Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and Seeing If I Can Put a Dent In Figuring Out What Is Next for Law.

When you allow yourself to ponder just how quickly technological advances have changed the daily life of a lawyer, it becomes pretty easy to speculate about just how foreign the daily life of a lawyer 10 years from now will be when compared to what it is today.  When I stop to think about the fact that some of the biggest law firms in not just the United States, but the world, are directly involved in various efforts that will help reshape the landscape, it makes me wonder whether that actually makes it more likely, or less likely, to happen quicker than it might otherwise.  I’m almost positive I don’t know the answer to that question at all, but I think it is worth asking and whatever the actual answer turns out to be should be interesting.

I’ve written about Dentons in the past but, at the time, focused only on their at-least-arguably-controversial-stance on conflicts of interest flowing (or not) from their organization as a Swiss verein.  Despite its massive size as the globe’s largest law firm (or perhaps because of it), Dentons seems to be pretty heavily invested in a number of innovative efforts that have the potential to impact what the practice of law looks like in a few years.

There was an event in Nashville last month — a symposium at Vanderbilt Law School called Watson Esq. – Will Your Next Lawyer Be A Machine? focused on the current and potential role of artificial intelligence in the practice of law.  I’ve also mentioned at least once before that I happen to be serving on a special committee of the Tennessee Bar Association focusing on the Evolving Legal Market.  Several members of the special committee were able to attend, I was not among them.  One of the topics that was discussed at length was Ross – Aaron Arruda with Ross Intelligence was a speaker, a particular artificial intelligence research product, that itself uses aspects of IBM’s Watson technology to try to be, for lack of a more sophisticated description, a robot attorney..  A subsidiary of Dentons, NextLaw Labs, has been reported as having been very involved in assisting with the training and development of Ross.

This week it was announced that an entirely different law firm, Baker Hostetler (an extremely large law firm compared to many but not when compared to Dentons — the Ross Intelligence press release includes the information that Baker Hostetler has 940 attorneys in 14 offices) announced that it had agreed to license the Ross AI product from Ross Intelligence for use in connection with segments of its bankruptcy practice.  As the ABA Journal online piece explains, Ross really does sound like a scrappy young associate – one that is not at all concerned about work-life balance by the way:

Ross responds to lawyers’ questions in natural language by reading through the law, gathering evidence and drawing inferences.  The program learns from the lawyers who use it to refine its search results.  It also monitors the law and notifies users of new, relevant court decisions.

The other interesting piece of news involving (much more directly) the world’s largest law firm was its announcement that another of Dentons’ subsidiaries is jumping into the realm of lawyer referral services/referral networks.  This story offers some explanation for what is intended.   At some level, the NextLaw Global Referral Network could really be nothing more than just a variation on the affiliated law firm network concepts like Meritas or State Capital or ALFA —  arrangements which have tried, with varying degrees of success, to leverage mutual interests of firms to encourage reciprocal referrals of work.  The new Dentons-backed network attempts to distinguish its arrangement from other arrangements as being both free to join and not limited to one firm in a particular market.

The hook beyond just the sheer size of Dentons (it touts itself as having more than 7400 lawyers in more than 125 offices in 50+ countries and that Dentons already has 1000 firms it has referred matters to and 500 firms that have referred matters to it), although not elaborated upon in incredible detail in the ABA Journal story, seems to be the notion that something about its network will use “new technology that promotes reciprocal repeat referrals.”

I have no idea how that would actually work — or what that technology would have to encompass — the Dentons’ press release describes it as being a combination of transparency and an “algorithm,” but realistically it sounds like it would be the transparency and accompanying pressure — what the FAQs acknowledge as a “tracking system” — against “free riding,” that would do the trick.

Given the existence of rules like Tennessee’s RPC 7.2(c)  prohibiting the giving of anything of value to someone in exchange for recommending or publicizing a lawyer’s services, actual outright agreements to engage in reciprocal referrals are viewed as prohibited conduct because the quid acts as something of value for the quo and vice versa.

Time will tell whether Dentons will, as the headline of its press release touts, actually “disrupt any pay to play legal referral industry.”  The NextLaw network will have its own separate CEO and a dive into the Terms of Use of the network indicates that NextLaw Global Referral Network is itself organized as an LLC.  (Presumably NextLaw Global Referral Network LLC is, like NextLaw Labs, a subsidiary of Dentons.)

