.’s rules.

In the Preamble to our Rules, in the second paragraph, we lay out a list of things that a “lawyer” is and, included among them, is “a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”  In the seventh paragraph of the Preamble to the Rules we say:

As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice, and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.  As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law; and work to strengthen legal education.

Further, we have a rule, RPC 6.4, patterned after ABA Model Rule 6.4, that specifically makes the point that lawyers can ethically undertake service in connection with entities that seek to reform the law or its administration even though such efforts could detrimentally affect the interests of a client of the lawyer.  If a Tennessee lawyer can engage in organized efforts to reform the law even though those efforts, if successful, might detrimentally affect the interests of one of the lawyer’s clients, then absolutely they can make public statements about what the law should be without violating the ethics rules.

Now, might a client decide not to hire a lawyer who has already indicated a personal belief contrary to the client’s position.  Sure, and they’d have every right to make that decision.  But they might also make a different decision and think that, if the lawyer is willing to take on and argue their position despite past public statements to the contrary, it would make their arguments stronger.

To my knowledge. opinion-writing entities have never warned lawyers about writing learned treatises or books on legal subjects or discouraged lawyers from speaking at Continuing Legal Education events or seminars (which are these days often videotaped and archived) because of some notion that expressing an opinion about a legal issue could create an ethical conflict for the lawyer.  Seems to me that the same “logic” that drove the almost offhand reference by the DC Bar in the Ethics Opinion could be applied to tell lawyers to “beware” of such other activities as well.

One thing I hope everyone could agree upon though is: if you are going to go to the trouble of injecting this issue into what is otherwise an extremely lengthy ethics opinion, then you should have done a better job of tackling the issue comprehensively rather than simply throwing out a half-baked statement that could serve to dissuade lawyers from speaking out.

Going from “easiest” to “most difficult” in three weeks.

It is Election Day, but neither the title nor the subject-matter of this post have anything to do with that.

Later this week, November 11, I will be fortunate enough to present at the annual meeting of the Tennessee Association of Construction Counsel in Nashville and have billed my topic as “The Easiest Hour of Ethics You’ll Ever Learn.”  Unlike my normal seminars, I don’t plan to push the audience to participate at all, but (and this is a warning for those who are planning to attend and reading this post… here be SPOILERS and if you want to stay surprised you should read no further…)


That should be enough hard returns and buffers for those who are trying to hit the back tab.

As most of you won’t be there, let me continue.  My plan is to essentially provide an “everything you ever wanted to know about the disciplinary process in Tennessee but were afraid to ask” presentation.  Far too few lawyer truly understand how the process works – and no one wants to learn about it for the first time when dealing with a disciplinary complaint filed against them, so hopefully it should be informative and a bit enjoyable.

Exactly three weeks later though, we’re going down the opposite path as I’m going to present at the Memphis Bar Association Labor and Employment Law section’s annual seminar in Memphis and my presentation is titled:  “The Most Difficult Ethics Hour You’ve Ever Earned – An Open Discussion of New ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and What Comes Next.”  That one is going to be almost entirely interactive and given that the folks in the room will be employment and labor lawyers… I expect an opinionated bunch with thoughts on the relative merits of turning an employment law issue into an ethics and disciplinary issue.

I’ve written on this blog three times previously about the ABA Model Rule and won’t repeat myself today.  But I did want to briefly discuss a development along these lines.  Specifically, it comes from the Philadelphia Bar Association which, on October 26, 2016, passed a Resolution urging the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:

to adopt the amendment to Rule 8.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct which adds section (g) making it an ethical violation to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.

It will be interesting to see if this spurs any action from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or not, particularly given the negative publicity that various justices have brought upon that court over the last few years.

A very Tennessee-specific discussion for this Friday.

Later today I will have the honor of speaking as part of a panel at the TBA Health Law Forum.  The other panelists are Sheree Wright, the Senior Associate General Counsel with Vanderbilt University and Bill Hannah a lawyer in Chattanooga with the Chambliss Bahner firm.  I’m fortunate enough to have both Sheree and Bill as members of the TBA Ethics Committee I chair and am very excited to spend a couple of hours talking with them and the crowd about ethics issues near and dear to Health Care lawyers.  We’ll be talking about “The Ethics of the Distracted Lawyer.”  If you happen to be in the Franklin/Cool Springs part of Tennessee, you probably still might be able to work your way into the venue to register and attend.

