Late this Summer, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued an opinion, over a dissent, that imposed a public censure against a lawyer for what were, pretty clearly, a series of failures on the part of the lawyer’s staff in the handling of a client’s matter. What makes the case, Garland v. BPR, interesting, and worthy of that dissent, is not the level of discipline imposed but the choice of the particular rules the lawyer was charged with violating. The things that make it interesting and dissent-worthy are also the things that make it potentially disturbing as precedent for lawyers and lawyers (like me) who defend lawyers.
Even though the case was clearly one in which the staff to whom the lawyer delegated tasks and responsibilities failed to do their job correctly, the Board did not charge the lawyer with a violation of the rule that is tailor-made for that situation, RPC 5.3.
RPC 5.3 requires the following of a lawyer in Garland’s position:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the nonlawyer is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer, and knows of the nonlawyer’s conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Instead of trying to build a case against Garland for any failures under RPC 5.3, the Board charged him with violations of RPC 1.3 and RPC 1.4, contending that he personally failed to act diligently in the client’s matter and failed to properly communicate directly with the client. The Board also charged Garland with what is often an add-on violation, RPC 8.4(a), but appears to have done so with an unusual twist — justifying it on the argument that the lawyer committed violations of the rules “through the acts of another,” where the “another” was a member of his own staff.
Justice Kirby, in her dissent, made the point that the rule that should have been the focus of the case was not:
The facts in this case center on the failure of Mr. Garland’s staff to response to [client’s] inquiries, the staff’s failure to make Mr. Garland aware of things that needed his attention, or staff members’ general incompetence in tasks such as filing and mailing.
Despite the fact that, “Rule 5.3 was tailor-made for situations such as the one presented in this case,” Justice Kirby trumpeted that the Board did not pursue any charge against Garland for a violation of that rule but instead leveled RPC 1.3 and 1.4 charges and explained her reluctance to adjudicate the disciplinary matter when the Court had “no findings on what measures Mr. Garland should have had in place to supervise his staff,” “no findings on what efforts Mr. Garland should have made to reasonably ensure that his staff’s conduct was appropriate,” and “no findings on whether Mr. Garland ordered or ratified his staff’s infractions, or whether he learned of them at a time when the consequences to [the client] could have been avoided or mitigated.”
Justice Kirby not only dissented from the ruling but also scolded the Board for not pursuing the case under the correct disciplinary rule — “I fault the Board primarily for the posture of this case. It is important for ethical charges against lawyers to be properly framed, so that the rules adopted to govern certain situations are applied to the intended situations.”
Justice Kirby’s admonition to the Board is important for at least two reasons. First, as she herself writes:
There are countless lawyers in Tennessee with law practices similar to Mr. Garland’s high-volume practice, in which many daily tasks and interactions with clients are delegated to nonlawyer staff. Delegating such tasks to nonlawyer employees does not
violate ethical rules, but failing to properly supervise nonlawyer employees does. It is important for practicing lawyers to understand what this Court expects from them in terms of supervising nonlawyer staff to whom mundane but important tasks are delegated.
Hopefully, and perhaps even more vitally, Justice Kirby’s admonition to the Board needs to have an impact because of the significant problems that could be created for lawyers if the Board is allowed to use RPC 8.4(a) to impose discipline in situations where RPC 5.3 would not support that outcome. In other words, Justice Kirby’s words — “Delegating tasks to nonlawyer employees does not violate ethical rules” — need to continue to be the law in Tennessee. If the Board is permitted to charge lawyers with infractions of RPC 8.4(a) on the basis that the failing of a staff member is the lawyer violating the rules through the “acts of another,” then RPC 5.3 essentially becomes surplusage in the rules altogether.