From the press release, it also appears clear that while Dentons and firms like Baker Hostetler may find themselves licensing the same AI software from Ross Intelligence some day, Dentons is much less interested in firms of that size and scope being a part of this global referral network.  The firms its looking for are:

primarily … small to mid-sized law firms, and firms of any size that are in one location, country or region, or that specialize in one practice area or industry sector.

A question I’d love to figure out the answer to is whether NextLaw Labs assistance in training and developing Ross also played a role in the development of whatever algorithm NextLaw Global Referral Network plans to use to encourage and increase repeated reciprocal referrals?

And, finally, although it is a round-about way to get there, the other topic a conversation like this brings me back around to is — when you are talking about giant law firms that already have subsidiaries that are pushing the notions of law-related services arrangements under RPC 5.7 to its very boundaries, how much actual difference would allowing outside investment in law firms really have on where the legal marketplace is headed?

The Wisdom of Ferris Bueller. The reality of Machiavelli.

Life moves pretty fast.  If you don’t stop and look around once in a while, you could miss it. – Ferris Bueller

Back in December 2015, during my Ethics Roadshow I talked a little bit about one of the items that had been rolled out for public comment by the ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, model regulatory objectives that might be used by jurisdictions to examine both how they regulate lawyers and how they might go about regulating others who provide legal services.  The discussion I had about this topic with audiences was way too disjointed at the time. (It is a topic that itself could have had an hour’s worth of dedicated discussion, but it was just one of many topics covered during the three hours of my presentation repeated across several cities in Tennessee.)  Earlier this week, a version of those regulatory objectives was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates after heated arguments and over significant opposition.  The ABA is now hawking Resolution 105 as a way to move the needle forward in an effort to ensure that those who provide legal services to consumers but are not lawyers are appropriately regulated.  Time will tell whether that effort will gain traction.

It was slightly less than a month ago that the news started to roll out about the planned launch of Avvo Legal Services and I wrote about it here. At the time, it was being tested in five cities.  Presumably, such testing was positive (or the outcome of the testing never really mattered) because now the news comes along that Avvo Legal Services has officially launched in 18 states.  Which states?  Well you can go read the article at the link, or you can see the list at the end of this post.

I’ve always liked the Ferris Bueller and life does move pretty fast, but another quote somehow seems more appropriate in this moment, though it comes from someone much less lovable:

[F]or there is such a gap between how one lives and how one ought to live that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation. – Niccolo Machiavelli

Oh yeah, which states has Avvo Legal Services launched in and is looking to have lawyers participate:

  • Arizona (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may: 1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service, which may include, in addition to any membership fee, a fee calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service or organization has referred a matter, provided that any such percentage fee shall not exceed ten percent, and shall be used only to help defray the reasonable operating expenses of the service or organization and to fund public service activities, including the delivery of pro bono legal services. The fees paid by a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges that the client would have paid had no such service been involved. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority….”)
  • California (Rule 1-600 (A) “A member shall not participate in a nongovernmental program, activity, or organization furnishing, recommending, or paying for legal services, which . . . allows any third person or organization to receive directly or indirectly any part of the consideration paid to the member except as permitted by these rules, or otherwise violates the State Bar Act or these rules.”)
  • Colorado (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a layer may (1) pay the reasonable costs of communications permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal service organization….”)
  •  Florida (Rule 4-7.17(b) “A lawyer may not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising permitted by these rules, may pay the usual charges of a lawyer referral service, lawyer directory or other legal service organization….”)
  • Georgia (RPC 5.4(a)(5) “A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that: . . . a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.”)
  • Illinois (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may (1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit lawyer referral service….”)
  • Massachusetts (RPC 7.2(c) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may: (1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal service organization….”)
  • Maryland (RPC 7.2(c) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may (1) pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit lawyer referral service….”)
  • Michigan (RPC 7.2(c) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may: Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct Last Updated 2/4/2015 (i) pay the reasonable cost of advertising or communication permitted by this rule; (ii) participate in, and pay the usual charges of, a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization that satisfies the requirements of Rule 6.3(b)….”)
  • North Carolina (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may (1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service that complies with Rule 7.2(d), or a prepaid or group legal services plan that complies with Rule 7.3(d)….”
  • New Jersey (RPC 7.2(c) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that: (1) a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule; … (3) a lawyer may pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.”)
  • New York (RPC 7.2(a) “A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or obtain employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in employment by a client, except that: . . . (2) a lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a qualified legal assistance organization or referral fees to another lawyer as permitted by Rule 1.5(g).”)
  • Ohio (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may pay any of the following: (1) the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this rule; (2) the usual charges of a legal service plan; (3) the usual charges for a nonprofit or lawyer referral service that complies with Rule XVI of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio ….”)
  • Pennsylvania (RPC 7.2(c) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may pay: … (2)  the usual charges of a lawyer referral service or other legal service organization….”) (RPC 7.7(b) “A ‘’lawyer referral service’’ is any person, group of persons, association, organization or entity that receives a fee or charge for referring or causing the direct or indirect referral of a potential client to a lawyer drawn from a specific group or panel of lawyers.”)
  • Texas (Rule 7.03(b) “A lawyer shall not pay, give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not licensed to practice law for soliciting prospective clients for, or referring clients or prospective clients to, any lawyer or firm, except that a lawyer may pay reasonable fees for advertising and public relations services rendered in accordance with this Rule and may pay the usual charges of a lawyer referral service that meets the requirements of Occupational Code Title 5, Subtitle B, Chapter 952.”)
  • Virginia (7.3(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may:(1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule and Rule 7.1; (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit qualified lawyer referral service ….”)
  • Washington (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may (1) pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit lawyer referral service….”)
  • Wisconsin (RPC 7.2(b) “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may: (1) pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications permitted by this rule; (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority….”)