As indicated in the title of the post, the only other thing I’m going to discuss today also is a topic that really is relevant only to Tennessee lawyers (but to a larger segment of that group, then the people that might actually contemplate a last minute visit to the above-highlighted seminar.)

I’ve now gotten enough inquiries over the last several weeks about the revised state-of-play in Tennessee state court litigation when it comes to attorney’s conferring with deponents during breaks in a deposition that it likely makes sense to write about it to have another handy link to send to folks that ask for a recollection refresher.

Whether such arrangements are kosher or not is subject to significant variance in various jurisdictions.  Perhaps the original case staking out the notion that an attorney’s communication with a client/deponent  during a deposition was not a privileged communication is Hall v. Clifton Precision,150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  I’ve done quite  few CLEs over the years where I used one hypothetical or another to tease out the situation and to lead the audience into a discussion about whether the lawyer taking the deposition can successfully force disclosure of what was said to the witness by another lawyer during a break.  The general principle from which courts have concluded that no privilege applies and that the contents of such discussions can be explored is that depositions are supposed to take place in the same manner as if they were trial testimony.  Karen Rubin back in 2015 delved pretty thoroughly into the state of the law on this issue at her firm’s blog here.

Tennessee has, assuming the vehicle chosen actually does the trick, created a very clear answer to this question now for cases pending in our state courts. The answer, in effect as of July 1, 2016, makes communications with a deponent during a break in the deposition perfectly appropriate, as long as: (1) there is not a question pending; and (2) the lawyer’s communication with the deponent during the break does not cross any lines so as to amount to a violation of RPC 3.3 or 3.4.

The vehicle chosen for doing this is a 2016 Advisory Commission Comment to our rule of civil procedure addressed at depositions, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 30.03  The comment provides as follows:

Rule 30.03 provides that “[e]xamination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.” This language does not imply that Tenn. R. Evid. 615 is applicable to depositions. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a lawyer may communicate with a deponent about deposition procedure or the substance of deposition testimony before, during (unless a question is pending) or after the deposition; however, such communications are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct including, but not limited to, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.3 and RPC 3.4.

Now I don’t know exactly where an Advisory Commission Comment to a rule of procedure ranks in terms of authority and precedent as a technical matter, but there is no question that this is the latest word on this matter – words that our Court has bought into or they would have not approved the release – and, thus, a lawyer who wants to talk to their client during a deposition in our state court system no longer has to be worried about the client being forced to divulge the discussion on a claim that privilege does not apply.  At least as long as there wasn’t a pending question at the time of the break and the conversation.

What lawyers will still need to be concerned about – whether the deponent is their client or not — is communications that could be construed as amounting to violations of RPC 3.3 because they involve assisting a fraud on the tribunal or that could be construed as violating RPC 3.4.

The two most obvious pieces of RPC 3.4 that a lawyer could run afoul of through coaching a deponent during a break would be:

(a)       unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; or

(b)       falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to offer false or misleading testimony

So, still a topic that can be explored through interesting hypos at future seminars even in Tennessee.

Everything’s bigger in Texas, including rule problems sometimes.

First, no argument from me that I’ve been a bad blogger this week.  I’d offer excuses, but no one likes to hear excuses.

Second, how about some actual substantive content … I’ve written in the past about ethical issues surrounding the verein structure of some of the largest law firms in the world.  Those prior discussions involved conflicts issues stemming from treatment of the verein as one firm for purposes of the ethics rules.

Within the last few weeks the State Bar of Texas Professional Ethics Committee issued Opinion 663 which reveals a new problem for lawyers practicing in a verein but a problem that is relatively specific to Texas given that it involves a pretty antiquated approach to law firm names — an approach that bars “trade names” altogether but that also gets very particular about whether a law firm name can have the name of someone who doesn’t actually practice law in that firm.

Texas still has in place a very persnickety rule about what law firm names, Rule 7.01 which reads:

A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm name containing names other than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except that … if otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its name the name or names of one or more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession.

So, what particularly was the issue – and the opinion does genericize the firm names involved but you can read this TexasLawyer article if you want to know the real details — well, the issue is a law firm, previously known as Smith, Johnson wants to operate under the name of the verein it has joined – Brown, Jones, Smith — as explained by the Committee is that there has never been a lawyer at the Smith, Johnson firm named Brown or Jones.  Kind of silly, right?  They also say it is misleading because it would make people think that all the lawyers in the firms in the verein are all lawyers in the same law firm when they aren’t really.

