New Jersey takes a step in the right direction on advertising

With a strong tip of the metaphorical hat I never wear to Kim Ringler (a former President of APRL) who alerted many ethics lawyers to the news, I write today about a new ethics opinion from the New Jersey Committee on Attorney Advertising.

In Opinion 45, issued less than a week ago, New Jersey has softened their harsh position on whether a lawyer can hold themselves out as having “expertise” or being a “specialist” or “specializing” in an area of the law.  New Jersey’s new opinion is candid about how developments in other states involving First Amendment challenges to advertising restrictions have resulted in its new stance.  It is also fairly decent in terms of the commonsense nature of the analysis it provides.

The opinion explains that it has been prompted by a grievance filed about a law firm’s website in which the statement is made that the lawyers have “expertise” in tax law.  (I’m willing to bet the shiniest of quarters that the grievance was filed by a lawyer and not a consumer.)  The opinion provides a bit of insight into the firm and its main lawyer:

The firm concentrates its practice in tax law.  The firm’s principal lawyer has an L.L.M. in tax, is the author of numerous publications on tax law, lectures on tax law, served as an attorney for the Internal Revenue Service, and has been practicing tax law for more than 30 years.

The opinion explains that New Jersey had previously imposed severe restrictions on the use of such terms unless a lawyer had been certified by the New Jersey Supreme Court or by an ABA-approved organization.  (My own state has a somewhat similar black-letter rule in RPC 7.4 [though it does not seek to regulate the term “expert” or “expertise” and it only relies upon ABA-accredited groups.)

But, going forward… well … I’ll just let New Jersey speak for itself:

After revisiting the issue in light of recent out-of-state First Amendment decisions in attorney advertising, the Committee has now determined that lawyers may use the terms “expertise,” “specialize,” and “specialist” in advertising provided the terms are accurate and the lawyers can demonstrate the necessary education, training, and experience to substantiate the claim.

So, kudos where kudos are due, but the reason I say “a step” in the right direction rather than any sort of “leap” is that New Jersey couldn’t quite bring itself to commit fully to the common-sense outcome on this topic because it still is clinging to its prohibition on the use of the word “expert.”  It does so by ending its opinion with the following sentence:

Only lawyers who are certified by the Supreme Court or an organization approved by the American Bar Association may call themselves “experts.”


A very good start.

My last post was filled with criticisms related to the roll out of a new ABA Ethics Opinion.  Today I’m offering a different tone and message for the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility – a positive message offering kudos for the working draft that has now been circulated to revise the ABA Model Rules on advertising issues.

I’ve written a number of times in this space in the past about the push by APRL on this front and, although the working draft that has now been put out by ABA SCEPR does not entirely match APRL’s proposal, it adopts a significant amount of what that proposal sought to accomplish.

The working draft deletes Model Rules 7.5 and consolidates much of the regulation involved in that rules into Comments added to Model Rule 7.1.

It trims a little bit of fat from the Comment to Model Rule 7.2 and explicitly acknowledges the ability of lawyers to offer things akin to a “token of appreciation” to people who provide them with referrals and the like without violating the ethics rules.

It also removes a number of restrictions on solicitation by narrowing what is prohibited to interactions that can be described with the term “live person to person contact,” adding a new class of purchasers of legal services who can even be asked for their business live and in person, and leaving the overarching prohibitions against coercion, duress, or harassment as the line that cannot be crossed in any effort to develop business.

What constitutes “live person to person contact,” would be defined in the first two sentences of Comment [2] to the rule:

“Live person to person contact” means in person, face to face, telephone and real-time person to person communications such as Skype or Facetime, and other visual/auditory communications where the prospective client may feel obligated to speak with the lawyer.  Such person to person contact does not include chat rooms, text messages, or other written communications that recipients may easily disregard.

The new category of purchasers of legal services who would be fair game for even live person to person contact would be people “known by the lawyer to be an experienced user of the type of legal services involved for business matters.”

Model Rule 7.4 would be honed down to two provisions — one that permits lawyers to truthfully tell people what fields of law they practice in and one that prohibits lawyers from claiming to be certified as a specialist in any area of law unless the lawyer actually is so certified by an appropriate entity and the name of the entity is clear in the communication.

The APRL proposal would be an even more streamlined regulatory approach than what is being offered in the ABA SCEPR working draft in large part because the APRL proposal also would have deleted Model Rule 7.2 and 7.4 altogether and retained bits from the Comment to each of those rules that were worth retaining by relocating them to Rule 7.1.