Avvo Legal Services won’t work in Tennessee without RPC 7.6 compliance, but should it be so?

The evolution of Avvo from its origins as a lawyer-rating service to something with a much, much more extensive impact in the legal marketplace continued this week with the news of the launch of Avvo Legal Services.  Robert Ambrogi was, as often is the case, the first to break the news online about the development, briefly describing the nature of the service and helpfully linking to the FAQ Avvo offers attorneys about it.

The nutshell version of what exactly this is can be found in the Attorney FAQ under “What are Avvo Legal Services?

Avvo Legal Services are fixed-fee, limited scope legal services determined by Avvo and fulfilled by local attorneys.  Avvo defines the services and prices.  Attorneys choose which services they would like to offer in their geographical area.  Local clients purchase legal services, choose the attorney they want to work with, and pay the full price of the service up front.  The chosen attorney then completes the service for the client and is paid the full legal fee.  As a separate transaction, the chosen attorney pays a per-service marketing fee for the completed, paid service.

Now a writer at the Solo Practice University blog has already teed up a thoughtful piece asking some questions about fee-splitting concerns, which do seem significant when, despite the separate transactions involved there is no question that the “marketing fee” rises as the attorney fees charged rises, and whether it would be highly inadvisable for lawyers to run these transactions through their trust accounts.  I will, for the most, part omit further discussion of those two issues for now.

However, Avvo can say what it wants in its FAQ about why this service is not a lawyer referral service (just as it can attempt to analogize its marketing fee to a credit card processing fee if it thinks that might fly), but I don’t think there is any doubt that, under current ethics rules in a number of states, lawyers who participate with Avvo Legal Services will be taking on significant risk.

Should a lawyer in Tennessee, for example, want to participate in this arrangement (assuming a future roll out here), the likely outcome of any scrutiny would be that the lawyer would violate RPC 7.2(c) unless and until Avvo Legal Services can manage to obtain approval as a registered intermediary organization under our RPC 7.6.

This becomes clear when you look at each of those two Tennessee rules.

Our RPC 7.2(c) generally prohibits a lawyer from “giv[ing] anything of value to a person for recommending or publicizing the lawyer’s services” but provides 4 specific exceptions.  Two of those exceptions are unquestionably unavailable with respect to Avvo Legal Services (publicity in exchange for charitable sponsorships/contributions or purchase of a law practice).  One of the exceptions involves the usual charges of a registered intermediary organization permitted by RPC 7.6.  The other allows payment for “the reasonable costs of advertisements permitted by [RPC 7.2].”