The outcome of the opinion also raises an interesting question of larger impact which is why did the Texas committee make the assumption it made in the first place? Everything about the opinion flows from the assumption that the Committee explains to open the “Discussion” portion:

This opinion is based on the Committee’s assumption that the lawyers in the law firms that become members of an organization that includes other law firms (in this instance a verein) are not legally determined to be members of one law firm as defined in the Terminology section of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

The word “firm” in that Terminology section, by the way, defines a firm in an entirely circular fashion as being “a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm; or a lawyer or lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation, legal services organization, or other organization, or in a unit of government.”

The opinion explains that the facts it had been provided about the verein’s role in a way that would seem to support the conclusion that it was not one firm:

The verein provides some administrative services to each of the member firms and coordinates certain activities of the firms, but it does not provide legal services to clients. The lawyers who are members of the Texas law firm and who are licensed in Texas are not partners or members of the other law firms in the verein. The lawyers in the Texas law firm do not share profits, losses, or liabilities with the lawyers in the other law firms in the verein. The lawyers in the Texas law firm have no authority or vote in the actions of the other law firms in the verein. The law firms who joined the verein are not merged as a result of joining the verein.

So, in an interesting way, this Texas opinion truly is the flipside to the disqualification ruling involving Dentons that I wrote about so long ago.  That judge decided that because Dentons held itself out to the world as one firm, it should be treated that way under the ethics rules as to conflicts.  The Texas opinion says that you can’t hold yourself out to the world as one firm because you aren’t really one.

And, if you happen to be in the Murfreesboro area today and happen to be a legal professional, you could come hear me speak about the “12 Commandments of Social Media for Legal Professionals.”


Both the java fight and the nut dispute are kind of bananas.

If you spend any time on social media these days, you may have noticed how irritable folks are.  There are lots of reasons for it, of course.  We live in stressful times.  Practicing law has always been a high-stress endeavor as far as professions go; thus, cries for more civility in the practice of law have been going on for many years and likely will continue to go on for many more years to come.

I’ve offered before on this blog my overarching “don’t be an ass” theory as it relates to practicing law but lawyers are people and people are people, so … sometimes people don’t get along.

There have been two relatively recent examples of lawyers not getting along, actually getting into dust-ups that have become pretty high-profile (or at least they were a few weeks ago) and that seem pretty hard to believe all involved wouldn’t wish for a chance at a simple do over.

One of them was talked about most frequently as being a coffee fight, but reads more like something that was already in the problem range before the hurling of coffee ever came into the picture.  The dispute happened during a deposition so in addition to the he said/she said aspects of what went down, there was a court reporter present.  The court reporter’s version of events grabs parts of each of the competing stories and likely gets the closest to the accurate version of events — the coffee was iced coffee and it likely was hurled at the other lawyer.  Doesn’t change the fact that it’s really bad behavior but at least it makes it much less likely that anyone was at risk of burns from scalding coffee.  You can read about all the various filings and back and forth here, here, here, and here if you’d like.

The other dispute that got lumped into my reading pile with the java jousting is both more and less bizarre at the same time.  As it all appears to turn over false allegations about how one lawyer acted upon learning about the existence of a nut allergy on the part of another lawyer’s paralegal.  You can read a bit more about that weirdness here.

Interestingly (although maybe that’s the wrong choice of word), assuming away any criminality in any of the conduct), the ethics rules that often come into play in dust-ups of these sorts are RPC 3.4 (at least as to the parts of them that relate to battles over obstructionist discovery tactics and the like), RPC 4.4(a)’s prohibition on using means when representing a client “that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass … or burden a third person,” and RPC 8.4(d) prohibition on conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Interestingly (and here it is definitely the apt word), the coffee fight at least contains some undertones of issues that might be in the wheelhouse of the ABA’s new RPC 8.4(g),

Speaking of disputes, but not disputes between lawyers and not disputes involving the weaponizing of any ingestible foodstuffs, I will be doing a national teleseminar tomorrow along with Sue Friedberg who serves as Associate General Counsel of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney on “Ethics and Disputes With Clients.”  You can sign up for it through a number of different channels (check with your local bar for example) like through this link in Oregon or this link in Nebraska or this one in Missouri.

