“No. No you’re not.”

So, you may recall back in October 2017 I had an itch and intended to write about a lawsuit in Pennsylvania that would fit in with the recent (seemingly) increased willingness of lawyers to sue other lawyers over their ads, but since I was beaten to the punch, instead I gave you a pointer to a very good piece somewhere else about it.

If that doesn’t ring bells, you can go see that again here.

I bring that lawsuit against a firm with a significant presence here in Memphis, Morgan & Morgan, again because there has been a new development.  And, particularly, a new development that talks about something that has always bounced around my brain when I hear a particular advertisement in that firm’s stable.

First, the recent development in that lawsuit, where a local Pennsylvania law firm sued Morgan & Morgan saying that its advertising was false and deceptive because, among other things, Morgan & Morgan only has one lawyer located in Philadelphia who is claimed by the plaintiff in the suit to have little experience handling personal injury litigation.  The federal district court has declined to dismiss one aspect of the lawsuit – the allegation that the founder of Morgan & Morgan, John Morgan, is lying when he says in an advertisement that he is “your lawyer.”

Now, why this strikes me in a way I find so interesting.  Nearly every time I have heard the line in a particular radio advertisement it has struck me as such an unwise, and unnecessary, thing to say from a legal ethics standpoint.

The line is this:  “Remember this, I’m not just a lawyer.  I’m your lawyer.”

It’s a nearly Pavlovian reaction for me at this point – I hear that, and I say (out loud if I’m alone or just in my head if there are people around):

“No.  No, you’re not.”

And, then, my mind wanders a bit down the path of mulling why that statement in that advertisement feels like such an unnecessary, “own goal” kind of thing to do to yourself.

Your firm has a giant plaintiff’s practice.  Your firm is going to have lots of people make appointments and undergo consultations, and your firm is going to turn a lot of those people away.  Sometimes it might be for conflicts reasons, sometimes it might be because you don’t think they have a case worth your time.  But, either way, you’ve unnecessarily opened yourself up to, at the very least, a disciplinary complaint from someone who claims you broke your promise and violated RPC 7.1 since you actually said you were their lawyer.

Admittedly, that isn’t the exact line of thought used by the federal judge in the Pennsylvania litigation — rather, it is the notion that . . . well, let me simply quote the Court instead of interpreting:

Rosenbaum alleges John Morgan, an attorney with Morgan & Morgan, appears in advertisements stating “I’m your lawyer” and describing “himself to the consumer as a trial lawyer with over thirty years of experience” which “convey[s]” the message John Morgan and Morgan & Morgan will handle the prospective clients’ claim.  Rosenbaum alleges, in reality, John Morgan is not licensed to practice law or to legally represent clients in Pennsylvania but the advertisements do not advise prospective clients of this fact….

Accepting as true Rosenbaum’s allegations, John Morgan’s statement “I’m your lawyer” may be literally false or have the tendency to mislead viewers into believing John Morgan, himself, will represent them….

If you’d like to read the full opinion which dismisses much of the Lanham claims, you can read it here.

That part is interesting and could, of course, be argued over and thoroughly parsed since the principals of imputation of conflicts and other matters would make the statement arguably truthful in the event that someone hires the firm, at least.

But, my qualm is the importance of that italicized language right up there.  My qualm remains true even for jurisdictions in which the lawyer making the claim is licensed.   I remember doing quite a few seminars many years ago that were focused on trying to help lawyer not accidentally end up with client they didn’t want because they were not clear enough in communicating to someone that they were not their lawyer.  (There is even a now-quite-long-ago law review piece on the topic that is very good called “Accidental Clients” written by Susan Martyn.)

Admittedly, I’m not an expert in legal marketing but it still strikes me as such an unnecessarily dangerous and damaging statement that is far-too-readily capable of being characterized as false and misleading to a consumer of legal services and far-too-difficult to characterize as the kind of “puffing” that should be treated as meaningless.

Your mileage may vary, of course.