Now, perhaps a lawyer handling cases through Avvo Legal Services could muster an argument that the “marketing fee” being paid is just the reasonable cost of an advertisement.  But nothing about the way Avvo Legal Services describes the program lends itself to such a view as everything about the explanatory materials point to the idea that the lawyer is paying for a result — a paying client — and not just an advertisement.  It’s also paying more for a more lucrative client engagement.  From paying $40 to earn $149 in attorney fees, up to paying $400 to earn $2,995 in attorney fees.

Nevertheless, paying the “marketing fee” could be justifiable under RPC 7.2(c) if it is the “usual charge” of a registered intermediary organization.

Given how broadly Tennessee RPC 7.6(a) defines the term “intermediary organization,” it seems difficult to figure a way that the Avvo Legal Services program would not meet the definition:

An intermediary organization is a lawyer-advertising cooperative, lawyer referral service, prepaid legal insurance provider, or a similar organization the business or activities of which include the referral of its customers, members, or beneficiaries to lawyers for the provision of legal services to the organization’s customers, members, or beneficiaries in matters for which the organization does not bear ultimate responsibility.

Whether or not Avvo Legal Services becomes properly registered will matter to Tennessee lawyers not only because then they could ethically pay a “usual charge,” but also because a Tennessee lawyer would be ethically prohibited by RPC 7.6(b) from “seek[ing] or accept[ing] a referral of a client, or compensation for representing a client, from” Avvo Legal Services unless several specific things were true.  For today’s purposes, the most significant would be that Avvo Legal Services would have to have “registered with the Board of Professional Responsibility and complied with all requirements imposed [on it] by the Board.”  RPC 7.6(b)(iv).

Tennessee lawyers can check, at any time, the list of entities that are properly registered with the Board in this respect at this link.  You’ll see that Avvo Legal Services is not on that list; of course, their current roll out explains that they are only launching in a few cities to start.  Presumably, Avvo Legal Services might pursue registration under our RPC 7.6/Supreme Court Rule 44 before opening the program up to lawyers in any Tennessee cities.

But should it have to?  What really is the rationale that would be used to justify why this sort of service should be off-limits to lawyers?

In jurisdictions that do not have Tennessee’s approach under RPC 7.2(c) and  RPC 7.6, this service may be more viable, albeit still burdened by a few thorny issues regarding arguments that this is fee sharing or what role Avvo Legal Services has (an agent/fiduciary for the client or an agent for the attorney or what exactly?) while it holds money paid by the client for the rendering of legal services.

Unlike Tennessee’s RPC 7.2(c), the ABA Model Rule does not include the words “or publicizing” and only imposes restrictions on the ability to pay someone for “recommending the lawyer’s services.”  Further, language in the Comment  to ABA Model Rule 7.2 further distinguishes between “recommendations” and “channeling” of work to the lawyer, as [5] indicates that while payments for recommendations are off limits altogether but that paying others for “channeling work” is only a problem if the channeling is “in a manner that violates RPC 7.3.”  Further, that same Comment elaborates that

a lawyer may pay others for generating client leads, such as Internet-based client leads, as long as the lead generator does not recommend the lawyer, any payment to the lead generator is consistent with Rule 1.5(e) (division of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer), and the lead generator’s communications are consistent with Rule 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer’s services).

Yet, even with that seeming additional flexibility in jurisdictions that track the ABA Model Rules approach, issues would remain that will depend significantly on how the program actually works — particularly the consumer side of the interactions.  The very next sentence of that Comment exhorts that a lawyer “must not pay a lead generator that states, implies, or creates a reasonable impression that it is recommending the lawyer, is making the referral without payment from the lawyer, or has analyzed a person’s legal problems when determining which lawyer should receive the referral.”

A review of what appears to be the consumer-side FAQ for Avvo Legal Services does not contain any explicit disclosure of the fact that the attorney providing the service will be paying Avvo Legal Services for getting to work for the client.  In addition to what it doesn’t say, it has some language that could be construed as at least “implying” a recommendation of the particular lawyer doing the work:

You will work with the lawyer you selected during checkout. For phone call advice sessions, you can also choose to speak to the next available lawyer. In that case, Avvo will connect you with a highly reviewed attorney who is experienced in your topic area and licensed to practice in your state.