Here today, gone tomorrow. But also there tomorrow.

So, tomorrow, I am speaking as part of a seminar put on by the Solo and Small Firm section of the Memphis Bar Association focusing on aspects of buying or selling a law practice.  I’ll be doing the second hour — “What to Do When (not) Everything Must Go? The Ethics of Buying or Selling a Law Practice” — so come out if you are in Memphis and it might be of interest to you.

One thing I’ll likely just mention barely though, if at all, is another important thing that solo lawyers should have on their to-do list which is having a plan in place for who takes over or takes care of their practice in the event something sudden and horrible happens to them.  In Tennessee, we’ve adopted a relatively robust provision as part of our rules of disciplinary procedure that allows for another law to serve as a receiver attorney and that permits lawyers to designate someone by contract in advance to perform those services and, presumably, end up imbued with all the same powers a receiver attorney would have if appointed by a court.

I’m pasting below a piece I authored addressing one aspect of this succession planning topic for lawyers — “Financial Planning for the Closing or Transition of Your Law Office.”  This is one piece of a collection of materials I put together that are housed within the Tennessee Bar Association’s Solo In A Box Toolkit.  You can read it along with the other pieces I put together for the very poorly (or at least unwieldily) named “TBA Handbook: Materials and Forms Relating to Planning/Providng For An Orderly Transition Before Sudden Death, Disability, or Incapacity Arises” (yes – typo in the original; ugh) at this link.  But here are my thoughts du jour on the financial planning aspect of the subject for those that don’t want to take a look at the link (and until this gets read I’m not sure more than 5 people have ever read it because the set of materials are buried albeit not on the deep web but pretty deep into the TBA website).

Receiver Attorneys who assist in transitioning your clients or closing your law practice after your death, sudden disability, or sudden incapacity need there to be available funds for a number of purposes to pay for items needed in the closing process and, of course, to compensate them for their time and service. Attorneys should do their best to make arrangements in advance for such needs. Attorneys also should plan to make funds available as working capital to pay staff, rent, utilities as well to insure the orderly transition and closing of their office after they are no longer able to practice law. When Attorneys fail to do this, they will put the Receiver Attorney in the position of having to seek to have their fees and other expenses paid from the Attorney’s Estate if there is one which may cause unnecessary conflicts to arise and burdens imposed. Receiver Attorneys and Attorney’s staff should not have to worry about their compensation while being asked to assist the Attorney, the Attorney’s Estate or family member by transitioning and closing the Attorney’s practice and office.

Some Suggested Methods of Funding the Transition and Closing of Your Office:

1. Establish an Office Closing Fund in a separate bank account in an amount projected to be sufficient to cover 2 months of operating expenses for your office. Have your designated Receiver Attorney listed as an authorized signatory for this separate bank account.

2. Take out a small life insurance policy of $10,000 to $25,000 on your life and amend your will to designate that these funds are too be used for the purposes of funding the orderly closing of your office and direct your Personal Representative or Executor accordingly.

3. If your law practice is organized as a professional limited liability company, professional corporation, or other business entity and leave a bequest in your will to the entity with directions that the funds be made immediately available to the Receiver Attorney to pay the costs and expenses of closing your law office.

4. Have your business entity purchase a life insurance policy on your life that names the entity as the beneficiary. Again, including directions/instructions in your will regarding the use to which the funds are to be put.

If funds are available to compensate those involved in doing the work, then the Receiver Attorney and your staff should be much better positioned to pull your files together, notify clients and opposing attorneys, collect accounts receivable, prepare motions and notices to courts and otherwise efficiently, and expeditiously, complete the transition of your practice and closing of your office.


Shameless self promotion – 2016 Ethics Roadshow update

Big news … well, the size of the news may be subject to differing opinions, but news.

Believe it or not, this year will be the 12th year that I have had the opportunity to do the Ethics Roadshow for lawyers throughout Tennessee.  Since this is my 12th go round at doing three hours of just me talking about ethics, the theme of this year’s Roadshow will be the “12 Most Important Developments of 2016 Impacting Ethics and Lawyering.”

Those of you are in the intersecting portion of the circles on the Venn diagram of Roadshow attendees and blog readers will likely be able to predict many of the topics we end up talking about in December 2016.