Nevertheless, decrying this progress from the ABA SCEPR would be an exercise in letting the perfect become the enemy of the good.  And, at least one time in 2017, I am going to refrain from doing that.

Virginia’s revised lawyer advertising rules – big win for APRL’s effort to streamline the advertising rules

[In the interest of full disclosure for those who might be new here, I am presently a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL).]

For those who aren’t new here, you know full well my personal opinion on lawyer advertising and what the ethics rules should and should not try to do in terms of regulation.

Unsurprisingly then, I was pleased to learn of Virginia’s decision to adopt new lawyer advertising rules effective July 1, 2017 and to learn that they largely do the kinds of things that APRL has been advocating should be the approach to these issues through proposed revisions to the ABA Model Rules.

You can go read the order entered by the Supreme Court of Virginia earlier this week that lays out the full text of what will now be its only rules in the 7.1 through 7.5 series, Rules 7.1 and 7.3 and accompanying Comments that will become effective July 1, 2017, but here are a few highlights:

  • Rule 7.1 will read in its entirety: “A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.  A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.”
  • Rule 7.2 has been deleted and instead any issues that it used to address are now addressed, if at all, in paragraphs of the Comment to Rule 7.1.
  • One such Comment to Rule 7.1, [2], explicitly acknowledges that the right kind of disclaimer can cure something that might otherwise be argued to be “a statement that is likely to create unjustified expectations or otherwise mislead the public.”
  • Another such Comment to Rule 7.1,, [4], explicitly acknowledges that someone could be a “specialist in a particular field of law by experience,” and that such a person can communicate that specialty as long it is not done in a way that is “false or misleading.”
  • Rule 7.3 addresses all aspects of targeted solicitations and also addresses the prohibitions on providing payment or things of value to someone for a recommendation or referral.
  • As to solicitation, Rule 7.3 makes clear that it applies only to communications that are “initiated” on the lawyer’s end.  And, appears to not attempt to prohibit in-person or real-time solicitation of clients.
  • Instead, it limits its outright prohibition on solicitation to situations where the solicitation is directed to someone who has made known to the lawyer they don’t want to be solicited or when the solicitation “involves harassment, undue influence, coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats or unwarranted promises of benefits.”
  • It does contain a provision requiring an “ADVERTISING MATERIAL” disclaimer on “written, recorded or electronic solicitation[s]” but not if they are addressed to the universe of folks ABA Model Rule 7.3 has traditionally excluded from the in-person/real-time ban (other lawyers, family members, prior professional relationships, etc.)
  • Rules 7.4 and 7.5 are deleted altogether.

Kudos to the Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court of Virginia.  One state down, 49 more (plus D.C.) to go.

Coming to praise rather than to bury (Part 2 of 2)

Yesterday, I offered a positive review of a recent ethics opinion from the New York City Bar.  Today, I want to talk through this Order on the Merits striking down Florida’s restriction in its ethics rules on the ability of lawyers to refer to themselves as a specialist in the absence of a board certification from Florida or an ABA approved third-party certification entity.  I said yesterday that praising a development on legal ethics out of Florida would be a change of pace, but that’s a bit misleading as I’m really praising a federal judge for reining in Florida bar regulators and that has been a more common event recently.

Before actually delving into the Florida ruling, I’d like to offer a little background that helps explain why I am so interested in this development.  For pretty much as long as I have been licensed to practice law (17+ years now), Tennessee’s ethics rules on lawyer advertising have included provisions that significantly limit a lawyer’s ability to say that s/he is a specialist or that s/he specializes in a particular area or field of the law.

The current version of our rule, RPC 7.4, articulates this restriction as follows:

(b) Except as permitted by paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall not state that the lawyer is a specialist, specializes, or is certified or recognized as a specialist in a particular field of law.

(c)  A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent Attorney” or a substantially similar designation.

(d) A lawyer who has been certified as a specialist in a field of law by an organization accredited by the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates, and who has registered such certification with the Tennessee Commission on Continuing Legal Education, may state that the lawyer “is certified as a specialist in [field of law] by [accredited organization.]”

Up until January 1, 2015, (d) of our rule read quite differently, referencing the need to have been certified as a specialist by the Tennessee Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization instead of directly pointing to the ABA.  As a result of a petition filed late in 2013 by the Commission the rule was changed because the Commission explained that it didn’t and wasn’t qualified to figure out how to certify anyone other than by simply relying upon whether the ABA had accredited a certifying organization and the “and Specialization” was dropped from the name of the Commission as part of it admitting that really wasn’t doing that part of its job.  I suspect there are likely still quite a few lawyers in Tennessee that are not aware of the change that resulted from this Tennessee Supreme Court order.