 

Change is hard. Even where it appears to be wanted.

I have been meaning to do this and am long overdue in getting to it, but you might recall back in the summer of 2017 when I wrote pretty extensively about the contents of the Oregon Futures Task Force Report, and its positive proposed changes to the ethics rules.  If you don’t, you can read those posts here and here.

In November 2017, the chair of the Legal Ethics Committee in Oregon who also was a member of the Futures Task Force was kind enough to drop me a line and update on how those proposed rules revisions were progressing.

Initially the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar approved the proposed revisions to RPC 5.4, 7.2, and 7.3 for discussion and voting by its House of Delegates.

After the process in the House of Delegates, in which there was quite a significant amount of debate and discussion as I am told, the proposed revisions to RPC 5.4 and 7.2 were referred back to the Board of Governors to a study committee, but the proposed revision to RPC 7.3 was passed and has been submitted to the Oregon Supreme Court so it can decide whether to adopt it or not.

While in my prior postings I discussed the RPC 5.4 proposed revision at some length, I did not provide any real detail of the RPC 7.3 change Oregon was considering beyond the fact that it would involve allowing in-person or real-time electronic solicitation, with limited exceptions.  For the record, this is what the Oregon Supreme Court now has in front of it for consideration:

RULE 7.3 SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS
A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by any means if:

(a) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person who is the target of the solicitation is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(b) the [person who is the] target of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
(c) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.

Now, you know what I know on this topic.

 

So what does 2018 hold in store for us?

It’s a new year and, of course, for many that means a time of reflection and goal-setting and much talk of how the new year will be different from the prior year.

I will spare you much of that because you can find that all over the Internet.  I am prompted to post today (in addition to just wanting to get back on the horse after the holiday break) because there has been some news today of note that tends to demonstrate that 2018 is likely going to be a lot like 2017 in terms of what matters and must be discussed.

Today, The Florida Bar and a marketplace technology company, Legal.io, announced a partnership in order to modernize The Florida Bar’s Florida Lawyer Referral Service.  You can read the announcement here.

There are a multitude of reasons why this step in Florida could matter greatly — particularly if it is successful — because other bar associations might follow suit (if such endeavors are not already in the works).  The key seems to be whether any action like this is too late to gain traction with consumers who are already turning to other, similar for-profit endeavors.  I have little doubt that lawyers will be more comfortable with such arrangements because of the safety involved with not having to worry about ethics issues of fee sharing or improper payments for referrals if they can work through bar referral programs.  Florida is an interesting place for this to happen at this moment in time as well because one might expect this development could be raised in the TIKD antitrust litigation, for example, as more fodder for arguments of claimed collusive behavior in the marketplace for legal services by the bar.

And, along those lines (but sort of flipped 180 degrees), there was another development late last year that I haven’t mentioned but that will likely be significant for lawyers in 2018.  It is this lawsuit filed on the other coast against LegalZoom and a number of state bar associations (as well as the USPTO) that seeks $60 million in antitrust damages.  You can read a nice story about this suit filed in California federal court – and what the Plaintiff in it is really trying to accomplish — here.

In short, although the suit alleges that LegalZoom is engaged in unauthorized practice and competes in a way that is unfair to lawyers, and alleges that the USPTO, the California bar, the Texas bar, and the Arizona bar are somehow turning a blind-eye to the conduct to allow it to continue, the Plaintiff, an IP lawyer and entrepreneur named Raj V. Abhyanker, admits that what he’s really looking for is a court ruling that tells him that he, and other lawyers, can use the same business model as LegalZoom without fear of ethical ramifications.

So, you know, stay tuned.

A very good start.

My last post was filled with criticisms related to the roll out of a new ABA Ethics Opinion.  Today I’m offering a different tone and message for the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility – a positive message offering kudos for the working draft that has now been circulated to revise the ABA Model Rules on advertising issues.

I’ve written a number of times in this space in the past about the push by APRL on this front and, although the working draft that has now been put out by ABA SCEPR does not entirely match APRL’s proposal, it adopts a significant amount of what that proposal sought to accomplish.