Because I don’t like to be completely predictable, however, it is possible,  especially given my full-on case of Hamilaria, that I’ll end up performing a 3-hr groundbreaking musical adaptation of the Second Edition of Professional Responsibility in LitigationAfter all, why should I throw away my shot?

I don’t think the TBA has the pages up and running yet to register to attend for any of the stops, but once they do I’ll put the links up at the Seminars page of the site.  In the meantime, here are the city-specific details:

The 2016 Ethics Roadshow: More Ethical by the Dozen?

Memphis – December 6, 2016

Nashville – December 7, 2016

Jackson – December 12, 2016

Chattanooga – December 14, 2016

Knoxville – December 15, 2016

Johnson City – December 16, 2016


Wait for it.

Stress, drinks, and folderol

Over the last several months there have been various iterations of stories and reports making the rounds about the susceptibility of our profession to depression and substance abuse, reports of 1 in 5 lawyers being problem drinkers, etc.  There are also always folks out there writing variations of pieces about the problems that are created by incivility among lawyers.  Here’s one rolled out earlier this month.  While I am a strong believer that vague and “eye of the beholder” concepts such as civility and professionalism should be kept separate from ethical codes that are enforceable through discipline, I’m also on record about the general, good advice of simply not being an ass.

I don’t know if it is true, as I’ve heard some say now or as some said in 1989 before I was ever even practicing for that matter, that things are worse/more vitriolic now than they have been in the past.  I don’t purport to know the answer to that last question but certainly have my own cynical views about nostalgia generally (and as to the practice of law particularly) where I end up agreeing almost wholeheartedly with John Hodgman’s view:

That’s the parlor trick of nostalgia, and it’s why nostalgia is the worst. It is a toxic impulse that leads to nothing good, honestly. The idea that things were better once and are terrible now and getting worse every minute is what fuels the worst, in my opinion, movements in contemporary culture.

But, at the same time I recognize in myself the additional stress in life that can come as a side effect to all of the wonderful benefits that technological advances do bring to life.  None of us are perfect and all of us are under pressure and all of us feel the need to provide rapid responses and take rapid action, a need that is inculcated with each passing day that we practice in the always-at-work world of smartphones, wearable tech, and whatever might have been invented just now.

A week from today I will be speaking in Memphis for attorneys who need an hour of ethics credit on the topic of “Ethics in Dealing With Opposing Counsel.  Ironically or not, the talk will be in connection with a Happy Hour event, and there will be adult drinks available afterwards.

All professions have aspects of what they do that induce stress; lawyers are not unique in that regard.  Yet, one thing that we do have to deal with that almost no other professionals have to endure are folks like the Connecticut gentleman who prompted this federal court order and who claims to have reopened the “federal postal court” and to have created his own language rife with strange syntax, mathematical formulas, and a core tenet that only nouns have legal meanings.

Ask any LAWYER YOU know and THEY’LL TELL YOU that they’ve HAD TO DEAL at least ONCE with one of THESE CHARACTERS that also MANAGES TO ALWAYS have to work in random BOUTS OF capitalization.  Having to deal with these folks and assist clients in attempting to unwind the crazy stuff these jokers attempt to do is a bonus stressor for the legal profession.

In this particular incident, as today’s ABA Journal online article explains, most of the heavy lifting in unwinding the nonsense was borne by a federal district judge.  Yet, the problem created was not insubstantial, and I would guess at least a lawyer or two spent some time stewing over the potential damage that was being caused to their client.  The gentleman had filed an $11.5 million “judgment” of the federal postal court for registration in Connecticut against Ocwen Financial Corp.

In ordering that the “judgment” be stricken, among other choice nuggets, an actual federal court had to write that that the gentleman claiming to be a judge of the postal court had explained during a telephonic hearing:

that the Federal Postal Court operates on the basis of a sophisticated mathematical understanding of language that proves that certain mortgage documents are fraudulent.

The story also notes that there were dozens of similar filings made recently in Connecticut purporting to be judgments of this “court” which, uniquely, has no physical fixed location but happens to have “transitory jurisdiction wherever the federal postal eagle symbol may be.”

Just writing about this issue kind of makes me interested in having a beer with lunch.  If I do (I won’t), it would be a Belgian beer as a reminder of real, and much more consequential, problems and stressors that are out there in the modern world.