The Future of Legal Services – Oregon weighs in

I was given an opportunity to provide a Legislative Update piece in the Spring 2017 issue of TortSource a publication of the ABA Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section.  The focus of the Spring 2017 issue is “Evolving Legal Markets” and, although the authorship is Tennessee-heavy, I think you will find all the articles to be worth a read if you can get access.  There is a piece on artificial intelligence, a piece on consumer-facing legal services provided by non-lawyers, a piece on predictive coding, and one on online dispute resolution.

My piece focuses on questions of UPL and responses by states to challenges posed by the companies that compete with lawyers for clients and I’ll share with you the conclusion section:

Other jurisdictions may choose to take more strident approaches, but it would appear that the best path forward for leveling the playing field for lawyers is to seek the adoption of regulations that will require companies providing such legal services to consumers to adhere to the same ethics rules as lawyers. The ABA’s Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services (A.B.A. Resolution 105, Feb. 2016) provide one template for states to consider to pursue such a path forward.

That conclusion feels more prescient than it truly was because, this past week, the Oregon State Bar Futures Task Force issued its report on the Future of Legal Services in Oregon.   Oregon is often discussed a rainy part of the U.S., and the volume of materials provided as the end product of the Futures Task Force is something of a deluge — the Executive Summary alone spans 15 pages of material.  You can read the Executive Summary here.

There is so much content of note in the work the OSB Futures Task Force has performed that I foresee spending a few posts discussing aspects of it, but today I want to start with a discussion of the findings of one of the two committees that made up the task force.

But even before discussing those two items, some background about the Futures Task Force and about the structure of the report and recommendations is in order.  First, the origin of the task force itself:

In April 2016, the OSB Board of Governors convened a Futures Task Force with the following charge:

“Examine how the Oregon State Bar can best protect the public          and support lawyers’ professional development in the face of            the public evolution of the manner in which legal services are            obtained and delivered.  Such changes have been spurred by              the blurring of traditional jurisdictional borders, the                            introduction of new models for regulating legal services and              educating legal professionals, dynamic public expectations                about how to seek and obtain affordable legal services, and                technological innovations that expand the ability to offer legal          services in dramatically different and financially viable ways.”

Second, the first step that was pursued as to the Task Force once created:

The Board split the Futures Task Force into two committees: a Legal Innovations Committee, focused on the tools and models required for a modern legal practice, and a Regulatory Committee, focused on how to best regulate and protect the public in light of the changing legal services market.

The end result was that the Regulatory Committee has made three recommendations and the Legal Innovations Committee has made five recommendations.  I plan to definitely write further, and in more detail, about the Regulatory Committee recommendations.

But, as indicated, for now I just want to talk about the findings made by one of the two committees, the Regulatory Committee.  I want to focus on them because, I think, they reveal just how universal the situation is that is faced in U.S. jurisdictions and, in turn, this means that the work product of this Oregon group has obvious potential application as a road map for action just about anywhere.  The Regulatory Committee made these nine findings:

  1. Oregonians need legal advice and legal services to successfully resolve problems and to access the courts.
  2. Consumers are increasingly unwilling or unable to engage traditional full-service legal representation.
  3. A significant number of self-represented litigants choose not to hire lawyers, even though they could afford to do so.
  4. Self-help resources are crucial and must be improved, even as we take steps to make professional legal services more accessible.
  5. Subsidized and free legal services, including legal aid and pro bono representation, are a key part of solving the access-to-justice gap, but they remain inadequate to meet all of the civil legal needs of low-income Oregonians.
  6. Despite the existence of numerous under- and unemployed lawyers, the supply of legal talent is not being matched with the need.
  7. Oregonians’ lack of access to legal advice and services leads to unfair outcomes, enlarges the access-to-justice gap, and generates public distrust in the justice system.
  8. For-profit online service providers are rapidly developing new models for delivering legal services to meet consumer demand.
  9. To fully serve the Bar’s mission of promoting respect for the rule of law, improving the quality of legal services, and increasing access to justice, we must allow and encourage the development of alternate models of legal service delivery to better meet the needs of Oregonians.

The question I would leave you with today is:  any reason at all to think that the first 8 items described would be any different if the discussion was about your state and its consumers rather than Oregon and Oregonians?  And, if not, then how could you think that the item identified in 9 isn’t something that your state is going to have to pursue as well?