The working draft deletes Model Rules 7.5 and consolidates much of the regulation involved in that rules into Comments added to Model Rule 7.1.

It trims a little bit of fat from the Comment to Model Rule 7.2 and explicitly acknowledges the ability of lawyers to offer things akin to a “token of appreciation” to people who provide them with referrals and the like without violating the ethics rules.

It also removes a number of restrictions on solicitation by narrowing what is prohibited to interactions that can be described with the term “live person to person contact,” adding a new class of purchasers of legal services who can even be asked for their business live and in person, and leaving the overarching prohibitions against coercion, duress, or harassment as the line that cannot be crossed in any effort to develop business.

What constitutes “live person to person contact,” would be defined in the first two sentences of Comment [2] to the rule:

“Live person to person contact” means in person, face to face, telephone and real-time person to person communications such as Skype or Facetime, and other visual/auditory communications where the prospective client may feel obligated to speak with the lawyer.  Such person to person contact does not include chat rooms, text messages, or other written communications that recipients may easily disregard.

The new category of purchasers of legal services who would be fair game for even live person to person contact would be people “known by the lawyer to be an experienced user of the type of legal services involved for business matters.”

Model Rule 7.4 would be honed down to two provisions — one that permits lawyers to truthfully tell people what fields of law they practice in and one that prohibits lawyers from claiming to be certified as a specialist in any area of law unless the lawyer actually is so certified by an appropriate entity and the name of the entity is clear in the communication.

The APRL proposal would be an even more streamlined regulatory approach than what is being offered in the ABA SCEPR working draft in large part because the APRL proposal also would have deleted Model Rule 7.2 and 7.4 altogether and retained bits from the Comment to each of those rules that were worth retaining by relocating them to Rule 7.1.

Nevertheless, decrying this progress from the ABA SCEPR would be an exercise in letting the perfect become the enemy of the good.  And, at least one time in 2017, I am going to refrain from doing that.

Friday follow up – TIKD off by a DQ motion and the Supremes won’t stop suspending the wrong lawyers.

In the middle of Roadshowing (short break until the next stops next week) and also still trying to handle client matters to boot, so this will be a quick post.

(If you are here next week looking for the Roadshow playlist, just keep scrolling down as it can be found in the post immediately below this one.)

The dustup between the smartphone app known as TIKD and the Florida Bar has been back in the news in the legal trades recently over a motion to disqualify TIKD’s counsel filed by the Florida Bar.

On its face, it sounds like a pretty decent disqualification motion on the merits as the Florida Bar is alleging that TIKD’s counsel who is a former Florida Bar president had access during his term in office to internal information evaluating the Florida Bar’s antitrust liability exposure given its structure in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in an antitrust suit against the board that regulates dentistry in North Carolina.  (You might recall that I wrote a bit about that in the past as well as it is that case that has revived interest in, and concerns about, antitrust issues for the regulation of the practice of law in unified bar/mandatory bar jurisdictions.)  That would seem like a slam-dunk in terms of disqualification if that person had been a former General Counsel or otherwise a lawyer for the Florida Bar, but the analysis may be a lot murkier if, as is the case generally of bar presidents, that the president of the Florida Bar is always a lawyer but isn’t necessarily acting as a lawyer for the organization during the term of office.

Oh, and speaking of the U.S. Supreme Court, I wrote a bit earlier this year (as many other people did) about the weirdness associated with the fact that the United States Supreme Court made the very unfortunate mistake of suspending the wrong attorney – confusing one lawyer named Christopher P. Sullivan for another lawyer named Christopher P. Sullivan.  At the time, I tried to make discussing the circumstances a bit more worthwhile substantively and not just anact of piling-on by citing that epic mistake by the highest court in the land as maybe the ultimate example of the need for people in our profession to be deliberate in their actions and take their time because what we do can have real consequences for us and for others.