Florida’s Rule 7-14(a)(4) goes a bit farther than Tennessee’s as it imposes restrictions not only on claims of being a “specialist” but explicitly to claims of being an “expert” as well, treating such statements as “potentially misleading” and prohibited unless:

(A) the lawyer has been certified under the Florida Certification Plan… and the advertisement includes the area of certification and that The Florida Bar is the certifying organization;

(B) the lawyer has been certified by an organization whose specialty certification program has been accredited by the American Bar Association or The Florida Bar as provided elsewhere in these rules.  A lawyer certified by a specialty certification program accredited by the American Bar Association but not The Florida Bar must include the statement “Not Certified as a Specialist by The Florida Bar” in reference to the specialization or certification.  All such advertisements must include the area of certification and the name of the certifying organization; or

(C) the lawyer has been certified by another state bar of the state bar program grants certification on the basis of standards reasonably comparable to the standards of the Florida Certification Plan … and the advertisement includes the area of certification and the name of the certifying organization.

A Florida personal-injury law firm, Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley PA, and each of its five-named partners individually, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida challenging this restriction as unconstitutional.

On September 30, 2015, Judge Hinkle entered an order enjoining the Florida Bar from “enforcing Rule 7-14(a)(4), to prohibit the plaintiffs from making truthful statements on a website, blog, or social medium about their specialty or expertise.”  The opinion is succinct but very well done.  (NB: it also contains very good analysis of another challenged provision that should eventually fall but for which Searcy Denney’s claim was unripe – Florida’s rule banning statements in advertisements that are not “objectively verifiable.”)

The Court quickly states the crux of the problem with the rule’s application to the plaintiff law firm and its lawyers:

The application of this rule is clear: Searcy Denney cannot say it specializes or has expertise in mass-tort or unsafe product cases, or even in personal-injury cases, even though the firm undeniably has expertise in these areas.  Nor can any individual attorney claim to specialize or have expertise in mass-tort or unsafe-product cases, even if the attorney handles only cases of that kind, and even if the attorney has successfully handled many such cases.

The Court then works through an overview of U.S. Supreme Court and federal circuit decisions readily demonstrating that the three-pronged Central Hudson test applies to determine the constitutionality of any restrictions by a state on lawyer advertising.  Most importantly, for purposes of the issue before the Court, the second and third prongs of Central Hudson require that the restriction on speech must “directly advance[] the asserted government interest” and that the restriction on speech not be “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”  Judge  Hinkle then recognizes that generally there has to be some “tangible evidence” offered to show that “the commercial speech in question is misleading and harmful to consumers” and that, as to the “fit” required between the ends and the means, it is a relevant consideration for the Court whether there are multiple, obvious alternatives that would be less burdensome than the challenged regulation.

Judge Hinkle then makes light work of the Florida Bar’s arguments in support of its rule.  The argument that a consumer “will be misled into believing that an attorney who ‘specializes’ or has ‘expertise’ in an area is board certified” gets brushed aside based on the lack of any evidence to support the assertion and the fact that a disclaimer would be a much narrower way to address the issue (as would educating people about what board certification means).  The Florida Bar’s second argument is rightly recognized by the Court as being a straw man of the “we have to be able to have some standards” variety.

The Court stresses that the Florida Bar can still prohibit untrue or misleading claims.  Thus, if a lawyer or law firm claims to have expertise in an area they do not or to specialize in something they do not, then the Florida Bar could still pursue them for discipline under other ethics rules.  But, as should be clear just in reading that it is within a collection of provisions entitled “Potentially Misleading Advertisements,” that is not the limit of this rule at all and, instead, the Florida Bar’s rule prohibits truthful speech.  A point easily underscored by reminding that there are many narrow fields where no certification is offered and the fact that law firms (unlike lawyers) cannot be board certified in Florida at all.

And, what is most praiseworthy, is that near the end of the Order, Judge Hinkle cites to Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91,, 105 (1990), which should have been understood a quarter of a century ago by all states, including mine, that these kinds of restrictions on truthful speech cannot stand when supported, as they are, only on the basis of a “paternalistic assumption” that consumers of legal services “would automatically mistake a claim of specialization for a claim of formal recognition by the State.”