But, again, a question worth asking is:  should this be something the ethics rules work to prohibit?  Avvo Legal Services certainly seems to think that this endeavor can be sufficiently profitable, which strongly implies that there are a large number of consumers of legal services who would be willing to make use of such an arrangement and, ultimately, a significant number of lawyers who would be willing to provide services to such consumers in this manner and on these financial terms.  So, the larger question ought to be — if the rules governing our profession will not abide this kind of arrangement, then what is the rationale for nixing it?

Just who exactly are we seeking to protect, and why?

I give you sprinkles today in hopes you will help me make it rain tomorrow?

About three months ago, I wrote about a New York ethics opinion that blessed a marketing effort that I stressed would likely be unethical in Tennessee.  That situation involved a lawyer giving client’s a rebate if they agreed to post a review of the lawyer’s work at an online site.

In a fairly decent sign about how competitive the market for legal services continues to be these days (and how risk averse lawyers can be when it comes to pursuing marketing concepts that other businesses don’t think twice about), South Carolina has issued a more recent opinion weighing in on the appropriateness of another marketing gimmick.  Karen Rubin over at her law firm’s blog offers a good treatment of the South Carolina opinion blessing the proposed “Donut Fridays,” (which also included koozies, marketing materials, a fee rate sheet, and a $50 off coupon for consultations) an effort to curry favor with those in a position to refer work to the law firm, that you can go read here.  The right conclusion was reached both that this was not an improper, in-person solicitation in violation of RPC 7.3 and that, as long as the law firm gives the donuts without regard to their effectiveness in generating referrals (i.e. irrespective of whether this approach produces a good return on investment), then there is no violation of RPC 7.2.

In the end, I certainly don’t disagree with the conclusion reached by the South Carolina opinion and think, unlike the New York rebate-for-a-good-Avvo-review scheme, the same conclusion would be reached in Tennessee.  There would be no inherent violation of Tennessee’s RPC 7.2(c) for a similar “Donut Friday” or, for you fans of The Lego Movie, a “Taco Tuesday.”

I do want to say though that it is really pretty remarkable that any ink had to be spilled on an opinion to address this situation at all.  There is a lot of cognitive dissonance out there among lawyers when it comes to ethics and business development efforts.  For example, the same kinds of lawyers who might think “Donut Fridays” requires close scrutiny likely would not give a second thought to sending a bottle of wine or other thank you gift to another lawyer who referred them a revenue-generating case.  The thank you gift which, fairly obviously, only gets sent because of the prior referral is arguably much more difficult to justify in any jurisdiction with the kind of rule S.C. and Tennessee have.  (And, please understand, I am not saying those are unethical.  I’m just saying … it’s a lot harder to explain than Donut Fridays.)

Beyond that, the only other point I’d like to make — and would have like to see given further treatment in the S.C. opinion — is that the aspect of the arrangement can actually be thorny is the coupon.  With respect to the South Carolina law firm making the inquiry, the inclusion of a fee rate sheet in the box with the donuts and the coupon was very helpful because it provides something tangible that would show that the coupon is in no way deceptive or misleading in terms of being ephemeral in value.  In the absence of the rate sheet though, the issue can be much more complex as can be seen in the wave of ethics opinions that were issued examining whether lawyers could participate in “Deal of the Day” website-style promotional campaigns, including this one issued by the ABA back in 2013.

 

 

NY lawyers can give clients a rebate for an Avvo rating, but Tennessee lawyers shouldn’t get excited.

For an ethics nerd who also gets to focus on something they enjoy thinking about as part of their practice, I find the proliferation of lawyer rating services to be fascinating, less for the actual availability of ratings, but more for the ancillary questions they lead people to ask.

One that I’ve seen discussed recently is what tools lawyers have at their disposal to try to encourage clients to do things for them that could help their ratings.  Thanks to the ABA BNA Lawyers’ Manual publication, I learned today of a New York State Bar Association ethics opinion published this spring that, to my surprise, concluded that a New York lawyer could offer to give clients a $50 credit on their bill if they rated the lawyer on Avvo, a website that  (among other things) lets clients rate lawyers in several categories and also permits the client to indicate they would recommend the lawyer to others.

The NYSBA opinion turns pretty strongly upon the possibility that the clients could rate the lawyer poorly and, for example, even indicate that s/he would not recommend the lawyer to others, and still receive the $50 credit.  I won’t spend much time speculating on how practical it would be for that to ever happen, especially if the lawyer picks and choose to whom to offer the credit deal in the first place.