As is of course true for literally billions of other people on the planet, the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court is not a dedicated reader of this space (or didn’t take heed of that message) as a new story came to light a week or so ago of pretty much the same thing happening again with the Court suspending a lawyer named Jim Robbins instead of a lawyer named James A. Robbins.  (Even more coincidentally, the Sullivan who was wrongly suspended earlier in 2017 practiced law with a firm called Robins Kaplan.)

Actually, to say that pretty much the same thing happened isn’t quite right, as the James A. Robbins that deserved to be suspended wasn’t actually a member of the U.S. Supreme Court bar at all.

I’ve been fortunate enough to have been admitted to the U.S. Supreme Court since December 2008 and even more fortunately it appears to be an admittee with a name, Brian S. Faughnan, that seems highly unlikely to be duplicated on (or off) its rolls.

Three-For-Tuesday.

Any old radio station in your town (most probably one playing “Classic Rock”) can provide you with a Two-For-Tuesday, but where else will you find a Three-For approach to this otherwise underrated day of the week?

First, I recently let you know that Tennessee was in play with a proposed version of RPC 8.4(g) to make harassing and discriminatory conduct related to the practice of law a violation of the ethics rules.  The Tennessee Supreme Court has put that joint petition out for public comment and has set a March 21, 2018 deadline for submissions.  So, by the time we know the outcome of the joint petition, you’ll have had the chance to go see two highly-anticipated film adaptations of very good books, A Wrinkle in Time, and Ready Player One.

Second, I’ve written recently about how rare lawsuits tend to be where a lawyer or law firm sues another lawyer or law firm over marketing activities.  There are lots of reasons that firms can tend to be reluctant to file such suits, but if you are looking for various objective indications of just how harshly competitive the marketplace for legal services is getting these days – and how much lawyers perceive their futures to be at risk – the fact that such suits seem to be happening with greater frequency is one such indicator.  Here is a link to the latest example where one advertising law firm has sued another over advertising firm over the design of billboards and whether those are serving to mislead consumers into confusion over which is which.

One of the billboards says “Injured?  Results You Deserve.”  The other says “Injured?  Don’t stand alone.”  Now, neither one of them are exactly fabulous exemplars of good marketing I guess.  I mean, you might see the first one and think, I’m kind of a shiftless person and I’m not sure the accident was anyone’s fault.  I’d rather not get the result I deserve.  And the other one might strike you as tone-deaf if you were so badly injured that you can’t stand at all.

Either way though, let me say this, there is a movie out in theaters now called Three Billboards, and I think a good third one to put out on this Massachusetts interstate would be one that reads:  “Injured?  Not by my billboard.”

Third, and speaking of advertising, based on this recent headline out of Ontario, it appears pretty clear that my words of wisdom and encouragement to a throng of Canadian lawyers suggesting they chill out about advertising issues was not a butterfly-flapping-its-wings-bringing-about-global-change kind of moment, but more akin to the impact that a butterfly makes on the windshield of a moving car.  In keeping with today’s theme, while it is incredibly untimely as far as movie recommendations go, it is still true to say that if someone is going to force you to watch an Ashton Kutcher film, The Butterfly Effect is your best option.

A short update on Avvo ratings

You may recall, a while back, that I kvetched a bit here about my belief that Avvo’s rating system was less than a bona fide system.  The primary focus of my argument centered on Avvo’s decision to assign numerical ratings to some lawyers even though those lawyers have never claimed their profiles.  I then spent a little bit of digital space picking some examples of lawyers that I considered to be exceedingly better than their ranking and that the such ratings would actually do a disservice not only to those lawyers – seeming to “punish” them for not claiming their profile – but also to consumers trying to use Avvo to make decisions about lawyers.  While admittedly not scientifically exhaustive, my research seemed to indicate that it was a rare lawyer who could get a rating at 7 or above without at least claiming their profile.