 

Go read this other stuff.

In a little over 2 years and out of 244 prior posts, this is only the second time I have done this, so I don’t feel incredibly bad.  Though I admittedly do feel somewhat bad.  But try as I have to find something this week that I had to say that was worth writing about and on-topic, I’ve been unable to do so.

Thus, if you happen to be checking here for worthwhile content, let me point you to 4 pieces written by other very intelligent folks that are truly worth your time.

First, following very quickly on the heels of Ravel Law’s announcement about one of its new offerings (which I did write about), it was announced that LexisNexis is buying Ravel Law.  Bob Ambrogi has written about how significant a development this is and you can read that here.

Second, although it is now a two-week old piece, the fine folks at The Law for Lawyers Today  have a really good post on yet another instance of a litigator crossing lines during a deposition into obstruction and why that continues to be such a bad idea for litigators.

Third, a circumstance in Tennessee has gotten a high-enough profile to be written about on Above The Law and you can go read about it here.  I don’t want to say too much about it at the moment, not because I have any involvement in the matter, but because a petition seeking a rule change has also been filed with the Tennessee Supreme Court and the TBA Ethics Committee that I chair will likely be looking that over and offering input.  (If you happen to be a subscriber to The Nashville Post, you can read article about the rule petition here.)

And, finally, Mike McCabe over at his blog has a very nice piece up reminding IP lawyers about how important it is to abide by protective orders in IP cases – though the reminder is just as valid to lawyers in other litigation practice areas.

Something to chew on during your holiday weekend.

I am nowhere near the most plugged in when it comes to lawyers on the forefront of tracking the ways in which rapid developments in technology are changing the practice of law.  I’m a bit more aware than likely most lawyers, in part because I’m constantly looking for things worth writing about here, but also because I’ve been fortunate enough over the last two years to be a members of the Tennessee Bar Association’s Special Committee on the Evolving Legal Market.

For a combination of those reasons, I’ve been reading a bit about the latest tool that Ravel Law has unleashed on the world, “Firm Analytics.”  Among other selling points that Ravel Law touts, and the one I want to leave you to think about over the weekend is:

In another first, Firm Analytics also provides rankings of firms across key variables including practice area, case volume, venue experience, and motion win rates. These leaderboards allow comparisons across substantive performance metrics, a significant innovation to traditional revenue and size rankings. As part of this launch, we are releasing rankings of the top five law firms across employment, securities, antitrust, administrative law, and bankruptcy (more below).

This is, of course, excellent information to be made available in the marketplace and with the constant creation of new ways to better, and more quickly, aggregate and synthesize data it is also inevitable for it to come into existence.

The thought I want to leave you with though is this — how crazy is it that, in many U.S. jurisdictions, if a lawyer or law firm wanted to advertise themselves using this same kind of data (win rates, success history, etc.), they would likely be opening themselves up to a disciplinary complaint under state advertising rules that prohibit lawyers from touting past successful outcomes in matters?

For example, let me pick a state at random and not a state that has any reason at all to be in the news, Montana.  If a law firm in Montana or a lawyer there decided to aggregate this data and tout their win percentages, they’d likely be at risk of seeing bar regulators accuse them of violating either or both of these provisions in Rule 7.1 prohibiting communications about a lawyer’s services that:

(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve;

(c) proclaims results obtained on behalf of clients, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer’s record in obtaining favorable verdicts or settlements, without stating that past results afford no guarantee of future results and that every case is different and must be judged on its own merits.

A glimpse into the world of consumer-facing legal services providers

Yesterday, I had the pleasure of serving as a moderator at a CLE event in Nashville focused on developments in the world of consumer-facing legal services providers.  There are a world of companies – predominantly existing only online — that have an increasing presence in the lives of people in need of legal services and answers to their legal questions who, often otherwise, would not reach out directly to a lawyer to try to obtain help for their problems.

The full event was a 3 hour long seminar covering several topics, but the panel I moderated encompassed an hour of conversation with Bob Aicher of ZeekBeek, Matt Horn from Legal Services Link, and Dan Lear from Avvo.

Now, if you are reading this, you’re likely already familiar with the various aspects of Avvo’s footprint in the marketplace.  You may not know as much, however, about ZeekBeek or Legal Services Link.

