Categories
. Legal ethics

Federal court releases crackin’ sanctions ruling

I will not seek pardon for the pun. I will also try not to prolong the nature of this post because the opinion that is the subject matter for today is a very good read, worthy of the limelight.

I have written on several occasions about the problematic efforts of two particular members of my profession who so thoroughly hitched their wagons to the idea that the former guy was somehow robbed of a second term in office that it would seem un-thorough of me not to make the time to write about the most significant ruling against them to date.

So, here it is.

Judge Parker, a Michigan federal district judge, has issued today a 110-page order sanctioning Lin Wood, Sidney Powell, and others for their filing, and continued pursuit, of a particular federal lawsuit that was part of the overall effort of lawyers on behalf of the former guy to gaslight the nation. You can read the full opinion here.

For you “bottom line” types, most of the lawyers most egregiously involved in this gaslighting litigation will have to pay the attorney fees of the defendants, will have to get 12 hours of additional CLE (6 of which will be focused on pleading standards and 6 of which will be focused on election law – good luck finding classes that focus on “pleading standards” that is the stuff of law school courses), and are being referred to various state bars for potential disciplinary proceedings.

Until such time as it is reviewed by the Sixth Circuit, which inevitably will happen, this opinion from the Michigan district court could serve as something of a “short-form treatise” on the concept of sanctions and the filing, and continued pursuit, of bogus litigation. In fact, if there were ever to be a Fourth Edition of the book I’ve been honored to co-author over the last decade, this case would likely be a real frontrunner for new content in Chapter 1, the chapter on the investigation necessary to pursue a case to begin with.

We could have a lot of fun pulling quotes from the opinion that demonstrate how irreparably round-the-bend these “Kraken” lawyers were and how they managed to step on rake-after-rake by continuing to say incredibly stupid things online while their case was being decided, but that’s not really all that interesting.

What strikes me as an interesting exercise though (and maybe it only strikes me that way) is if it were possible to boil down the most instructive pieces of wisdom in the 110-page opinion to give a short talk that might be educational to brand new lawyers about how to avoid filing a lawsuit that could get you sanctioned.

So, here goes nothing. (And so that this effort is perfectly clear, everything that follows this sentence shall be excerpts verbatim from the opinion combined into one excerpt – snips and reshuffles are omitted. Reproduction of this excerpt is something for which you could seek the express permission of Major League Baseball, but they will look at you funny when you do.)

[A]ttorneys have an obligation to the judiciary, their profession, and the public (i) to conduct some degree of due diligence before presenting allegations as truth; (ii) to advance only tenable claims; and (iii) to proceed with a lawsuit in good faith and based on a proper purpose. Attorneys also have an obligation to dismiss a lawsuit when it becomes clear that the requested relief is unavailable.

For purposes of Rule 11, an attorney who is knowingly listed as counsel on a
pleading, written motion, or other paper “expressly authorize[d] the signing, filing,
submitting or later advocating of the offending paper” and “shares responsibility
with the signer, filer, submitter, or advocate.” In this age of electronic filing, it is frivolous to argue that an electronic signature on a pleading or motion is insufficient to subject the attorney to the court’s jurisdiction if the attorney violates the jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct or a federal rule or statute establishing the standards of practice.

Even if there are sanctions available under statutes or specific federal rules of procedure, . . . the ‘inherent authority’ of the court is an independent basis for sanctioning bad faith conduct in litigation. To award attorneys’ fees under this “bad faith exception,” a district court must find that (i) “the claims advanced were meritless”; (ii) “counsel knew or should have known this”; and (iii) “the motive for filing the suit was for an improper purpose such as harassment.” When invoking its inherent authority to sanction, “[a] court must, of course, . . . comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.”

[L]itigants and attorneys cannot come to federal court asserting that certain acts violate the law based only upon an opportunity for—or counsel and the litigant’s suspicions of—a violation. The rule[s] continues to require litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions.

[A]n “empty-head” but “pure-heart” does not justify lodging patently unsupported factual assertions. And the good or bad faith nature of actions or submissions is not what determines whether sanctions are warranted under Rule 11(b)(3). Inferences must be reasonable and come from facts proven, not speculation or conjecture. Pursuant to their duties as officers of the court, attorneys typically do not offer factual allegations that have no hope of passing as evidentiary support at any stage of the litigation. Substituting another lawyer’s judgment for one’s own does not constitute reasonable inquiry.”

As an initial matter, an affiant’s subjective belief that an event occurred does not constitute evidence that the event in fact occurred. Plaintiffs are not entitled to rely on the discovery process to mine for evidence that never existed in the first instance. Attorneys are not journalists. It is not acceptable to support a lawsuit with opinions, which counsel herself claims no reasonable person would accept as fact and which were “inexact,” “exaggerate[ed],” and “hyperbole.” Nor is it acceptable to use the federal judiciary as a political forum to satisfy one’s political agenda. Such behavior by an attorney in a court of law has consequences.

An attorney’s right to free speech while litigating an action “is extremely circumscribed.” Something does not become plausible simply because it is repeated many times by many people. An attorney who willingly continues to assert claims doomed to fail . . . must be deemed to be acting with an improper motive.

The nation’s courts . . . are reserved for hearing legitimate causes of action. Individuals may have a right (within certain bounds) to disseminate allegations of fraud unsupported by law or fact in the public sphere. But attorneys cannot exploit their privilege and access to the judicial process to do the same. And when an attorney has done so, sanctions are in order. Here’s why. America’s civil litigation system affords individuals the privilege to file a lawsuit to allege a violation of law. Individuals, however, must litigate within the established parameters for filing a claim. Such parameters are set forth in statutes, rules of civil procedure, local court rules, and professional rules of responsibility and ethics. Every attorney who files a claim on behalf of a client is charged with the obligation to know these statutes and rules, as well as the law allegedly violated.