Well, I am pleased to report that Avvo has recently changed its approach and has now returned to offering only a non-numerical rating for most lawyers who have not claimed their Avvo profile.  Earlier this month, Avvo has changed its approach and, according to Avvo’s General Counsel, “most unclaimed lawyer profiles are now rated either ‘No Concern’ or ‘Attention’ (the latter for those with underlying Avvo Ratings below a 5).”

If you go back to look at that prior post, you will see that Avvo’s General Counsel, Josh King, was kind enough to share that information in a new Comment on that post last week, but knowing that not everyone goes back and reads old posts to find new comments I wanted to make sure to prominently note the change here.

Also, in light of this change, I can follow through with what I said in a comment to that earlier post in an exchange with Josh where I wrote:  “If Avvo only assigned numerical ratings to those who claim and participate, and limited itself to the “no concern” or “concern” approach to others, I would readily agree that it was a bona fide system in the way the rules contemplate.”

Now that they are back to that sort of approach, and consumers now can’t use numerical ratings to compare apples and oranges, I think I am left where I said I would be – readily agreeing that Avvo’s rating system is bona fide in the way the rules contemplate.

Something TIKD this way comes.

So, about a week ago, the Florida Bar and The Ticket Clinic (a Florida law firm that somehow can manage to keep the lights on by specializing in representing people regarding traffic tickets) were sued in federal district court by something called TIKD.  TIKD is, at heart, an app for your smart phone.

The lawsuit alleges that the bar and the law firm have combined to damage TIKD in its business endeavors in violation of antitrust law and other unfair competition law.  Others have already written a bit about this development, but I still cannot resist chiming in because, though the litigation will likely end up amounting to nothing truly impactful, the underlying substance (or lack thereof) of the area of law being battled over with potentially such high stakes for the profession could easily be made into the stuff of a dark fantasy novel.

While others have written about this new federal court lawsuit where TIKD is the plaintiff, and there is some decent media coverage of it at The Washington Post and in some Florida news outlets, I want to just flag for your attention the existence of another lawsuit in Florida involving TIKD, but that was brought against TIKD seven months earlier in state court by one of the defendants in the TIKD suit, The Ticket Clinic.

You can read that full lawsuit at this link.  The gist of it though is also one for unfair competition.  The law firm, Gold & Associates d/b/a as The Ticket Clinic sued TIKD and its two owners claiming TIKD engages in false and deceptive advertising and is itself engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  You can judge for yourself, but those particular claims to me seem dubious at best.  TIKD seems to do exactly what it advertises it will do and hires lawyers rather than tries to practice law.  But in the midst of those questionable claims, the suit still finds the nub of a true problem: unfair competition for lawyers trying to compete with (rather than work with) TIKD.

While it is the suit TIKD has filed pursuing the Florida Bar and The Ticket Clinic for antitrust violations that is currently getting all the media attention — folks who want to be “disruptors” in the legal industry are certainly using it as an opportunity to attack the entire concept of the regulation of the practice of law — the lawsuit filed by The Ticket Clinic as plaintiff forces a reader to think about the flip side of that problem by pointing out that what TIKD is doing to market its service, and convince people to use it, is making guarantees and promises that lawyers are prohibited from making under the ethics rules.

Specifically, paragraph 12 of the complaint points out a number of aspects of the TIKD business model that allow for unfair competition, which includes TIKD:

b) making guarantees to pay financial penalties imposed by courts and/or the “full cost of their ticket”;

[snip]

g) promising to “cover the full cost of your ticket no matter the price – even if the cost is higher than what you paid us;”

Paragraph 28 of the complaint further drives the point home:

In promising to pay a fine if they lose at no additional cost, TIKD, RILEY and BERTHOLD make a promise that a lawyer or law firm cannot possibly make, and they essentially “rob Peter (those persons whose cases are dismissed with no fine or court cost after
paying TIKD 75-80% of the fine stated in the citation) to pay Paul (those persons who are directed to pay the fine in full or greater, with costs)” which is a “house of cards” that will eventually fall, leaving clients with no remedy.