In some ways, they do quite similar things but the approach is different.  Both operate as an online platform through which people in need of legal services can connect with lawyers who are willing to provide services.  ZeekBeek partners exclusively with state bar associations and, thus, in those states comes across as an entity that has the imprimatur of the state regulatory body and also — for a fee — provides its participating lawyers within a state a different platform for making referrals of work to other lawyers.  Legal Services Link monetizes its provision of a market place for consumers to ask questions and obtain legal advice and representation from participating lawyers by allowing lawyers to view questions for free but requiring lawyers who want to interact with the consumer by replying and answering their inquiries to pay an annual membership fee for that privilege.

While each of the three representatives had differing views on the topic of whether they versus those they compete with are able to do what they do in a way that the participating lawyers can be assured of compliance with the ethics rules, it was very interesting (though not surprising) to hear all three of them agree that the ethics rules that relate to their services are desperately in need of change.

It was a very interesting and engaging discussion.  The good news for you, if you are interested in checking it out, is that you can view the entire program by registering/purchasing it at this link from the TBA.  (As of now there is no way to just pay for the middle hour which was the program I moderated, but should that change I will update this post.)

 

A weird-ish ethics opinion out of New York.

I have written a few times about the ABA’s adoption of a new Model Rule 8.4(g).  One point that was brought up in the run-up to that rule actually finally being adopted was that some more than 20 jurisdictions already had an anti-discrimination rule in place in the black letter of their rules in one form or another.

One of those jurisdictions is New York, and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics issued an ethics opinion back in January of this year that says it addresses an interpretation of NY’s Rule 8.4(g) and whether it prohibits a lawyer from refusing to accept a representation because of a lawyer’s own religious affiliation.

Specifically, the scenario addressed in NYSBA Ethics Opinion 1111 is this:

A lawyer has been requested to represent a person desiring to bring a childhood sex abuse claim against a religious institution.  The lawyer is of the same religion as the institution against which the claim is to be made.  Because of this religious affiliation, the lawyer is unwilling to represent the claimant against the institution.

The opinion, ultimately, doesn’t really answer the question of whether refusal to accept under those facts would be illegal discrimination.  Instead, the opinion first provides reassurance (at least of the rhetorical variety) that lawyers do not have any ethical obligation to accept every request for representation that they receive.  Then, though, it mostly punts on how to reconcile that fact with the fact that lawyers cannot engage in conduct that would violate a federal, state, or local anti-discrimination statute.  The opinion references New York case law which addresses certain kinds of professional services as being “place[s] of public accommodation” and directly admits that New York’s 8.4(g) contains language acknowledging that law could limit a lawyer’s ability to freely choose to decline a representation, but, despite the fact that the very rule itself that New York chose to adopt requires for its enforcement a conclusion about “unlawful discrimination,” just punts on whether the facts trigger such a conclusion.

At some level I get why the opinion goes that route as typically bodies providing ethics opinion have refrained from ruling on questions of law as being outside the scope of the rules.  But it does seem to me like once you adopt a rule that envelops the need for such a legal determination into the enforcement of the rule, you lose some of the ability to credibly punt on such an issue.

For context, here is the language of the rule New York has in place providing that a lawyer shall not:

(g) unlawfully discriminate in the practice of law, including in hiring, promoting or otherwise determining conditions of employment on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, marital status or sexual orientation. Where there is a tribunal with jurisdiction to hear a complaint, if timely brought, other than a Departmental Disciplinary Committee, a complaint based on unlawful discrimination shall be brought before such tribunal in the first instance. A certified copy of a determination by such a tribunal, which has become final and enforceable and as to which the right to judicial or appellate review has been exhausted, finding that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice shall constitute prima facie evidence of professional misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding….

For what it is worth, you would think that the body issuing the opinion could — at least on this particular inquiry – have been able to comfortably say that since the facts presented did not even involve a lawyer turning down a potential client because of the potential client’s religious affiliation that it would be safe to say that it is highly, highly unlikely that a credible case of unlawful discrimination could be made out against the lawyer.

One thing that this opinion does help sharpen in terms of a salient point is that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) appears to be a better drafted approach to this issue given its explicit terms protecting decisions on whether to take on the representation of a client.  Unlike the New York version of the rule, the ABA Model — in addition to not having all the language about the need for a ruling by a tribunal to be a condition precedent in certain instances — includes this sentence in the black-letter of the rule:  “This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.”