But, much more importantly from my perspective, the outcome turns on the details of the language of New York’s RPC 7.2(a).  New York’s version of that rule reads:  “A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or obtain employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in employment by a client.”  If that is your guideline, then the NYSBA opinion’s conclusion is certainly plausible.

Tennessee’s pertinent rule,  RPC 7.2(c), has significantly different language and leaves me with little doubt that the offering of such an incentive to a client would be deemed to run afoul of our rules.  Our RPC 7.2(c) reads: “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending or publicizing the lawyer’s services” and then offers three exceptions that would not be relevant to something like this rebate offer.

There would seem to be no way around the notion that each client who goes ahead and rates the lawyer is publicizing the lawyer’s services.  Thus, on this topic (as with many things) what works in New York would not fly in Tennessee.

Social media and advertising issues

Another bar association has recently issued an ethics opinion  over whether/how lawyers can make use of particular types of social media, whether such use constitutes advertising, and related issues.  The particular ethics opinion in question was issued March 10, 2015 by the New York County Lawyers Association and deals with LinkedIn.

Many of the questions addressed in the opinion are not as relevant in Tennessee as they might be to lawyers in other jurisdictions.  This is because, thankfully, our state has a less burdensome regulatory regime when it comes to advertising overall (and one that gives a bit more respect to the intellect of consumers of legal services) than many other jurisdictions.  A key aspect of the NYCLA opinion focuses on what responsibility a lawyer may have for third-party endorsements on LinkedIn.  The opinion gives what I consider to be largely sound advice for Tennessee lawyers to try to follow on that question.  (This is not the first New York opinion focused on LinkedIn; a 2013 opinion of the New York State Bar Association that dealt with a heading no longer available on the platform – “Specialties” – actually likely had some impact on LinkedIn changing its nomenclature to avoid using the “specialty” buzzword.)

I get asked variations of this “skills/endorsements” question about LinkedIn profiles at an increasing number of seminars and have consistently tried to offer a response that focuses on application of RPC 7.1 – don’t say things about yourself or your services that are false or misleading.  RPC 7.1’s prohibition on “mak[ing] a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services” applies to all statements made by a lawyer about themselves or their services not just advertising.  It is also implicated by false billing to clients — saying you spent 2 hours doing something you only spent 1 hour doing is a false statement about your services.

Thus, as long as LinkedIn allows a lawyer to control the decision to accept particular endorsements of skills and have them added to a profile or to ignore them/reject them, I think the best way to draw the line is to decline endorsements of skills in areas of practice that you don’t really do or know a good bit about.

For example, if someone endorses me in the area of tax law, I don’t ratify their gesture by adding it to my profile.  I do not try to draw lines, however, in areas where I do practice by trying to second-guess people who I may not quite understand how they feel comfortable endorsing me in an area (as long as I do happen to think I know a thing or to about that area of practice).  The New York opinion, for the most part, echoes that type of guidance and does a good job of making clear that lawyers should have a reasonable time to deal with a third-party attribution that shows up on their profile and remedy it – recognizing that it would be unreasonable to expect lawyers to scrub their profiles on say a daily basis.

By the way, if you haven’t done so within your LinkedIn profile, it helps to go see how your profile looks to your connections versus just members of the public versus how it appears just to you.  As to the public at large, for example, skills endorsements you accept will likely lead your profile to simply list the collection of skills without any indication that those were suggested by other folks.  The second sentence of RPC 7.1 explains that “[a] communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.”  So, if I accepted an endorsement from someone for a skill I don’t really have, then my public profile looks like I’m saying I’m  skilled in tax law, not that I’m saying “according to John Doe who is pictured in this little thumbnail to the right, I’m skilled in tax law.”  This could present a RPC 7.1 problem.

The rest of the NYCLA opinion – its concerns with whether a LinkedIn profile is “attorney advertising” or not —  is not nearly as pertinent for Tennessee lawyers because our rules no longer require lawyers to file advertisements with the BPR (as was the case until 2011) and, instead, RPC 7.2 only imposes a retention requirement on lawyers.  Likewise, since people have to go seek out your profile information – or agree at least to “connect” with you on the platform – there is limited risk that your LinkedIn profile information would be treated as a targeted solicitation of a potential client requiring compliance with RPC 7.3.