The story in The Washington Post also helpfully reinforces that these are important aspects of what makes TIKD a desirable service for which to pay:

TIKD, which launched in February, works this way in Florida: A driver who gets a traffic ticket can contact the company on a cellphone and be offered a one-time charge below the amount of the ticket. TIKD connects the driver with an independent attorney for no additional costs or fees, and the attorney handles the case without the driver having to appear in court.

If the ticket is not dismissed, TIKD pays any fines, and if the driver gets points on his or her license, TIKD will fully refund the one-time charge.

It is undeniably correct that the ethics rules would never let a lawyer make the same arrangements with a client.  It also seems pretty clear that without the ability to make those financial guarantees the app would lose pretty much all of its luster.  Thus, regardless of what you may think about the merits of any claim that The Florida Bar and The Ticket Clinic are engaged in some coordinated effort to hurt TIKD, it appears undeniably correct that there is a fundamentally unfair competitive advantage to being able to make the kind of financial guarantees that the app is making and which any lawyer would have to risk their license to match.

A reckoning in the legal industry is going to have to take place at some point relatively soon, but part of that reckoning absolutely has to be a level playing field in the area of providing legal services.  Either the same rules and restrictions will have to apply to all those operating in the space or those rules ought to apply to no one operating in the space.

The notion that the reckoning could be ushered along more quickly because of a fight over an area of legal representation that most firms have first-year associates handle for free as a perk for clients (i.e. getting speeding tickets dismissed) and involves a firm run by a lawyer who has been embroiled in litigation over a nearly $20,000 tab at a strip club and whose firm is being investigated for taking money to falsify traffic school certificates is just absurd enough to fit in with the rest of the fundamental absurdity that plagues 2017.

Advocating for attorney advertising.

So, back in August, I mentioned that I was going to have the opportunity to debate issues of lawyer advertising before an audience of top-notch Canadian lawyers in November.  This post is something of a coda to that post as I want to, very briefly, say a word or two about that talk.

It was, as I anticipated, a highly rewarding experience and all of the attorneys affiliated with The Advocates’ Society with whom I had the opportunity to meet and speak were delightful.

During the presentation, my job was to be the one to give voice to things that those assembled might not want to hear.  So, to start things off, I broke the news to them all that we don’t pronounce Hermitage, as in The Hermitage Hotel, in the fancy manner they were wont to do.  After having dealt that disappointing blow, I gave my pitch about what regulation of lawyer advertising should be, and what it shouldn’t be.

I tried to do so with a focus on things beyond just the protections afforded under our First Amendment for commercial speech because they don’t have anything quite the same under their nation’s law.

Those points – which I will happily repeat as many times as anyone ever gives me the chance to do so — are:

  • Ethical restrictions on lawyer advertising ought to pretty much start and end with prohibiting statements that are false or actually misleading.
  • It is pretty much a universal truth that the only people who complain about lawyer advertisements are other lawyers.
  • Those tasked with regulating attorney conduct don’t particularly like spending time adjudicating squabbles between lawyers about ads.
  • Consumers don’t get worked up about lawyer advertising at least in part because they get it.  If you are paying to advertise something, you are going to emphasize its good points.
  • But consumers also don’t get worked up about it because they don’t view it the way lawyers do.  There are still people out there who simply did not know they could hire a lawyer without having to pay money or who don’t know their problem might be something a lawyer could even help them with at all.
  • Some times the way those people learn this information is because they see some kind of lawyer advertisement in one place or another and, when they do, they don’t particularly think about whether or not it is something that you would think is “dignified.”
  • If you are motivated to want to impose stricter regulations on lawyer advertisements because of a concern that there is not enough public respect for our profession and advertisements that you think should be “beneath” lawyers fosters such disrespect, then I have a suggestion of how you could better direct your energies.
  • Imagine how much more could be done to foster better respect for our profession and what we do if we all focused our energies on encouraging communication of what it is that lawyers do, the role we play in society, and what we bring to the table that can help people in times of need for legal services, including helping educate them that their problem is one that could be helped by the work of a lawyer?