Jurisdictions adopting a version of Rule 8.4(g) with that kind of language would appear to be much better positioned to actually address questions like the one raised in the New York opinion by providing the lawyer with assurance about the ability to simply choose not to take on the representation of a client where doing so would require them to sue their own church.

 

Dear ABA – Embrace reform of the lawyer advertising rules. Please.

I have written in the past about the APRL white papers providing the rationale for, and data supporting the need to, reform the way lawyer advertising is regulated in the United States by state bar entities.  You can read those prior posts here and here if you are so inclined.

Jayne Reardon, the Executive Director of the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism, over at the 2Civility blog has posted a very thorough report on events that transpired in Miami earlier this month and that reminds folks that the deadline put together by the ABA working group looking at whether to back APRL’s proposals is March 1, 2017.

I am a proud member of APRL – actually presently I’m even fortunate enough to serve as a member of its Board of Directors – but was not able to make it down to Miami for our meeting and the ABA meetings this year.  If you are a reader of this blog, you know that my view is that the only advertising rule that ought to be necessary is a version of RPC 7.1 that states, as does the ABA Model:

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.  A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.

Period.  Full stop.

Now Jayne’s report from the ground mentions that some folks criticized or complained about APRL’s proposal because it would not apply only to advertisements by lawyers.  To me that is a feature, not a bug.  As I’ve also written and spoken about, RPC 7.1 is violated when a lawyer sends a fraudulent bill to a client saying they spent more time on something than they really did and that’s a good thing.  It also, for example, applies to lawyers who lie on their resumes as we saw with this recent instance of lawyer misconduct.

The concern expressed by someone that it could result in discipline against a lawyer politician (presumably one who would have to have lied about some aspect of their personal history I guess) does not give me much pause because if it were so applied it would likely fail First Amendment scrutiny because of the higher standards afforded to protect political speech rather than constitutional speech.

While I think RPC 7.1 ideally is the only rule that ought to exist, I recognize that people are going to insist there be some restriction on in-person solicitation so I also support APRL’s proposed approach to having an additional rule, over and above RPC 7.1, to address that.  As I’ve said before, my only quibble with APRL’s proposal on that front is as to how it defines a sophisticated user of legal services:

If I had one criticism of the APRL proposal, it is with the way it defines a sophisticated user of legal services.  The second part about regular retention of legal services for business purposes is likely where it should have stopped, as the first portion of the definition is pretty amorphous and subject to manipulation.  For example, would a recidivist offender who has gone through repeated jury trials and spent many years in prison someone who would qualify as having had significant dealings with the legal profession?  Seems like a pretty clear argument could be made that the answer would be yes.

I’m going to send this post in to the ABA working committee as my own personal comment.  If you have a viewpoint on these issues (whether it jibes with mine or not), I’d encourage you to send your thoughts as well to them at this email address: modelruleamend@americanbar.org.  (Unless you don’t think lawyer advertising rules are strict enough already.  Then I’d encourage you to stay busy doing other things.  Kidding, just kidding.  But more like Al Franken’s kidding on the square actually.)

Maybe the weirdest proof of the old adage about “a lawyer who represents himself…”

Over the last year or so, I have repeatedly said in a number of contexts that with the rapid changes occurring in the modern practice of law, the lawyers who will survive and thrive will be those who can demonstrate that the value that they bring is that of the “trusted advisor.”  The lawyers who consistently demonstrate the ability to exercise very sound judgment and wisdom, provide practical answers, and leave their clients feeling like the person should be part of their “brain trust.”  I don’t claim to be unique in that viewpoint by any means, but I do hope that is what I am able to accomplish during the next decade of my practice or I fear I will have to go do something else to scratch out a living, and I have said so at least one before at this blog.

All of this is prologue to justify a brief mention of a Mississippi lawyer who managed to just demonstrate that, if my speculative musings are correct, he will not be a practicing lawyer all that much longer.  I noticed this case on the ABA Journal online today, and now that I also went and read the complaint — I think it will be hard for folks to think he’s likely to fit the bill of the wise counselor possessing sound judgment.

The gentleman filed a lawsuit, representing himself, against a popular provider of Louisiana-style cajun chicken.  If you were a  client, in the market for a probate and tax attorney which this person apparently is at the moment, here are the four paragraphs of the lawsuit that would probably be all you would need to read to know that you might want to think twice:

11.  In the drive-through line, plaintiff Newton ordered, received and paid for two chicken breasts, and [sic] order of red beans and rice, a biscuit, and a soft drink.  Newton’s order was delivered to him in a bag which included the napkins, salt and pepper, and the utensil deemed necessary for consumption of his order.

12.  Plaintiff Newton drove directly to his business office [snip] and began to consume his meal.  The sole utensil accompanying the order was a plastic “spork,” which is a combination fork and spoon, which Newton used to consume the red beans and rice.

13.  Because Newton’s order did not include a plastic knife, plaintiff Newton’s only option for consumption of the chicken breasts was to hold a chicken breast in his hands and to tear off pieces thereof with his teeth.

14.  During his consumption of his meal, plaintiff Newton became [sic] choked on a portion of chicken which lodged in his throat and other neck areas, and was unable to swallow the bite, or to spit or cough the bite out.

(emphasis added).

Whether or not you happen to “love that chicken from Popeyes,” my guess is, if you are a lawyer, you’d love to have the defense of Popeyes on this one.  And, again, if you aren’t a lawyer and you read the complaint ever, my guess is that you are also going to want a probate or tax lawyer who might be able to have recognized at least one other option in that situation.

Friday follow-up: Puff, puff, PA’s overreach

Couple of quick hits (pun wasn’t really intended but just sort of happened) for this Friday.

A little more than a month ago, I wrote about an ethics opinion out of Ohio that created a real dilemma for lawyers looking to advise businesses related to the medical marijuana industry that was going to become legal in Ohio on September 8, 2016.  Under the analysis in the ethics opinion, Ohio’s RPC 1.2(d) prohibited lawyers from assisting people with such business endeavors.

Moving with what seemed like an unusual amount of speed when it comes to rule-making endeavors (and entirely contrary to the conventional wisdom that pot slows things down), the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted a revision to its RPC 1.2(d) to specifically address the situation and permit Ohio attorneys to assist clients in this industry.  The new rule language reads:

(d)(1)  A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent.  A lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client in making a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.

(2)  A lawyer may counsel or assist a client regarding conduct expressly permitted under Sub. H.B. 523 of the 131st General Assembly authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes and any state statutes, rules, orders, or other provisions implementing the act.  In these circumstances, the lawyer shall advise the client regarding related federal law.

Now, I totally understand the addition of (d)(2), though it is the kind of hyper-specific revision to the language of a rule that makes me cringe on the inside.  But, I don’t quite understand why the Ohio court changed the language of (d)(1) to replace “criminal” with “illegal.”  Wonder what that is all about exactly and what they would articulate to be the difference in those two terms?

About a week before I wrote about the Ohio marijuana opinion, I wrote at length about a South Carolina ethics opinion that served as an exemplar of the kind of ethics opinion I anticipated a number of other states might write about the problems with  Avvo Legal Services.  Well, this month another state has added its voice with an ethics opinion pointing out ethical dilemmas for lawyers that might look to do business with that service and similar services. Pennsylvania has issued Formal Op. 2016-200: Ethical Considerations Relating to Participation in Fixed Fee Limited Scope Legal Services Referral Programs.  Ironically though, I can’t help reading the Pennsylvania opinion as being a bit more of an indictment of certain kinds of thinking in our profession than it is an indictment of the ethics problems with Avvo Legal Services.

I plan to write about this Pennsylvania opinion in more detail later — and can’t give you a link to go read it yourself because Pennsylvania still tries to keep its ethics opinions limited to members-eyes only in the online world.  (That is, in and of itself, a weird and outdated way of thinking altogether but that too would be a topic for another day.)

For today, I’ll simply preview that the fundamental problem I currently have with the Pennsylvania opinion is that it overreaches and comes across as indicative of a line of inflexible thinking that seems to be entirely out of touch with what is actually going on in the marketplace and that is mostly antithetical to innovation altogether.