This Florida lawyer should not have “Went for It”

I had it in mind that I might write a little something about the Pennsylvania lawsuit against the Morgan & Morgan firm over lawyer advertising issues, but Karen Rubin and the fine folks at The Law for Lawyers Today beat me to that punch with a nice piece at their site that you can read at this link.

So, instead, but still staying on the general theme of lawyer advertising issues, I’m going to focus just a bit on a story coming out of what is often thought of as “ground-zero” in the U.S. when it comes to the battle over lawyer advertising issues — Florida.  It is a tale of a lawyer who is being suspended for one year over conduct involving solicitation of a client.  (Should you want to, you can read the full per curiam opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Bar v. Dopazo here.)

The opinion mostly focuses on the question of what was the right amount of punishment, deciding to increase the suspension from the 60 days that was recommended to a full one-year suspension.  That isn’t my interest for today.  My interest for today is to use this case as a reminder of a few things in the context of larger issues that are going on in the world of lawyer advertising (and, in particular, the APRL effort to persuade the ABA to revise the Model Rules to streamline the restrictions on both general advertising and solicitation).

Those who study questions of legal ethics or attorney advertising or both will remember that the only U.S. Supreme Court case to uphold a restriction on attorney advertising efforts as constitutional is Florida Bar v. Went For It.  The restriction upheld there was the 30-day off limits concept for soliciting representation by mail from folks affected by disaster or traumatic personal injury in any fashion.

Dopazo’s conduct not only ran afoul of prohibitions on in-person solicitation but was well within that kind of 30-day off-limits period and would have been prohibited in any form or fashion.

In March 2007, days after her son suffered traumatic brain injury as the result of a motor vehicle injury, Penny Jones was approached at Jackson Memorial Hospital Ryder Trauma Center  by Dopazo, who successfully solicited her to become a client of his for a fee.  There was no prior relationship between Jones and Dopazo, nor were his legal services sought by her or anyone acting on her behalf.

No one who is out there actively advocating for revisions to the ethics rules addressing lawyer advertising and solicitation is pushing a rule revision that would permit this kind of in-person solicitation in a hospital even if a jurisdiction did not also have some version of a 30-day off-limits period.  Even those of us who question the fairness of 30-day off limits provisions because they only prohibit communications from one side of things -_ the side seeking to provide representation — are in favor of restrictions on in-person solicitation by lawyers of strangers.

Those of us who are actively advocating for changes though are very much in favor of trying to not have these sort of situations — which can be adequately addressed by simple prohibitions — drive the discourse to try to justify more expansive restrictions on commercial speech.  Among the many reasons for that are the kinds of unnecessary and unneeded restrictions that can come to pass because of expansions of such concepts.

Using my own state as an example, over time our rule imposing a version of the 30-day off limits provision has now been expanded to prevent lawyers from sending letters to strangers offering to provide representation in a divorce matter within 30 days of the filing of a divorce.  I’ve written in the past about the problems I have with that concept (if you click through that link which gives you an electronic/pdf-ish version of The Memphis Lawyer magazine from 2015, you’ll need to go to pages 14-15 to read the column).

So, unquestionably, this Florida lawyer’s situation is one that the ethics rules ought to prohibit.  But the fact that such conduct was engaged in does not provide a basis for saying that the rules aren’t in need of reform.

(N.B. You might be asking yourself why in the world a lawyer is being disciplined in 2017 for misconduct that happened in 2007.  The opinion elaborates that it was not the target of the solicitation who complained about Dopazo but rather that the Florida Bar only learned of the incident in 2011 as a result of the findings of an FBI investigation of this lawyer over alleged payments to non-lawyers for a client recruitment scheme involving medical clinics.  Interestingly, the delay in the prosecution of the case from 2011 to 2015 was, in fact, taken into account as a mitigating factor when concluding that the appropriate discipline was a one-year suspension.)