Let me offer one example to hopefully pique your curiosity if not whet your appetite, it comes from Section IX of the opinion, titled “Access to Legal Services” —

Operators of FFLS programs argue that “unbundling” legal services reduces the cost to clients, thereby making legal services more accessible.  Expanding access to legal services is, of course, an important goal that all lawyers, and the organized Bar, should support.  However, the manner in which these FFLS programs currently operate raises concerns about whether they advance the goal of expanding access to legal services.  Further, compliance with the RPCs should not be considered inconsistent with the goal of facilitating greater access to legal services.  Any lawyer can offer “unbundled” or “limited scope” legal services at, or even below, the rates described by an FFLS program, provided the lawyer can do so in a manner that complies with his or her professional and ethical obligations, including the obligation of competence (see RPC 1.1) and full disclosure of and informed consent to any limitations on the scope of the legal services rendered.  If a lawyer cannot fulfill those obligations working outside the scope of an FFLS program, he or she almost certainly would not be able to do so working within such a program.

Really?

Yet another lawyer marketing network joins the fray.

It is often jokingly said that “you learn something new every day.”  I kind of like to think that I learn more than one new thing every day, but results fluctuate.  Last week, in connection with reading about the launch of a new legal marketing network that combines Martindale-Hubbell (which is also behind www.lawyers.com) and Nolo, I learned that Martindale and Nolo are owned by the same company, Internet Brands.  This same company also owns something with which I was entirely unfamiliar, Ngage Live Chat –  a live chat service for lawyers.

Nolo Press is well-known as one of the pioneers for consumers in the “do-it-yourself” approach to law.  The purchase of a pretty well-known commodity in the lawyer rating community by a company called Internet Brands and the fact of common ownership with Nolo seems like something I should have been aware of sooner, but c’est la vie, I guess.

This new marketing network, which will be called the Martindale-Nolo Legal Marketing Network, offers yet another indication of just how significant a push is being made by extremely well-funded companies further into the legal marketing and lead generation space.  Now, of course, like other networks when they have launched, this one claims that it is now that world’s largest legal marketing network.  I don’t have a good sense of whether that is true or not.

A deeper dive into the press release put out about this leaves me learning even more new things (which hopefully drives my per day average up for a while).  The same company that owns Martindale-Hubbell also owns TotalAttorneys.com and a few other services including something called DisabilitySecrets.com, something called DivorceNet.com and another something called DrivingLaws.org.  Total Attorneys is well known among legal ethics nerds such as myself, but if you haven’t paid a visit to its website in a while you might be surprised to see how much more expansive its offerings seem to be, in fact, it really seems like something that looks much more like a direct competitor with something like Martindale-Nolo but for the common ownership.  Interestingly, while the press release references it, I have a good bit of trouble finding it anywhere on the actual Martindale-Nolo website.

The same Martindale-Nolo press release also explains what is contemplated by this particular marketing network in terms of the three “core services” it will deliver, and these clearly include things that are quite likely to be scrutinized under ethics rules referencing payments for referrals versus advertising expenses and lead generation services… which likely means that participating lawyers, at least under current ethics rules like Model Rule 7.2, will need to make sure to pay close attention to terms and conditions.  (And in Tennessee it will be interesting to see if this arrangement finds its way into the basket covered by our special RPC 7.6.)

  • Highlytargeted lead generation, delivered through Martindale-Nolo’s business unit in Pleasanton, Calif., connecting more than 100,000 consumers to attorneys each month from its network of websites. These sites include the high-trafficked domains of Nolo.com, Attorneys.com, AllLaw.com, TotalAttorneys.com, DisabilitySecrets.com, DivorceNet.com, DrivingLaws.org, and a variety of other practice-specific sites. Nolo.com is also highly recognized by consumers for its extensive library of legal resources.
  • Professional websites and online profiles, delivered through Martindale-Hubbell’s flagship websites Martindale.com and Lawyers.com. These established websites display more than 1 million Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review Ratings and Client Review Ratings, as well as educational content to inform visitors about legal issues and processes. The New Providence, N.J.-based business unit has also built and hosted professional websites for more than 40,000 attorneys.
  • Ngage Live Chat, providing 24/7 live chat service for law firm websites. Based in Austin, Texas, Ngage Live Chat uses advanced conversion techniques to deliver twice as many leads to lawyers versus standard website forms or competing chat providers.

You can go take a look yourself at this new offering here, or if you really just want to marvel at how far and fast things have changed in terms of what you think about when you think about Martindale-Hubbell, just read the lead generation portion of the site – here.

“Troubling and counterproductive” – yep

One of the more archaic aspects of lawyer regulation is the heavy-handed approach to UPL.  And, I’m not referring to UPL in the sense of something done that involves the practice of law by a person who isn’t a lawyer anywhere.  I’m referring to regulatory efforts involving UPL that are brandished against someone who is a lawyer somewhere but not licensed in the jurisdiction that happens to be doing the regulating.

Admittedly, a heavy-handed approach almost inevitably follows from the fact that our profession continues to embrace a model in which each state’s law is treated as being of such unique character in all respects that a lawyer in Wyoming cannot be considered competent to practice law in Wisconsin absent obtaining a Wisconsin law license in addition to the Wyoming law license.

The adoption of ABA Model Rule 5.5 — which has been embraced by many U.S. jurisdictions — was supposed to go a long way toward making the realities of cross-border practice a safer proposition for modern-day lawyers.  Unfortunately, a recent private admonition imposed in Minnesota on a Colorado lawyer offers a pretty good example of just how archaic and heavy handed the regulation of UPL continues to be despite such efforts.  Almost the only positive that I can bring myself to say about the matter at all is that Minnesota, at least, has truly private discipline and, therefore, the name of the lawyer disciplined is not obvious and public, which is why the case is styled In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct.

Here’s the quick and dirty description of the scenario:  son-in-law, a Colorado lawyer, is contacted by his mother-in-law and father-in-law about a small judgment (less than $2500) entered against them and trying to help negotiate a better outcome as to its satisfaction.  In-laws live in Minnesota, owe money to a creditor who got the judgment in Minnesota, and the creditor is being represented by a Minnesota lawyer.  Colorado lawyer agrees to handle and then proceeds to have relatively extensive email communication with the Minnesota lawyer for the judgment holder.

Eventually, that Minnesota lawyer filed a bar complaint against the Colorado lawyer, and the Colorado lawyer was found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Minnesota RPC 5.5(a).  Minnesota’s version of that rule looks pretty much like the ABA Model so the explanation doesn’t lie in some local variation.  Instead the explanation is mostly that this was regulation for regulation’s sake.

If you want to read the rationale of the Minnesota court, you can read the full opinion, at the link above.  There was a dissent – which is the source of the quoted language in the title of the post.  I can find fault with much of what the majority opinion offers as analysis, but what I’d rather talk for a moment about is how this outcome feels emblematic of a much larger problem in terms of the approach to regulation of this issue.

The Colorado lawyer argued that a number of the various exceptions set out in Minnesota’s RPC 5.5 ought to serve to protect what he did from being a violation but he also, quite understandably, argued that he was not practicing law in Minnesota at all because he was sitting in Colorado at all times.  The Minnesota court was having none of it as to that argument because the clients being represented were in Minnesota, and the matter was characterized as a Minnesota matter.  And there is some logic to that conclusion.

But, here’s the thing, I suspect Minnesota pursues a “cake and eat it too” approach on this issue.  When the facts are flipped around a bit, I worry that Minnesota wouldn’t hesitate to also conclude that a Colorado lawyer would be engaged in unauthorized practice in Minnesota if, while working out of an office in Minnesota, the Colorado lawyer only engaged in representation of Colorado clients in Colorado litigation.  Now, if it were just a temporary situation, like say a week-long vacation to the Mall of America or to visit his in-laws, then there probably would be no problem for the Colorado lawyer.

But, if the Colorado lawyer had moved to Minnesota because his spouse got a new job there because she wanted to be closer to her parents, then I’d venture a guess that Minnesota regulatory bodies would be willing to impose discipline against the Colorado lawyer premised on the notion the Colorado lawyer could not have that kind of systematic, continuous presence in Minnesota for the practice of law and that it would not matter that the Colorado lawyer was only handling matters remotely in a jurisdiction in which he fully licensed.

And that, at least to me, is emblematic of the scope of the problem.  I tend to think that neither situation should be treated as unethical UPL.  I acknowledge reasonable minds can differ on that opinion.  I’m not as inclined to offer up a reasonable minds can disagree approach though to the idea that a state should be able to conclude that both versions are a problem.  At most, a state should have to choose only one of them as being out of bounds.